Abstract
E.J. Nanson, in 1883, proposed a voting rule designed mainly to select the Condorcet winner. Unfortunately, much of the collective choice literature has misstated Nanson's rule. This note shows that the misstated versions of the rule and Nanson's actual rule can yield different outcomes, and it provides a counter example, which shows that Nanson's rule, although it satisfies the strong Condorcet condition, does not satisfy the weak Condorcet condition.
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References
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The author thanks Peter Ordeshook and Thomas Schwartz for their helpful suggestions in preparing this note.
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Niou, E.M.S. A note on Nanson's rule. Public Choice 54, 191–193 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123006
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123006