Abstract
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,
Commented by Blanke (Articles 1, 5, 6), Lupo (Article 2), Fasone (Article 2), Mangiameli (Articles 6–8), Colasante (Articles 7, 9), Iacoviello (Article 8).
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Notes
- 1.
For an overview, see Hrbek (2012), p. 143 et seq.
- 2.
- 3.
Streinz, in Streinz (2012), Art. 5 EUV para 32.
- 4.
Cf. Constantinesco (1990), p. 165 (169 et seq.).
- 5.
Cf. e.g. Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 5 para 26, who even speaks of “dematerialisation”. Cf., on the other hand, the process explained below of the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity since 1993.
- 6.
See Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 12 EUV para 31 et seqq., 35; v. Bogdandy and Bast, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 5 EUV para 74 et seq., that in addition to Art. 5 see a reference to the principle of proportionality only in Art. 9 of Protocol No. 2; with a different opinion - Art. 6, 7 and 8 of Protocol No. 2 refer exclusively to the principle of subsidiarity - Streinz, in Streinz (2012), Art. 5 EUV para 47.
- 7.
Bull. EC 10/1993, p. 118 et seqq. It dates back to the conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council of 11/12 December 1992. Cf. with regard to this declaration Blanke (1995), p. 202 et seqq.
- 8.
German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) para 160—Maastricht (in BVerfGE 89, 155 [211]).
- 9.
Blanke (1995), p. 203.
- 10.
Streinz, in Streinz (2012), Art. 5 EUV para 31.
- 11.
Edinburgh European Council of 11/12 December 1992, Conclusions, Annex 1 to Part A.
- 12.
Commission Communication of 27 October 1992, The Principle of Subsidiarity, SEC(92) 1990 final, p. 10.
- 13.
- 14.
Cf. Mellein (2007), p. 233, who criticises that guidelines have not contributed to a better control practice.
- 15.
CONV 579/03 (Praesidium to the Convention) 27 February 2003, Annex I; CONV 610/03 (Secretariat to the Convention), 12 March 2003 (amendments).
- 16.
Cf. CONV 579/03 (Praesidium to the Convention) 27 February 2003, p. 2.
- 17.
With regard to Protocol No. 30 (Amsterdam) this is expressly provided for by Annex 8 to Section 74.1 of the Joint Rules of Procedure for Federal Ministries (GGO).With regard to the European level, Mellein (2007), p. 232 et seq. criticises the deletion of the guidelines, although recognising that it contributes to better readability and comprehensibility.
- 18.
Printed in the original version in Hrbek (1995), p. 151 et seqq. 153 et seqq.
- 19.
- 20.
As of 1 September 2011: http://www.verwaltungsvorschriften-im-internet.de/BMI-01-20090601-KF02-A008.htm.
- 21.
Oschatz (1994), p. 99 et seq.
- 22.
Cf. the last Bundesrats-Drs. 52/06: http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_235/nn_8336/SharedDocs/Drucksachen/2006/0001-0100/52-06,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/52-06.pdf.
- 23.
Verbatim reproduction of Annex 8 to Section 74.1 GGO.
- 24.
- 25.
Roffiaen (2005), p. 45 et seqq.
- 26.
See, for instance, European Commission, Stakeholder Consultation on Smart Regulation in the EU. Follow up to the 2010 Communication on Smart Regulation, 27 June 2012 (on http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/smart_regulation/consultation_2012/docs/consultation_en.pdf. Accessed 30 June 2012).
- 27.
There are two reasons for this exception: on the one hand, it shows a sort of continuity with the past (ex-Art. 138 EC); on the other hand, social policy falls for the largest part in the remit of the MS’ competences and the EU is only entitled to coordinate national policies.
- 28.
See, for instance, Commission Communication on Implementing Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, COM(2009) 673 final, 9 December 2009, according to which, before presenting a draft delegated act the Commission intends to accomplish wide consultation, but especially of experts from national authorities of the MS who will be responsible for implementing the delegated act. See Schütze (2011), p. 686.
- 29.
See the Protocol on cooperation between the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions, O.J. C 102/6 (2012).
- 30.
Section 22 of the Protocol on cooperation between the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions stresses the importance of the common commitment of the Commission and of the CoR and their mutual cooperation in implementing Art. 2 of Protocol No. 2.
- 31.
- 32.
Greenwood (2011), p. 176–198.
- 33.
See Greenwood (2011), p. 178.
- 34.
See Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on the European Governance, COM(2001) 428 final, Brussels, 25.7.2001, p. 4.
- 35.
- 36.
See Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Commission on the establishment of a transparency register for organisations and self-employed individuals engaged in EU policy-making and policy implementation, O.J. L 191/29 (2011).
- 37.
See, on the official web site (http://europa.eu/transparency-register/your-organisation/who-register/index_en.htm. Accessed on 15 February 2012), the public statement made by Vice-President of the Commission Sefcovic: “Services forming an integral part of their administration, staffed by local, regional or municipal officials and engaged in activities corresponding to their institutional or constitutional attributions, will thus not be expected to register”. So, “indeed autonomous structures, with a private legal status, which would include subnational public authorities but which would be also shared with private interests, created in order to pursue activities falling within the scope of the Register would be expected to register”.
- 38.
For instance, this is the case of the Consejería de Agricultura of the Junta de Andalucía, the permanent delegation of Barcelona in Brussels and the Department on Fisheries of the Emilia-Romagna Region.
- 39.
See section 16 of the Protocol on cooperation.
- 40.
See section 18 of the Protocol on cooperation.
- 41.
See section 19 of the Protocol on cooperation, although it refers explicitly to the associations of regional and local authorities. See also the CoR’s “Subsidiarity Monitoring Network”, http://extranet.cor.europa.eu/subsidiarity.
- 42.
See Boussaguet et al. (2011), p. 186 et seqq.
- 43.
See Pernice (2002), p. 511 et seqq., esp. para III.1.
- 44.
