Books by Andrei Buckareff
This volume contains a set of state-of-the-art essays by younger philosophers on various topics i... more This volume contains a set of state-of-the-art essays by younger philosophers on various topics in the philosophy of action. Some of the essays are about the metaphysics of action and agency; some consider the nature of autonomy and free agency; some explore conceptual and normative issues, some draw on data from psychology and psychopathology. But what all of them have in common is that they address some problem related to our existence as human agents. The range of topics covered is this collection is broad. This is intentional. Rather than focus on one narrow topic in the philosophy of action, this volume brings together papers that, taken together, introduce readers to some key debates in contemporary philosophy of action. Readers new to the field should come away from the volume with a good sense of the state-of-the-art with respect to current thinking about human action and agency. For their part, established researchers in the field will find the essays to be original contributions that substantially advance many debates about action and agency.
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The causal theory of action (CTA) is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of act... more The causal theory of action (CTA) is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency—the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources while others focus on recent developments; some rely on the tools of analytic philosophy while others cite the latest empirical research on human action. All agree, however, on the centrality of the CTA in the philosophy of action.
The contributors first consider metaphysical issues, then reasons-explanations of action, and, finally, new directions for thinking about the CTA. They discuss such topics as the tenability of some alternatives to the CTA; basic causal deviance; the etiology of action; teleologism and anticausalism; and the compatibility of the CTA with theories of embodied cognition. Two contributors engage in an exchange of views on intentional omissions that stretches over four essays, directly responding to each other in their follow-up essays.
As the action-oriented perspective becomes more influential in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, this volume offers a long-needed debate over foundational issues.
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PREFACE
The philosophy of action is a broad field. Some characterize the field narrowly, t... more PREFACE
The philosophy of action is a broad field. Some characterize the field narrowly, treating it as a sub-area in the philosophy of mind or, if one’s concerns are chiefly normative, as providing the foundations of moral psychology. But this strikes us a mistake. Broadly characterized, the philosophy of action encompasses a host of problems about the nature and scope of human action and agency, including, but not limited to, intention and intentional action, the ontology of action, reason-explanations of action, motivation and practical reason, free will and moral responsibility, mental agency, social action, controlling attitudes, akrasia and enkrasia, and many other issues. Depending upon the topic someone working in the philosophy of action is working on, her work can be characterized as epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, philosophy of religion, or philosophy of social science, among other areas. Moreover, the work of philosophers of action overlaps in exciting ways with the work of non-philosophers working on human action and agency, including jurists, neuroscientists, psychologists, and others.
Rather than characterize the philosophy of action as a sub-field of any other areas in philosophy, it seems best to regard the philosophy of action as an area in philosophy in its own right. The vague boundaries of the field should not count against treating it as a distinct area any more than the vague boundaries of any of the other established areas of philosophy should count against treating them as distinct (e.g., philosophy of mind overlaps with the philosophy of language, epistemology, and metaphysics—yet it is regarded as a distinct area).
This volume brings together some of the leading figures in the philosophy of action. Some of them have published research on virtually every major problem in the field, while others have devoted their careers to examining a narrow set of topics. Regardless of the scope of their research into the nature of human action and agency, all of the philosophers who have contributed to this volume have made a significant impact on the field. There is as much diversity in the views articulated by these authors as there are ways of conceiving of the field and what issues are important in the field. But they all agree that examining the nature and scope of human action and agency is a worthwhile endeavor that can help us shed light on many other philosophical and existential problems—e.g., the nature of personhood, what makes for a good life, etc.
We asked the contributors to the volume five questions. Some of them answered all five questions directly. Others took the liberty of modifying the questions somewhat. Still others elected to only answer some but not all of the questions. Finally, a few wrote short essays that address the issues raised in the questions, offering nice summaries of their research, its importance, and what they see as some of the most important issues about human action and agency they are addressing or hope to address in the future.
For readers with no background in the philosophy of action the chapters of this volume should serve as a nice introduction to the breadth of issues and the current state of play in much of the philosophy of action. These readers will have the opportunity to become acquainted for the first time with leading contemporary philosophers of action, their views, and motivations. In this way the present volume provides a nice jumping off point to explore topics in the philosophy of action and the work of key players in this exciting field. More experienced readers working on action and agency should find this volume as enjoyable and illuminating as we have. Not only will they appreciate the refreshing reformulation of established views within the philosophy of action but very likely will be exposed to novel ideas and approaches often ignored given the breath of this burgeoning philosophical field. In this sense, it is our hope that this volume will motivate others to explore the philosophy of action, and for those working on a sub-field in the philosophy of action to recognize the value of researching topics they may have ignored until now.
Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff
Rochester, NY & Poughkeepsie, NY
July 2008
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Papers by Andrei Buckareff
Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2024
An account of what sort of causal integration is necessary for an agent to exercise agency is off... more An account of what sort of causal integration is necessary for an agent to exercise agency is offered in support of a soft-line response to Derk Pereboom's four-case argument against source-compatibilism. I argue that, in cases of manipulation, the manipulative activity affects the identity of the causal process of which it is a part. Specifically, I argue that causal processes involving direct manipulation fail to count as exercises of intentional agency because they involve heteromesial causal deviance. In contrast, standard deterministic causal processes do not involve heteromesial causal deviance and are agency-preserving. The upshot is that there is a relevant difference between a causal process involving direct manipulation by another agent and a deterministic causal process that involves no such intervention. If this is right, then Pereboom's four-case argument does not pose a threat to source-compatibilist theories of free will and moral responsibility.
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Religious Studies, 2017
According to theistic consubstantialism, the universe and God are essentially made of the same st... more According to theistic consubstantialism, the universe and God are essentially made of the same stuff. If theistic consubstantialism is correct, then God possesses the essential power to have knowledge de se of the contents of the mind of every conscious being internal to God. If theistic consubstantialism is false, then God lacks this essential property. So either God is essentially corporeal and possesses greater essential epistemic powers than God would have otherwise or God is essentially incorporeal and has a diminished range of essential epistemic powers. In light of this dilemma, I argue that theists should accept theistic consubstantialism.
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Sophia, 2016
In this paper, I examine Mark Johnston’s panentheistic account of the metaphysics of the divine d... more In this paper, I examine Mark Johnston’s panentheistic account of the metaphysics of the divine developed in his recent book, Saving God: Religion After Idolatry (2009). On Johnston’s account, God is the ‘Highest One’ and is identified with ‘the outpouring of Being by way of its exemplification in ordinary existents for the sake of the self-disclosure of Being’ (Johnston 2009, 158). Johnston eschews supernaturalism and takes his position to be consistent with what he calls ‘legitimate naturalism’ which he takes to be some version of ontological naturalism. But, as I will argue in what follows, Johnston’s legitimate naturalism is not clearly ontological naturalism. In what follows, given the other general features of his account, I argue that if we assume ontological naturalism, we should prefer a pantheistic conception of God over a panentheistic conception of God such as the one Johnston proffers. I take it that we can preserve everything Johnston wants in his account of divinity if we accept pantheism; but, if we wish to purge our conception of God of any supernaturalism, we should accept pantheism.
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Dialogue, 2021
Many powers-realists assume that the powers of objects are identical with the dispositions of obj... more Many powers-realists assume that the powers of objects are identical with the dispositions of objects and, hence, that ‘power’ and ‘disposition’ are interchangeable. In this article, I aim to disentangle dispositions from powers with the goal of getting a better sense of how powers and dispositions relate to one another. I present and defend a modest realism about dispositions built upon a standard strong realism about powers. I argue that each correct disposition-ascription we can make of an object is made true by the manifestations towards which a given power or collection of powers of the object is directed.
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The Palgrave Handbook of the Afterlife, 2017
In his posthumously published essay, “Divine Evil,” David Lewis presents an argument from evil ag... more In his posthumously published essay, “Divine Evil,” David Lewis presents an argument from evil against theism that focuses on the problem of hell. In our paper, we use Lewis’s challenge to the theist to help motivate our escapist alternative to the traditional doctrine of hell that we have developed and defended elsewhere. Specifically, we argue that the problem as presented by Lewis dissipates once we shift to an issuant view of hell on which hell is not a place where retributive punishment is exacted against the unrepentant but is rather a place God has provided, being motivated by love, for those who wish to be separated from God. On an issuant view, hell issues from God’s loving character. Further, we argue that an issuant view of hell is more compatible with traditional views of God’s desires and motivational states than is a retributive view of hell. Finally we argue that, while any version of issuantism fares better than retributivism, not all versions of issuantism are equal. Focusing on Jonathan Kvanvig’s version of issuantism, we argue that the escapist version of issuantism we have defended better provides theists with the resources needed to respond to objections to theism such as Lewis’s.
