Abstract
Objectives
This paper assesses the impact of the new regime of non-custodial sanctions implemented in Chile in 2013. It aims to contribute to the evidence regarding structural changes in systems involving non-custodial sanctions.
Methods
To identify the causal effect of the new regime of non-custodial sanctions on recidivism, we perform three complementary estimations. First, a before and after regression model of recidivism was estimated. Second, in order to compare cohorts with non-custodial and custodial sanctions, we build a difference-in-difference estimation to control for time-invariant confounding factors. Additionally, we use controls to address potential differences across groups not related to the change in treatment status. Third, we estimate the yearly effect through difference-in-differences for multiple periods.
Results
The results suggest a small statistically significant increase of 1.54 percentage points in the recidivism rate, attributable to the reform of non-custodial sanctions during the first year of its implementation. After that, the reform impact on recidivism begins to stabilise at zero.
Conclusions
The results are consistent with a neutral scenario whereby the recidivism rate eventually remains stable after the reform was implemented despite the increase in the number of people sentenced. Considering that the reform helped to decongest prisons, a neutral scenario on recidivism seems favourable for the Chilean penal system.
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Notes
Conditional remission could be imposed if the offender had no previous convictions, was sentenced to a sanction up to three years and if the measure appeared suitable for the offender’s resettlement possibilities; probation could be imposed if the offender had no previous convictions, was sentenced to a sanction up to five years and if the measure appeared suitable for the offender’s resettlement possibilities; while night imprisonment could be imposed if the offender had no previous convictions, was sentenced to a sanction up to three years and if the measure appeared suitable for the offender’s resettlement possibilities and also in the case of offenders with previous convictions sentenced to a sanction up to two years and if the measure appeared suitable for the offender’s resettlement possibilities.
This model relies on the basis of three main principles: Risk, that contends that the higher risk offenders should receive the greater dosage of treatment; Need, that states that treatment should target offenders’ criminogenic needs; and Responsivity, that proposes that treatment is more likely to be effective if it is a cognitive-behavioural treatment programme and if the style of service delivery matches with the offender’s learning style (Andrews et al. 1990; Andrews and Bonta 2016; Gendreau 1996).
In the case of common offences, the sentenced person will have to attend a "Social Competencies Programme" (PCS), which is a cognitive behavioural programme implemented in 2014 for males that have committed common crimes. If the offender has been punished for sexual abuse, they will have to participate in the "Programme for Sexual Offenders" (PAS), which is a programme based on the RNR model combined with the “Good Life Model” for sex offenders (Ward 2002) implemented in 2014 for males that have committed sexual offences; while in case of offenders punished for domestic violence, they will have to attend the "Programme for Aggressors of a Partner" (PAP), which is a programme that combines the ecological model, gender approach and construction of new masculinities, cognitive-behavioural approach, transtheoretical model of change, and RNR for persons sentenced for committing domestic violence offences (ISUC 2017).
Activities designed to ensure compliance with the conditions imposed.
This regulation was implemented because more professionals, training and new technologies were required to provide the reform with a source of operational support.
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Appendix
Appendix
General Exclusion Rules
Law N°20,603 contains an exclusion clause (Article N°1) which bans non-custodial sentences in the case of offenders sentenced as perpetrators for committing the following crimes established in the Chilean Criminal Code:
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Aggravated kidnapping (Article 141.3; 141.4, 141.5)
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Kidnapping of a minor (Article 142)
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Rape (Article 361)
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Aggravated rape (the victim was 13 years old or younger) (Article 362)
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Rape with homicide (Article 372 bis).
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Murder (Article 391 N°2).
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Aggravated murder (the victim was a relative) (Article 390)
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Aggravated murder (it was committed with malice; by reward or promise of remuneration; by means of poison; viciously, deliberately and inhumanly increasing the pain of the victim; with known premeditation) (Article 391, N° 1)
The law also contains an exclusion clause (Article N°1) which bans non-custodial sentences in the case of offenders sentenced as perpetrators of robbery (Criminal Code, Article 436.1) who had previous convictions for committing robbery, aggravated robbery Criminal Code, Article 433), mugging (Criminal Code, Article 436.2) and burglary (Criminal Code, Article 442).
Exclusion Rules for Granting Conditional Remission
Law N°20,603 bans conditional remission in the case of offenders sentenced as perpetrators for committing the following crimes (in these cases, the court must impose probation, intensive probation or partial confinement):
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Petty drug dealing (Law N°20,000, Article 4) sentenced to at least 541 days but less than 3 years.
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Murder or causing injuries due to a traffic accident under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Law N°18,290, Article 196.2 and 196.3), sentenced to at least 541 days but less than 3 years.
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Domestic violence crimes (Law N°20,066 in relation to Criminal Code, Articles 296, 297, 390, 391, 395, 396, 397, 398 or 399), sentenced to at least 541 days but less than 5 years.
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Sex crimes (Criminal Code, Articles 363, 365 bis, 366, 366 bis, 366 quáter, 366 quinquies, 367, 367 ter or 411 ter), for at least 541 days but less than 5 years.
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Moraga, G., Morales, A.M., Fábrega, J. et al. Impact of the Reform to Non-custodial Sanctions in Chile. J Quant Criminol 39, 875–896 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-022-09552-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-022-09552-x