The original deadline was fixed by the Commission Communication, Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue – General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, COM(2002) 704 final, 7.12.2002. However, the Commission Communication, Smart Regulation in the European Union, COM(2010) 543 final, Brussels, 8.10.2010, p. 10 provides that since January 2012 on the deadline would have been prolonged, as it is at the present, to 12 weeks.
- 45.
See Starita (2012), p. 58, according to whom all Protocol No. 2 is profoundly influenced by the idea of the deliberative democracy. On the relationship between deliberative democracy and participatory democracy (the former deemed as a more broad and inclusive notion than the latter) see Bifulco (2011), p. 278. On the raising of the participatory democracy in the EU, see Reale (2003), Bernard (2005), p. 375–376, Sipala (2007), p. 367 et seqq., Michel (2008), p. 107–119, Siclari (2010), p. 193–212.
- 46.
- 47.
See Starita (2012), p. 179.
- 48.
From 2002 until the Treaty of Lisbon some attempts to make the interpretation of the “individual concern” less rigid had actually been put in place, but they did not succeed. See, for instance, Case C-55/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (Opinion of the AG Jacobs of 21 March 2002); the opinion that was not followed by the Court of Justice. On this point, see Lenaerts et al. (2006), p. 262–264; Condinanzi and Mastroianni (2009), p. 118–121; Wathelet and Wildemeersch (2010), p. 209–211; and Türk (2010), p. 96–98.
- 49.
- 50.
See Case T-9/89, Hüls v Commission (CFI 10 March 1992) and Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health v Council (CFI 11 September 2002). With this regard, see Alemanno (2011), p. 494.
- 51.
- 52.
See, for instance, the explanatory memorandum of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/138/EC on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II), as regards the dates of its transposition and application and the date of the repeal of certain Directives [COM(2012) 217 final], Brussels, 16 May 2012.
- 53.
Cf. Krajewski and Rösslein, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 296 para 15.
- 54.
For a timeline of a full IA up to the eventual adoption of a draft legislative act by the Commission see European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, Annex 2.
- 55.
Cf. Streinz, in Streinz (2012), Art. 5 EUV para 32.
- 56.
- 57.
- 58.
- 59.
Cf. Krajewski and Rösslein, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 296 para 32. In this sense e.g. Case 16/65, Schwarze v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (ECJ 1 December 1965), p. 1167 with regard to final acts.
- 60.
Krajewski and Rösslein, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 296 para 33.
- 61.
Cf. Mellein (2007), p. 243 et seq.
- 62.
European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, p. 21 et seq. and Annex 6.
- 63.
European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, p. 22.
- 64.
Cf. Hofmann (2007), p. 514. See from the European case law Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst v Commission (ECJ 21 September 1989) para 42; Joined Cases 121/91 and 122/91, CT Control et al. V Commission (ECJ 6 July 1993) para 31–35; Case T-66/89, Publishers’ Association v Commission (CFI 6 July 1992) para 75; Case T-24/90, Automec v Commission (CFI 18 September 1992) para 85–86; Case T-46/98, CCRE v Commission (CFI 3 February 2000) para 46.
- 65.
Cf. especially European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, Annex 8.1.
- 66.
Cf. also European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, p. 39 et seqq.
- 67.
European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, p. 13 et seq. The need for a “proportionate level of analysis” is confirmed e.g. by Case T-46/98, CCRE v Commission (CFI 3 February 2000) para 46; Case T-80/00, Associação Comercial de Aveiro v Commission (CFI 14 May 2002) para 35. A very enlightening example is the so called Services Directive [Parliament/Council Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, O.J. L 376/36 (2006)], which comprises a total of 118 recitals, which reflects the importance of the legislative act and the problem concerned.
- 68.
Case C-466/93, Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft et al. (II) v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft (ECJ 9 November 1995) para 16.
- 69.
Cf. Krajewski and Rösslein, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 296 para 37, 42; Pabel (2011), p. 289 et seq. holds that even the lack of individual information is an infringement of procedural requirements. According to Jarass (1994), p. 214, the lack of a justification of the necessity of the legislative act in the light of the subsidiarity principle is a reason for its illegality unless such justification is evidently redundant.
- 70.
In that respect see Joined Cases 240/82 et al., Stichting Sigarettenindustrie et al. v Commission (ECJ 10 December 1985) para 61 et seqq.; Case 34/62, Germany v Commission (ECJ 15 July 1963), p. 314; Case C-367/95 P, Commission v Sytravaland Brink’s France (ECJ 2 April 1998) para 64.
- 71.
Case 158/80, Rewe v Hauptzollamt Kiel (ECJ 7 July 1981) para 25–26.
- 72.
Cf. Krajewski and Rösslein, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 296 para 35. For case law see e.g. Case 131/86, United Kingdom v Council (ECJ 23 February 1988) para 37; Case C-137/92, Commission v BASF et al. (ECJ 15 June 1994) para 67; Case T-613/97, Ufex et al. v Commission (CFI 7 June 2006) para. 69; Case T-46/98, CCRE v Commission (CFI 3 February 2000) para 47.
- 73.
Cf. Evaluation of the Commission’s Impact Assessment System, Final Report, Executive Summary, 2007, p. 2. For a list of the possible impacts see European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, p. 33–34 (economic), p. 35–36 (social), p. 37–38 (environmental).
- 74.
Commission Communication, Action plan “Simplifying and improving the regulatory environment”, COM(2002) 278 final, p. 3.
- 75.
Commission Communication, Action plan “Simplifying and improving the regulatory environment”, COM(2002) 278 final, p. 8.
- 76.
Cf. European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, p. 6, 16 et seq.
- 77.
Commission Communication, Impact Assessment, COM(2002) 276 final, p. 2 et seq.
- 78.
Cf. European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, p. 9; → Protocol No. 1 para 46, 47.
- 79.
Cf. Hofmann (2007), p. 64.
- 80.