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Law and the Philosophy of Action, 2014
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Philosophia, 2017
In her recent paper, “A Defense of Substance Causation,” Ann Whittle makes a case for substance c... more In her recent paper, “A Defense of Substance Causation,” Ann Whittle makes a case for substance causation. In this paper, assuming that causation is a generative or productive relation, I argue that Whittle’s argument is not successful. While substances are causally relevant in causal processes owing to outcomes being counterfactually dependent upon their role in such occurrences, the real productive work in causal processes is accomplished by the causal powers of substances.
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European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2019
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2018
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Metaphysica, 2019
Humean compatibilism combines a Humean conception of laws of nature with a strong dual-ability co... more Humean compatibilism combines a Humean conception of laws of nature with a strong dual-ability condition for free will that requires that agents possess the ability to decide differently when they make a free decision. On the Humean view of laws of nature, laws of nature are taken to be contingent non-governing descriptions of significant regularities that obtain in the entire history of the universe. On Humean compatibilism, agents are taken to possess dual ability when making free decisions because what the laws of nature will finally be is (at least partially) dependent upon how an agent decides. In this paper, I argue that the tenability of Humean compatibilism depends in part upon what theory of time is correct. More specifically, I argue that Humean compatibilism is untenable in a deterministic universe if eternalism is true.
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2019
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Synthese, 2017
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Philosophy in Review, Dec 31, 2013
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2007
Many, I suspect most, philosophers of action afford intentions a central role in theorizing about... more Many, I suspect most, philosophers of action afford intentions a central role in theorizing about action and its explanation. Furthermore, current orthodoxy in the philosophy of action has it that intentions play a causal role with respect to the etiology and explanation of action. But action theory is not without its heretics. Some philosophers have challenged the orthodox view. In this paper I will examine and critique one such challenge. I will consider David-Hillel Ruben's case against the need for intentions to play a causal role in the etiology and explanation of mental actions. Contra Ruben, I will defend the orthodox view that intentions play an indispensable causal and explanatory role with respect to mental actions.
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The Modern Schoolman, 2011
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2014
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Books by Andrei Buckareff
The contributors first consider metaphysical issues, then reasons-explanations of action, and, finally, new directions for thinking about the CTA. They discuss such topics as the tenability of some alternatives to the CTA; basic causal deviance; the etiology of action; teleologism and anticausalism; and the compatibility of the CTA with theories of embodied cognition. Two contributors engage in an exchange of views on intentional omissions that stretches over four essays, directly responding to each other in their follow-up essays.
As the action-oriented perspective becomes more influential in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, this volume offers a long-needed debate over foundational issues.
The philosophy of action is a broad field. Some characterize the field narrowly, treating it as a sub-area in the philosophy of mind or, if one’s concerns are chiefly normative, as providing the foundations of moral psychology. But this strikes us a mistake. Broadly characterized, the philosophy of action encompasses a host of problems about the nature and scope of human action and agency, including, but not limited to, intention and intentional action, the ontology of action, reason-explanations of action, motivation and practical reason, free will and moral responsibility, mental agency, social action, controlling attitudes, akrasia and enkrasia, and many other issues. Depending upon the topic someone working in the philosophy of action is working on, her work can be characterized as epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, philosophy of religion, or philosophy of social science, among other areas. Moreover, the work of philosophers of action overlaps in exciting ways with the work of non-philosophers working on human action and agency, including jurists, neuroscientists, psychologists, and others.
Rather than characterize the philosophy of action as a sub-field of any other areas in philosophy, it seems best to regard the philosophy of action as an area in philosophy in its own right. The vague boundaries of the field should not count against treating it as a distinct area any more than the vague boundaries of any of the other established areas of philosophy should count against treating them as distinct (e.g., philosophy of mind overlaps with the philosophy of language, epistemology, and metaphysics—yet it is regarded as a distinct area).
This volume brings together some of the leading figures in the philosophy of action. Some of them have published research on virtually every major problem in the field, while others have devoted their careers to examining a narrow set of topics. Regardless of the scope of their research into the nature of human action and agency, all of the philosophers who have contributed to this volume have made a significant impact on the field. There is as much diversity in the views articulated by these authors as there are ways of conceiving of the field and what issues are important in the field. But they all agree that examining the nature and scope of human action and agency is a worthwhile endeavor that can help us shed light on many other philosophical and existential problems—e.g., the nature of personhood, what makes for a good life, etc.
We asked the contributors to the volume five questions. Some of them answered all five questions directly. Others took the liberty of modifying the questions somewhat. Still others elected to only answer some but not all of the questions. Finally, a few wrote short essays that address the issues raised in the questions, offering nice summaries of their research, its importance, and what they see as some of the most important issues about human action and agency they are addressing or hope to address in the future.
