Summary
Public-key encryption would seem to be inherently assymmetric, in that only messages sent to a user can be encrypted using his public key. We demonstrate that the use of interactive protocols for sending encrypted messages enables a symmetric use of public keys; we give cryptographic protocols for the following tasks:
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Probabilistic encryption, using the same public key, both of messages that are sent to a particular user as well as of messages that the user sends to others, without compromising the key. We propose a public-key cryptosystem based on these protocols which has only one key, owned by a cryptographic server.
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Authentication both of the sender and of the receiver of a probabilistically encrypted message.
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Probabilistic encryption which is provably secure against both chosen-message and chosen-ciphertext attack.
December 1985
Supported in part by NSF grants MCS-8303139 and DCR-8511713.
Supported in part by an IBM graduate fellowship.
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© 1986 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Galil, Z., Haber, S., Yung, M. (1986). Symmetric Public-Key Encryption. In: Williams, H.C. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’85 Proceedings. CRYPTO 1985. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 218. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39799-X_12
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