Open-Mindedness as a Critical Virtue

This paper proposes to examine Daniel Cohen’s recent attempt to apply virtues to argumentation theory, with special attention given to his explication of how open-mindedness can be regarded as an argumentational or critical virtue. It is argued that his analysis involves a contentious claim about open-mindedness as an epistemic virtue, which generates a tension for agents who are simultaneously both an arguer and a knower (or who strive to be both). I contend that this tension can be eased or resolved by clarifying the nature of open-mindedness and by construing open-mindedness in terms of its function. Specifically, a willingness to take a novel viewpoint seriously is sufficient for making open-mindedness both an epistemic and a critical virtue.

1. In this paper, I will use the terms ‘critical’ and ‘argumentational’ interchangeably.

2. Cohen distinguishes intellectual (or cognitive) virtues from epistemic ones. For him, the latter are concerned principally with the acquisition of true belief and knowledge, whereas the former incorporate a wider range of goods (e.g., understanding, discharging our responsibilities as arguers). While many virtue epistemologists refer to open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue, they are essentially referring to it as an epistemic virtue in Cohen’s sense. Unless otherwise noted, this paper will follow Cohen’s usage.

3. Incidentally, as Riggs has pointed out, it is precisely with respect to beliefs that we hold closely that we should exercise open-mindedness (177). This is because many of them—e.g., political and religious ones—may have been acquired dubiously (i.e., through biases and/or cognitive weaknesses or blind-spots).

4. The agent’s discovery that she does not have as good an understanding of her original view does not necessarily imply that her view is false. She may, for example, simply have trouble grasping some of its more difficult components.

5. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for raising this objection.

6. In my view, Aberdein’s claims confirm my earlier point regarding the close ties between the argumentational and the epistemic in terms of truth: arguing is a means by which to change the epistemic status of another (including one’s own). Indeed, notice that an agent’s firmly held beliefs, which, according to Cohen, should allow no room for open-mindedness, are ready information for her to relay to others. But when she tries to do so, to repeat an earlier point, she may fall short of the task: she may encounter objections that she discovers she cannot answer. This of course does not necessarily imply that her beliefs are false, but it does put her at an epistemic risk. In such a case, not only will she fail to disseminate what to her are true beliefs, but she will also have to revise her own epistemic position: either to abandon those beliefs or to reduce her confidence in them. At any rate, the agent’s exercise of open-mindedness, although done with the intent to bring about certain non-epistemic cognitive goals (i.e., to make her beliefs accessible to others), results, directly or indirectly, in exposing the weaknesses of her beliefs and even in losing them.

7. Indeed, most virtue epistemologists already think of open-mindedness as an epistemic virtue, and regard it as one of the most important ones (Baehr 2011; Riggs 2010).

8. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into detail about what an agent might do once she puts a belief on the table. However, I find it instructive to think of it in terms of what Robert Brandom calls the ‘game of giving and asking for reasons’, a discursive practice in which the commitments and entitlements of an agent and her interlocutors are made explicit and defended (Brandom 1994). Here, we can imagine numerous ways in which an agent might exhibit failings that can cause her to abandon her beliefs (e.g., the discovery that she is not entitled to a particular view, or that her current position commits her to unwanted consequences).

9. Riggs uses the qualifier ‘at least sometimes’ because as mentioned above, he does not think that we should always be open-minded.

10. The engagement, of course, will have to be serious and sincere. In all likelihood, the intellectual activities involved will also consist of other intellectual virtues or cognitive activities.

11. I am grateful to Anna Cremaldi, Rick Elmore, Davis Hankins, and Luke Kwong for their help and advice in writing this paper. I would also like to thank two anonymous Topoi referees for their insightful comments and suggestions.

Authors and Affiliations

1. Department of Philosophy and Religion, Appalachian State University, 114 Greer Hall, Boone, NC, 28608, USA

   Jack M. C. Kwong

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jack M. C. Kwong.

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