Cf. Zuleeg, in von der Groeben and Schwarze (2003), Art. 5 EGV para 27.
- 81.
Mellein (2007), p. 234.
- 82.
- 83.
- 84.
Altmaier (2006), p. 320.
- 85.
Cf. Edinburgh European Council of 11/12 December 1993, Conclusions, Annex I to Part A, p. 7.
- 86.
Mellein (2007), p. 234 et seq.
- 87.
Koch and Kullas (2010), p. 2.
- 88.
Altmaier (2006), p. 320.
- 89.
European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, p. 22.
- 90.
Koch and Kullas (2010), p. 13.
- 91.
European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, p. 23.
- 92.
Zuleeg, in von der Groeben and Schwarze (2003), Art. 5 EGV para 29.
- 93.
Lambers (1993), p. 235 et seq.
- 94.
- 95.
Lambers (1993), p. 237.
- 96.
Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 5 EUV para 42.
- 97.
Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 5 EUV para 42.
- 98.
Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 5 EUV para 42.
- 99.
Commission Communication, Impact assessment, COM(2002) 276 final, p. 14.
- 100.
European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, p. 23.
- 101.
European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, p. 23.
- 102.
European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, p. 30.
- 103.
Commission Communication, Action plan “Simplifying and improving the regulatory environment”, COM(2002) 278 final, p. 12.
- 104.
European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, Annex 10.1.
- 105.
This is done using the EU Standard Cost Model and with the help of the “Administrative Burdens Calculator” and the “EU database on Administrative Burdens”.
- 106.
European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, p. 33 et seq.
- 107.
European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2009, p. 34.
- 108.
Reasoned opinions can be accessed via the IPEX website: http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/search.do (all numbers in the text as of October 2012).
- 109.
See Stancanelli, in Curti Gialdino (2012), Art. 5, p. 89.
- 110.
See Craig (2010), p. 186, and the references provided therein.
- 111.
Possibility is offered by Art. 6.1 in fine. This choice is criticised by D’Atena (2003), p. 145.
- 112.
- 113.
On this point see Fasone (2009), p. 420.
- 114.
See Communication of 10 May 2006, COM(2006) 211; cf. also Buzogány and Stuchlik 2012, p. 349 et seqq.
- 115.
See also Committee of the Regions, The Role of Regional Parliaments in the Process of Subsidiarity Analysis within the Early Warning System of the Lisbon Treaty.
- 116.
States regionalised in an asymmetrical manner means a State where only some regions have legislative autonomy. Another State that is of this type is Finland where only the Åland islands have an independent statute. In this regard, it is pointed out that the Finnish Parliament is under the obligation of discussing any violation against the principle of subsidiarity by a European legislative draft whenever the regional Parliament of this region makes a deliberation to this effect (http://www.cosac.eu/subs-finland).
- 117.
Loi constitutionnelle no. 2008-103 of 4 February 2008, amending Title XV of the Constitution.
- 118.
The new provisions, however, entered into force on 1 December 2009 together with the reform Treaty, see Art. 47 of Loi constitutionnelle no. 2008-724 of 23 July 2008.
- 119.
See Art. 88-4, para. 2, Fr. Const.: “Selon des modalités fixées par le règlement de chaque assemblée, des résolutions européennes peuvent être adoptées, le cas échéant en dehors des sessions, sur les projets ou propositions mentionnés au premier alinéa, ainsi que sur tout document émanant d’une institution de l’Union européenne”.
- 120.
See Art. 151-9, para. 1, Règ. Ass. Nat.
- 121.
Art. 151-1, para. 2, Règ. Ass. Nat.
- 122.
Art. 151-2, para. 2, Règ. Ass. Nat.
- 123.
Art. 151-2, 151-5, 151-6 Règ. Ass. Nat.
- 124.
Art. 151-5 Règ. Ass. Nat.
- 125.
Art. 151-6, para. 2, Règ. Ass. Nat. (in connection with Art. 151-9 Règ. Ass. Nat.).
- 126.
See Art. 47, para. 1, Règ. Ass. Nat.: “La Conférence des présidents est compétente pour constater, s’agissant des projets de loi déposés sur le bureau de l’Assemblée, une éventuelle méconnaissance des conditions de présentation fixées par la loi organique relative à l’application de l’article 39 de la Constitution. Elle dispose d’un délai de dix jours à compter du dépôt du projet pour se prononcer. Ce délai est suspendu entre les sessions jusqu’au dixième jour qui précède le début de la session suivante”.
- 127.
Art. 151-7, para. 1, Règ. Ass. Nat.
- 128.
Approved by the French Constitutional Council, decision no. 2010-621 DC (13 January 2011).
- 129.
Art. 73 octies, para. 2, Règ. Senat.
- 130.
Art. 73 bis Règ. Senat.
- 131.
Art. 73 octies, para. 3, Règ. Senat.
- 132.
Art. 73 octies, para. 4, Règ. Senat.
- 133.
Art. 73 octies, para. 5, Règ. Senat.
- 134.
Art. 73 octies, para. 8, Règ. Senat.
- 135.
Proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 on the financing of the common agricultural policy and Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) as regards food distribution to the most deprived persons in the Community (COD/2008/0183). Reasoned opinion of the Senate; 27 October 2010.
- 136.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Regulation on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area (COM/2011/0821). Reasoned opinion of the Senate; 24 January 2012.
- 137.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) (COM/2012/0011). Reasoned opinion of the Senate; 6 March 2012.
- 138.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Regulation on the establishment of rules and procedures with regard to the introduction of noise-related operating restrictions at Union airports within a Balanced Approach and repealing Directive 2002/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM/2011/0828). Reasoned opinion of the Senate; 7 February 2012.
- 139.
Proposal for a for a Parliament/Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances (COM/2011/0560). Reasoned opinion of the National Assembly; 8 November 2011.
- 140.
Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services (COM/2012/0130). Reasoned opinion of the Senate; 22 May 2012.
- 141.