For readers with no background in the philosophy of action the chapters of this volume should serve as a nice introduction to the breadth of issues and the current state of play in much of the philosophy of action. These readers will have the opportunity to become acquainted for the first time with leading contemporary philosophers of action, their views, and motivations. In this way the present volume provides a nice jumping off point to explore topics in the philosophy of action and the work of key players in this exciting field. More experienced readers working on action and agency should find this volume as enjoyable and illuminating as we have. Not only will they appreciate the refreshing reformulation of established views within the philosophy of action but very likely will be exposed to novel ideas and approaches often ignored given the breath of this burgeoning philosophical field. In this sense, it is our hope that this volume will motivate others to explore the philosophy of action, and for those working on a sub-field in the philosophy of action to recognize the value of researching topics they may have ignored until now.
Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff
Rochester, NY & Poughkeepsie, NY
July 2008
Papers by Andrei Buckareff
The contributors first consider metaphysical issues, then reasons-explanations of action, and, finally, new directions for thinking about the CTA. They discuss such topics as the tenability of some alternatives to the CTA; basic causal deviance; the etiology of action; teleologism and anticausalism; and the compatibility of the CTA with theories of embodied cognition. Two contributors engage in an exchange of views on intentional omissions that stretches over four essays, directly responding to each other in their follow-up essays.
As the action-oriented perspective becomes more influential in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, this volume offers a long-needed debate over foundational issues.
The philosophy of action is a broad field. Some characterize the field narrowly, treating it as a sub-area in the philosophy of mind or, if one’s concerns are chiefly normative, as providing the foundations of moral psychology. But this strikes us a mistake. Broadly characterized, the philosophy of action encompasses a host of problems about the nature and scope of human action and agency, including, but not limited to, intention and intentional action, the ontology of action, reason-explanations of action, motivation and practical reason, free will and moral responsibility, mental agency, social action, controlling attitudes, akrasia and enkrasia, and many other issues. Depending upon the topic someone working in the philosophy of action is working on, her work can be characterized as epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, philosophy of religion, or philosophy of social science, among other areas. Moreover, the work of philosophers of action overlaps in exciting ways with the work of non-philosophers working on human action and agency, including jurists, neuroscientists, psychologists, and others.
Rather than characterize the philosophy of action as a sub-field of any other areas in philosophy, it seems best to regard the philosophy of action as an area in philosophy in its own right. The vague boundaries of the field should not count against treating it as a distinct area any more than the vague boundaries of any of the other established areas of philosophy should count against treating them as distinct (e.g., philosophy of mind overlaps with the philosophy of language, epistemology, and metaphysics—yet it is regarded as a distinct area).
This volume brings together some of the leading figures in the philosophy of action. Some of them have published research on virtually every major problem in the field, while others have devoted their careers to examining a narrow set of topics. Regardless of the scope of their research into the nature of human action and agency, all of the philosophers who have contributed to this volume have made a significant impact on the field. There is as much diversity in the views articulated by these authors as there are ways of conceiving of the field and what issues are important in the field. But they all agree that examining the nature and scope of human action and agency is a worthwhile endeavor that can help us shed light on many other philosophical and existential problems—e.g., the nature of personhood, what makes for a good life, etc.
We asked the contributors to the volume five questions. Some of them answered all five questions directly. Others took the liberty of modifying the questions somewhat. Still others elected to only answer some but not all of the questions. Finally, a few wrote short essays that address the issues raised in the questions, offering nice summaries of their research, its importance, and what they see as some of the most important issues about human action and agency they are addressing or hope to address in the future.
For readers with no background in the philosophy of action the chapters of this volume should serve as a nice introduction to the breadth of issues and the current state of play in much of the philosophy of action. These readers will have the opportunity to become acquainted for the first time with leading contemporary philosophers of action, their views, and motivations. In this way the present volume provides a nice jumping off point to explore topics in the philosophy of action and the work of key players in this exciting field. More experienced readers working on action and agency should find this volume as enjoyable and illuminating as we have. Not only will they appreciate the refreshing reformulation of established views within the philosophy of action but very likely will be exposed to novel ideas and approaches often ignored given the breath of this burgeoning philosophical field. In this sense, it is our hope that this volume will motivate others to explore the philosophy of action, and for those working on a sub-field in the philosophy of action to recognize the value of researching topics they may have ignored until now.
Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff
Rochester, NY & Poughkeepsie, NY
July 2008