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A profile and tool for modelling safety information with design information in SysML

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Abstract

Communication both between development teams and between individual developers is a common source of safety-related faults in safety–critical system design. Communication between experts in different fields can be particularly challenging due to gaps in assumed knowledge, vocabulary and understanding. Faults caused by communication failures must be removed once found, which can be expensive if they are found late in the development process. Aiding communication earlier in development can reduce faults and costs. Modelling languages for design have been shown through practical experience to improve communication through better information presentation and increased information consistency. In this paper, we describe a SysML profile designed for modelling the safety-related concerns of a system. The profile models common safety concepts from safety standards and safety analysis techniques integrated with system design information. We demonstrate that the profile is capable of modelling the concepts through examples. We also show the use of supporting tools to aid the application of the profile through analysis of the model and generation of reports presenting safety information in formats appropriate to the target reader. Through increased traceability and integration, the profile allows for greater consistency between safety information and system design information and can aid in communicating that information to stakeholders.

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Notes

  1. http://ttool.telecom-paristech.fr/avatar.html.

  2. The OMG is also responsible for the UML and SysML standards.

  3. MARTE, like UML, is designed to be easy to extend.

  4. A powerful open-source modelling tool is the Papyrus project, which adds modelling capabilities for UML, SysML and several other languages to the Eclipse Framework. See http://www.eclipse.org/papyrus/.

  5. Note that the types presented here for the tagged values are an example; see Sect. 3.4 for details.

    Fig. 2
    figure 2

    The SafeML profile elements relating to hazardous events

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    Fig. 3
    figure 3

    The SafeML profile elements relating to defences

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    Table 1 SafeML::Hazard specification
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    Table 2 SafeML::Harm specification
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    Table 3 SafeML::HarmContext specification
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    Table 4 SafeML::ContextDetector specification
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    Table 5 SafeML::PassiveDefence specification
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    Table 6 SafeML::ActiveDefence specification
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    Table 7 SafeML::DefenceResult specification
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  6. Defence elements should not be decomposed into further Defence elements; this has no semantic meaning in SafeML.

  7. SafeML treats defences as independent.

  8. It is common practice in SysML to only represent top-level requirements in Requirements diagrams, with the remainder entered in a tabular view of the model.

  9. The ability to alter how information is presented without altering the underlying structure of the model is a benefit of describing safety information in a model.

  10. If the kettle did not have a lid covering the water tank, we might find a context for water burns due to the ease of spilling water out of an uncovered tank while pouring.

  11. Although it could be possible to deal with it by placing a prominent warning on the kettle about watching the boiling process constantly, we are assuming for this example that such a defence will not provide sufficient safety.

  12. A system may have multiple defences in place in case one fails.

  13. http://www.sparxsystems.com/products/ea/index.html.

  14. We note that this calculation may or may not be suitable for use in real systems, whether or not it is possible to quantify the safety of a system is still debated. Our purpose in this section is merely to show that a model allows such calculations to be made automatically.

  15. See Sect. 3.4 for a description of what a probability may be.

  16. These are reliability concerns, not safety concerns.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Intelligent Systems Research Institute, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Tsukuba, Japan

    Geoffrey Biggs & Tetsuo Kotoku

  2. Global Assist, Inc., Tokyo, Japan

    Takeshi Sakamoto

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  1. Geoffrey Biggs
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  2. Takeshi Sakamoto
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  3. Tetsuo Kotoku
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Correspondence to Geoffrey Biggs.

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Communicated by Prof. Jean-Michel Bruel.

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Biggs, G., Sakamoto, T. & Kotoku, T. A profile and tool for modelling safety information with design information in SysML. Softw Syst Model 15, 147–178 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10270-014-0400-x

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