Five opinions have been issued by the chambers of the following bicameral Parliaments (hence they correspond to five votes): French Senate, Belgian Chamber of Representatives, British House of Commons, Polish Sejm, Dutch Lower House. Seven opinions have been issued by the single chamber Parliaments of the following States (hence, 14 votes): Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Sweden.
- 142.
BGBl. I Nr. 57/2010, 27.07.2010.
- 143.
On the implementation of the Protocol in Austria, see Pabel (2011).
- 144.
The main/central Parliamentary Committee.
- 145.
The main Parliamentary Committee for European Union Affairs.
- 146.
See § 30, para. 1, GO-NR.
- 147.
Federal law on Parliamentary rules.
- 148.
Parliamentary sub-committee for European Affairs.
- 149.
See § 31e, para. 1, GO-NR.
- 150.
Cf. Committee of the Regions, The Role of Regional Parliaments in the process of subsidiarity analysis within the EWS of the Lisbon Treaty, in http://extranet.cor.europa.eu/, p. 7.
- 151.
§ 31d, para. 5, GO-NR.
- 152.
§ 31c, para. 7, GO-NR.
- 153.
§ 31c, para. 8, GO-NR.
- 154.
§ 31d, para. 4, no. 3), GO-NR.
- 155.
§ 13a, para. 1 and 2, no. 5), GO-BR.
- 156.
§ 13, para. 1, GO-NR.
- 157.
§ 13a, para. 2, no. 4) e 7), GO-BR.
- 158.
§ 13a, para. 3, GO-BR.
- 159.
§ 13b, para. 3 and 10, GO-BR.
- 160.
See § 13b, para. 2 and 3, part two, GO-BR.
- 161.
§ 13b, para. 9, GO-BR.
- 162.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment (COM/2010/379). Reasoned opinion of the Nationalrat: 15 September 2010. Reasoned opinion of the Bundesrat: 5 October 2010.
- 163.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (COM/2011/635). Reasoned opinion of Bundesrat: 1 December 2011.
- 164.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Directive on the award of concession contracts (COM/2011/0897). Reasoned opinion of Bundesrat: 1 February 2012.
- 165.
Vlaams Parlement, Gedachtewisseling over de stand van zaken aangaande het intra-Belgische interparlementaire samenwerkingsakkoord noodzakelijk voor de operationalisering van een aantal bepalingen van het verdrag van Lissabon, Stuk 1807 (2007–2008)—n. 1.
- 166.
Art. 31, para. 1, Règlement de la Chambre.
- 167.
Art. 5, para. 1, Règlement de la Chambre.
- 168.
Art. 85, para. 1, Règlement du Sénat.
- 169.
Art. 23, para. 8, Règlement du Sénat.
- 170.
Committee of the Regions, The Role of Regional Parliaments, p. 29.
- 171.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (COM/2011/635). Reasoned opinion of the Senat: 12 December 2011.
- 172.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) (COM/2012/0011). Reasoned opinion of the Chambre des représentants: 27 March 2012.
- 173.
Proposal for a Council regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services (COM/2012/0130). Reasoned opinion of the Chambre des représentants: 22 May 2012. See the final part of the paragraph on France for greater details on the mentioned use of the yellow card.
- 174.
Gesetz zum Vertrag von Lissabon vom 13. Dezember 2007.
- 175.
Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes – Artikel 23, 45 und 93.
- 176.
Gesetz über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union.
- 177.
On this issue see also von Arnauld and Hufeld (2011), p. 289, para 59–61.
- 178.
§ 12 GO-BT.
- 179.
§ 69, para. 1, GO-BT.
- 180.
§ 45f, para. 1, GO BR.
- 181.
On the participation of the Länder, see also von Arnauld and Hufeld (2011), p. 289, para 62.
- 182.
Art. 34a Constitution Baden-Württemberg; Art. 76a Constitution Saarland; Art. 79 Constitution Bremen.
- 183.
Commission Report: Review of Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (COM/2010/369). Reasoned opinion of the Bundestag: 6 October 2010. Reasoned opinion of the Bundesrat: 24 September 2010.
- 184.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (COM/2011/635). Reasoned opinion of the Bundestag: 1 December 2011.
- 185.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Directive on the award of concession contracts (COM/2011/0897). Reasoned opinion of the Bundesrat: 30 March 2012 (submission deadline: 7 March 2012).
- 186.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) (COM/2012/0011). Reasoned opinion of the Bundesrat: 30 March 2012.
- 187.
- 188.
Art. 8 R.C.D.
- 189.
Inferred a contrario from Art. 65, para. 2, R.C.
- 190.
Art. 23, para. 3, R.S.
- 191.
See Capuano (2011), p. 7–9.
- 192.
Art. 8 R.S.
- 193.
Art. 33, para. 3, R.S.
- 194.
Art. 33, para. 1, R.S.
- 195.
In the meantime, this reform bill has become law n. 234/2012, so all the following remarks are meant to be considered as de iure condito.
- 196.
The draft law mentioned here has been extensively commented on by Di Salvatore and Mangiameli (2010).
- 197.
The first Memorandum of Understanding between the Senate of the Republic, the Chamber of Deputies and the Conference of the Speakers of the Legislative Assemblies of the Regions and Autonomous Provinces was signed on 28 June 2007; the second on 21 July 2009. This latter Memorandum envisages cooperation not only on European issues but on all legislation (“a liaison body between the multiple requests coming from the legislative assemblies of the different territorial levels”) whose scope includes the “implementation of article 119 of the Constitution”, that “represents a unifying framework for the implementation of public policies at different territorial levels”. In particular, the protocol envisages the “promotion of new procedures designed to give a voice to the requests of the local bodies within the legislative procedure at national and regional levels, with specific reference to Art. 119 of the Constitution on tax federalism” and “the development and integration of legislative, policy and control functions especially in the area of complex policies”.
- 198.
- 199.
The regional regulations and the cases of actual participation being referred to and those that are quoted below are taken from Iacoviello, in Iacoviello and Saputelli (2011), p. 257–264.
- 200.
“1. Within the framework of the procedure envisaged in Art. 4, para. 2, the Regional Council evaluates compliance with the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality in the draft acts of the European Union that deal with subjects over which the regions have competence and forwards the results to the Chambers, in accordance with the provision of Art. 6 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (no. 2), annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The results of this evaluation are forwarded also to the Committee of the Regions. 2. The Region forwards the data, reports or documents requested by the Council within the deadline that has been set and in any case in time for them to be examined as per para. 1. This evaluation, where deemed appropriate, is forwarded to the Council of the local governments for their opinion in accordance with Art. 9, para. 4 of R.L. no. 1 of 17 January 2005 (Establishment of the Council of local governments and of the Standing Conference of Regions – local authorities). 3. The results of the verification envisaged in para. 1 are forwarded to the regional giunta for the adoption of any acts as the case may be and for the definition of the position of the Region in institutional forums for discussion with the Government as identified in state laws on procedures”.
- 201.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) (COM/2012/0011). Reasoned opinion of the Camera dei deputati: 29 March 2012.
- 202.
The documents are the following: (1) Proposal for a Parliament/Council Regulation implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection (COM/2011/215). Reasoned opinion of the Camera dei deputati: 9 June 2011; (2) Proposal for a Council Regulation implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements (COM/2011/216). Reasoned opinion of the Camera dei deputati: 8 June 2011.
- 203.
On this issue see also Ibrido (2010).
- 204.
Art. 5, para. 1, Ley 8/1994.
- 205.
Art. 3, para. 1, lit. j), Ley 8/1994.
- 206.
Art. 5, para. 2, Ley 8/1994.
- 207.
Art. 5, para. 2, Ley 8/1994.
- 208.
Art. 5, para. 3, Ley 8/1994.
- 209.
On the Spanish Regions and the EU in general, see Orofino (2001).
- 210.
Committee of the Regions, The Role of Regional Parliaments, p. 79–80.
- 211.
Art. 6, para. 2, Ley 8/1994.
- 212.
Committee of the Regions, The Role of Regional Parliaments, p. 85–86.
- 213.
Art. 10, para. 1, Ley 8/1994.
- 214.
Art. 10, para. 2, Ley 8/1994.
- 215.
Art. 64, para. 1, Reglamento.
- 216.
Art. 65, para. 1, Reglamento.
- 217.
Reference is being made to the following documents: (1) Proposal for a Parliament/Council Regulation implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection (COM/2011/215). Reasoned opinion of the Cortes generales: 14 June 2011; (2) Proposal for a Council Regulation implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements (COM/2011/216). Reasoned opinion of the Cortes generales: 14 June 2011.
- 218.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Directive on the award of concession contracts (COM/2011/0897). Reasoned opinion of Cortes generales: 1 February 2012.
- 219.
Especially because three of these five opinions concern acts against which no other Parliament has made complaints concerning subsidiarity. In the other two cases, the Spanish “double” opinion was accompanied by only one other opinion (that of the Bulgarian Parliament and that of the Austrian Nationalrat, respectively).
- 220.
See Biondi (2012), p. 220–222.
- 221.
SO-Commons, n. 84, lit. i).
- 222.
SO-Commons, n. 143, para. 2.
- 223.
SO-Commons, n. 143, para. 6.
- 224.
SO-Commons, n. 143, para. 7.
- 225.
SO-Commons, n. 143, para. 3.
- 226.
SO-Commons, n. 143, para. 10.
- 227.
House of Commons—European Scrutiny Committee, First Special Report on “Subsidiarity, National Parliaments and the Lisbon Treaty: Government Response to the Committee’s Thirty-third Report of Session 2007–08” (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmeuleg/197/197.pdf).
- 228.
House of Commons—Select Committee on Modernisation, Scrutiny of European Business, HC 465-I (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmmodern/465/46502.htm).
- 229.
Ivi, para. 119.
- 230.
SO-Commons, n. 143, para. 4.
- 231.
SO-Commons, n. 143, para. 5.
- 232.
SO-Commons, n. 143, para. 11.
- 233.
Cf. Mayer (2012), p. 466, according to whom the Committees on European Affairs are not entitled to any “plenary competence”.
- 234.
Department of the Clerk of the House, The European Scrutiny System in the House of Commons (http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/TheEuroScrutinySystemintheHoC.pdf), p. 9–10.
- 235.
SO-Commons, n. 125; n. 119, para. 12, in connection with no. 89, para. 2.
- 236.
Companion SO-Lords, n. 10.64 et seq.
- 237.
Companion SO-Lords, n. 10.64, para. 2.
- 238.
Companion SO-Lords, n. 10.65.
- 239.
Companion SO-Lords, n. 11.16.
- 240.
- 241.
Companion SO-Lords, n. 11.16.
- 242.
House of Lords, Subsidiarity and the Lords EU Committee (http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-select/subsidiarity/websubsidiaritydoc.pdf), p. 3.
- 243.
Companion SO-Lords, n. 1.42.
- 244.
Companion SO-Lords, n. 11.33.
- 245.
Companion SO-Lords, n. 11.33.
- 246.
House of Lords, How will the Lords EU Committee operate these new powers? (http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-select/subsidiarity/use-new-powers.pdf), p. 1.
- 247.
See Fasone (2009), p. 423–424.
- 248.
This is how Bogdanor (2009), p. 89, refers to it.
- 249.
Bogdanor (2009), p. 89.
- 250.
Art. 6, para. 8, Standing Orders of the Scottish Parliament. On the functions of the Committee, see Fasone (2009), p. 424–425.
- 251.
Fasone (2009), p. 424–425.
- 252.
Committee of the Regions, The Role of Regional Parliaments, p. 122–123.
- 253.
Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (COM/2011/121). Reasoned opinion of the House of Commons: 19 October 2011.
- 254.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (COM/2011/635). Reasoned opinion of House of Commons: 23 November 2011.
- 255.
Proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 on the financing of the common agricultural policy and Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) as regards food distribution to the most deprived persons in the Community (COD/2008/0183). Reasoned opinion of the House of Lords; 25 October 2011.
- 256.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment (COM/2010/379). Reasoned opinion of the House of Lords: 24 August 2010.
- 257.
Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services (COM/2012/0130). Reasoned opinion of the House of Commons: 9 May 2012. See the final part of the paragraph on France for greater details on the mentioned use of the yellow card.
- 258.
On this issue see House of Commons—Library, Scotland, independence and the EU (http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06110) 8 November 2011.
- 259.
See Committee of the Regions, The Role of Regional Parliaments.
- 260.
Ivi, 85–86.
- 261.
It is worth pointing out that all the data provided here are taken from the IPEX data base.
- 262.
Given the special procedure established in Spain, with a view to comparing individual chambers, it was decided to attribute to each of the two Cortes Generales, half of the votes cast by the mixed Committee (which votes on behalf of both).
- 263.
And in ranking order there are also: Chamber of Deputies (4 opinions); House of Lords, Italian Senate and Belgian Chamber of Representatives (3); Austrian Nationalrat and German Bundestag (2); Belgian Senate and French National Assembly (1).
- 264.
Data are provided also on the national Parliaments that have not yet been mentioned: Denmark (5 opinions); Slovakia (4); Lithuania and Romania (3); Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Malta and Portugal (2); Cyprus and Latvia (1); Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland and Slovenia (0).
- 265.
Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services (COM/2012/0130).
- 266.
Five opinions were issued by the following two-chamber Parliaments (hence, five votes): French Senate, Belgian Chamber of Representatives, House of Commons, Polish Sejm, Dutch Lower Chamber. Seven opinions were issued by the single-chamber Parliaments of the following States (hence, 14 votes): Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Sweden.
- 267.
- 268.
Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 on the financing of the common agricultural policy and Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) as regards food distribution to the most deprived persons in the Community (COD/2008/0183).
- 269.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) (COM/2012/0011).
- 270.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment (COM/2010/379).
- 271.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (COM/2011/635).
- 272.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Directive on the award of concession contracts (COM/2011/0897).
- 273.
Proposal for a Parliament/Council Regulation implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection (COM/2011/215) and Proposal for a Council Regulation implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements (COM/2011/216).
- 274.
Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (COM/2011/121).
- 275.
- 276.
- 277.
Cf. Cooper (2006).
- 278.
CONV 286/02, 23 September 2002.
- 279.
Except for the adjustments concerning the cross-references to other articles, due to the different numbering of them in the two Treaties, the wordings of the four paragraphs of Art. 7 in the Constitutional Treaty and the wordings of the first two sections of Art. 7 in the actual version fit together neatly.
- 280.
- 281.
This point of view implies a perspective in favour of the so-called Kompetenzschutz durch Verfahren and calls to mind the words used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 19 February 1985: “State sovereign interests […] are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power”. See also Massa Pinto (2003), p. 1234, according to whom “this procedure could be qualified as an expression of cooperative federalism, directed at satisfying the requirements through participation in the process rather than through the strict formal division of responsibilities”.
- 282.
See Kiiver (2012b), p. 103–125.
- 283.
For an analysis of the underlying mechanism of the early warning system, see Kiiver (2012a).
- 284.
We must specify that the Constitutional Treaty provided the different time-limit of 6 weeks.
- 285.
See Art. 289.4 TFEU: “In the specific cases provided for by the Treaties, legislative acts may be adopted on the initiative of a group of Member States or of the European Parliament, on a recommendation from the European Central Bank or at the request of the Court of Justice or the European Investment Bank”.
- 286.
See Art. 223.1; 223.2; 226.3; 228.4 TFEU.
- 287.
See Art. 76 TFEU.
- 288.
See Art. 129.3 TFEU.
- 289.
See Art. 257.1; 281.2 TFEU.
- 290.
See Art. 308.3 TFEU.
- 291.
In fact, Art. 4 of Protocol No. 2, that indicates the bodies in charge of sending legislative drafts to Parliaments, does not mention the case in which the draft derives from Council.
- 292.
- 293.
Hence, in total the available votes are 54 (2 for each of the 27 MS). Twelve of them have a two-chamber Parliament (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Spain); the remaining 15 have a single chamber (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden and Hungary).
- 294.
See Bruno (2005), p. 638.
- 295.
See Stancanelli, in Curti Gialdino (2012), Art. 5, p. 90. Also Priollaud and Siritzky (2008) think that the concrete application of the Protocol depends on the interparliamentary coordination system, though the right to send reasoned opinions remains an individual right of the chambers (p. 432). Moreover see Porchia (2011), p. 16.
- 296.
Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union. On the interparliamentary coordination system, see Storini (2004).
- 297.
See Bußjäger (2010), p. 55.
- 298.
Council Decision 2009/937/EU of 1 December 2009 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure, O.J. L 325/35 (2009).
- 299.
For example, with the simple majority system the orange card can be activated if a legislative drafts receives two “non-compliance” votes and one “compliance” vote. That is a paradox, because only two votes are needed to activate the orange card, while a larger consensus (33 %, i.e. 18 votes) is needed for the “weaker” yellow card.
- 300.
The Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam did not envisage jurisdictional control after preventive control. Ex post control was entrusted to the Court of Justice because it is competent to ensure “respect for the law in interpreting and applying the treaty” in accordance with general rules by entities that are entitled to having recourse to Art. 230 EC (Tizzano 2004, p. 207).
- 301.
Final Document of the “Subsidiarity” working group—CONV 286/2002, that can be found on the internet website http://european-convention.eu.int. See also the Resolution of the European Parliament on the role of regional and local powers in the European construction of 14 January 2003, in O.J. C 38 (2004).
- 302.
The working group did not take on the proposal of granting to the regions having legislative powers the right of having recourse to the Court of Justice when the principle of subsidiarity is violated. Failure to legitimise procedures before the Court of Justice by the regions having legislative powers cannot be taken to be offset by legitimising the Committee of Regions to overrule European legislative acts that are in contrast with the subsidiarity principle. If it is true that the Regions with legislative powers could be tempted to take advantage of the role acknowledged to the Committee of Regions to earn new space at the European level, it is likewise true that the Committee can file a challenge only for the European acts for the adoption of which the Treaty envisages consultation; there is no full correspondence between the subjects for which it is compulsory to consult the Committee of the Regions and the subjects over which the regions are competent. Hence in case of violation of the subsidiarity principle referring to legislative acts for the adoption of which the Treaty on the functioning of the Union does not envisage consultation, the Committee could not take action with evident consequences on the involvement of the regions that could only activate the challenge procedure only where this is envisaged by their national orders. See Mangiameli (2008), p. 195–196.
- 303.
Envisaging a link between the possibility of filing a challenge for the violation of the principle of subsidiarity and the activation by the national Parliaments of the early warning system, or the formulation of a reasoned opinion by the Committee of Regions would entail the risk of stimulating national Parliaments and the Committee of Regions to raise issues on the principle of subsidiarity just not to lose the right to challenge an act, with evident consequences on the European decision-making process (Mastroianni 2005, p. 411).
- 304.
The TFEU lays down that the Committee of Regions must be consulted for policies on transport (Art. 100 TFEU), employment (Art. 148, 149 TFEU), social policy (Art. 153 TFEU), education, vocational training, youth and sport (Art. 165, 166 TFEU), culture (Art. 167 TFEU), health (Art. 168 TFEU), transeuropean networks (Art. 172 TFEU), economic cohesion (Art. 177 TFEU), environment (Art. 191 TFEU) and energy (Art. 194 TFEU). Hence, besides the consultative role envisaged by the TFEU, it also has the role of overseeing compliance of the European legislation with the subsidiarity principle. The new role attributed to the Committee of Regions is an additional procedural measure that guarantees sub-state government levels. On the procedural measures for the principle and on their importance with a view to its justiciability see D’Atena (2005), p. 72–73.
- 305.
It is important to highlight that the enhancement of the role of national Parliaments as a form of democratic legitimisation external to the system may run the risk of reducing the role and the prestige of the EP; to this effect see, Mastroianni (2010), p. 196.
- 306.
Even though the Committee goes on being a consultative body of the European institutions, it is given the possibility of bringing cases before the Court of Justice independently of the defence of its own prerogatives stricto sensu. The power of filing a challenge for violation of the principle of subsidiarity attributed by the Treaty of Lisbon to the Committee of Regions comes to add to the power it has been granted of acting to protect its own rights in all the cases in which it was not consulted. To this effect see, Feral (2004).
- 307.
Envisaging that challenges may be filed as per Art. 8 of the Protocol, attributes a precise legal value to the principle of subsidiarity and makes it justiciable, which evidently strengthens control on its correct application by the European legislator; to this effect, see Chiti (2010), p. 394.
- 308.
- 309.
To this effect see Bruno (2005), p. 639.
- 310.
With reference to the expectations of a different European case law on the subsidiarity principle, by way of criticism, it is found that with respect to the case law of the Court, “the breakdown of competences and the subsidiarity principle on which the protection of the legislative powers of national Parliaments are based, would end up being brought before the European judge who almost invariably – as decisions are made on a case by case basis – would use it in a highly discretional manner without constitutional predictability”; cf. Mangiameli (2008), p. 195. On this issue see also Hinosa Martinez (2004), p. 824–826.
- 311.
Art. 8 (1) envisages that challenges be forwarded by MS consistently with their internal legal order on behalf of their respective national Parliaments or of a single chamber; it is well known however that the challenges before the Court of Justice are forwarded by national governments. Hence the need to set up internal application mechanisms for submitting challenges.
- 312.
On the risk of internal conflicts between national Parliaments and executive powers following the overlapping of roles, and in particular the contrast between the position of Parliament and that expressed by the Government in the Council of the Union, see Cafari Panico (2006), p. 107–108. More in general, on the problems opened up by the mechanism of involvement of national Parliaments in ex post control on the correct application of the subsidiarity principle, see Mastroianni (2005), p. 411–413.; see also Gianniti (2010), p. 183–185.
- 313.
With special reference to the involvement of the legislative assemblies see Mangiameli (2008), p. 196.
- 314.
In these cases the decisions of the chambers are considered to be policy acts by Parliament addressed to the government; among the countries that have opted for this approach consider Spain that has attributed to the Government the power of not complying with the request by Parliament to file a challenge with the Court of Justice, but with the obligation of presenting its motivation before the Mixed Committee for the European Union (see Art. 7 of Ley 8/1994, as amended by Ley 24/2009).
- 315.
The Italian order seems to be looking to this model as it is delineating the institutional mechanisms for filing challenges with the Court of Justice by Parliament, in that Art. 39 of the reform bill of Act 11/2005 entitled “Filing Challenges to the European Union Court of Justice”, due for discussion in the Senate (A.S. n. 2646), in para. 3 envisages that “the Government, without delay, shall file the challenges decided by the Senate of the Republic or by the Chamber of Deputies to the Court of Justice against a legislative act of the European Union for violation of the subsidiarity principle in accordance with [Art. 8 of Protocol No. 2]. The Chamber that has decided the challenge shall appear before the Court through its representative”. For more thorough information about the solutions adopted by MS on the actual application of Art. 8.1 of the Protocol see Porchia (2011), p. 24–25, and the references provided therein.
- 316.
As for the political implications of the right of national Parliaments to refer to the CJEU, some authors fear that this right may be politically exploited by parliamentary minorities in the parliamentary discussion. In Germany, in order to create a sort of compensation for the right to refer to the Court, these concerns have been addressed by installing the possibility of a majority of two thirds of the Bundestag to oppose a motion of a parliamentary group (fraction) to initiate proceedings; on this point see Edenharter and Uerpmann-Wittzack (2009), p. 326. Mention is also made of the case of Lithuania that envisages the power of initiative by 1/5 of the members of the Seimas, which is however followed only by the obligation of holding a parliamentary debate.
- 317.
- 318.
Various States, in implementing Art. 8.1 of the Protocol, have introduced articulated procedures both with reference to the instruments that provide connections between Parliament and Government and to those for the actual forwarding of challenges: Polish Parliament confers an express mandate on the Prime Minister “to represent the Sejm or the Senate, as appropriate, in proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning the complaint”; that document shall be attached to the complaint lodged with the Court of Justice of the European Union (Art. 17, para. 2, Act of 8 October 2010 on the cooperation of the Council of Ministers with the Sejm and the Senate in matters relating to the Republic of Poland’s membership of the European Union). Estonia envisages a non-binding opinion by Government, which nevertheless is obliged to forward the complaint (§ 1527, para. 5–6, Riigikogu Rules of Procedure and Internal Rules Act Union, RT I 2010, 28, 144—entered into force 14 June 2010). Lithuania provides detailed provisions on the procedure for deciding on the complaint. It envisages the involvement of the Parliamentary Committees and Government, that also in this case is obliged to forward the complaint (see Art. 180-41, para. 6, 7, 13, of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania).
- 319.
In this case, it is deemed that the legal instance can be considered as the exercise of an executive power of the Government: the forwarding of the challenge by the Government would indeed be configured as an execution or “administrative” act in the strict sense (in the same way, failure to exercise the power would be seem to be a significant silence of the Government), prejudicial to the legal sphere of national Parliament or of one of its chambers. Parliament, or one of its chambers, holders of an autonomous public law legal personality, could therefore take legal action before an administrative court (or another court that may be competent depending on the specificities of each legal order) asking that the internal regulation envisaging that Government has a filtering power be disapplied in favour of European law and in particular Art. 8.1 of the Protocol.
- 320.
See Porchia (2011), p. 223 and in particular p. 238.
- 321.
In Italy, for example, only a few Regions (Emilia Romagna, Sicily and Sardinia) have made specific provisions on procedures for controlling the correct application of the subsidiarity principle, envisaging links with the Giunta to define the position that the Region is to take in the forums identified by the procedural laws, including the request to Government to have recourse to the Court of Justice for violation of the subsidiarity principle [on this point see Iacoviello, in Iacoviello and Saputelli (2011), p. 258–259]; in the Italian case, the formalisation of the position of the region in the procedures for participating in the shaping of European law is entrusted mainly to the regional executive bodies, as in the case of Art. 5 para. 2 of Act 131/2003 that lays down the duty for Government to act before the CJEU if the request comes from the State-Regions Conference, with an absolute majority of Regions and Autonomous Provinces.
- 322.
Committee of the Regions, Rules of Procedure, O.J. L 6/14 (2010). It is worth pointing out that the Treaty of Lisbon, by transposing the TCE provisions, has extended to the Committee of Regions the status of so-called semi-privileged petitioner, who is legitimised to take action before the Court of Justice to protect its attributions; it is well known that the acceptance of complaints filed by semi-privileged petitioners is subject to demonstration of the violation of their rights. For further information on bodies that are legitimised to file complaints to the Court of Justice see Art. 263 TFEU.
- 323.
The Committee that draws up the draft opinion decides on the majority of members present, after ensuring there is a quorum; the reasons for submitting a complaint to the Court of Justice must be presented in a detailed report that the Committee submits to the attention of the plenary Assembly or to the President’s Office.
- 324.
- 325.
For the type of complaint, express reference is made to Art. 263 TFEU contained in Art. 8.1 of the Protocol. Also complaints that protect the powers of the Committee of Regions fall into the same category; in the latter case, the reasons for censuring a challenged acts refer to a violation of substantial forms, which includes the violation of the duty to consult with the consultative bodies as provided for by the Treaties. Mention is made here also of a complaint for failure to act based on non compliance with the principle of subsidiarity when an institution does not intervene on a subject that comes under its exclusive competence; to this effect see, Curti Gialdino (1993), p. 68 et seqq.
- 326.
For a study of the differences between this jurisdictional control and the controls envisaged ordinarily in national Constitutions and, in particular, in the German Constitution, see Shirvani (2010), p. 755–756.
- 327.
The idea of restricting ex post control only to legislative acts is not shared by some authors in the literature; on the main arguments in support of an extensive interpretation see Porchia (2011) and the references provided therein.
- 328.
Gianniti (2010), p. 185. Only exceptionally, has the Court of Justice verified in point of fact the compliance of a European legislative act with the principle of subsidiarity, confirming the competence of the European legislator [Case C-377/1998, Netherlands v Parliament and Council (ECJ 9 October 2001); Case C-491/01, British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd. and Imperial Tobacco Ltd (ECJ 10 December 2002); for an overview of the limited development of the case law of the Court see Case T-374/04, Germany v Commission (CFI 7 November 2007); Case T-170/06, Alrosa v Commission (CFI 11 July 2007); Case C-32/05, Commission v Luxembourg (ECJ 30 November 2006); Case C-216/05, Commission v Ireland (ECJ 9 November 2006)]. Considering the fact that the motivation consists in a multiplicity of arguments that are strictly linked to the broad discretionary powers of the European legislator, in order to make jurisdictional control as objective as possible, some evaluation parameters need to be identified. Both the Court of Justice, as jurisdictional control body, and the Commission, since it is burdened by the need to motivate the draft legislative acts, will have to identify indicators that make it possible to verify whether a given goal may be achieved best through a legislative intervention at European level. On case law concerning subsidiarity see also Lienbacher, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 5 para 31.
- 329.
This remark is made in the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 305—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 383 et seq.).
- 330.
Commission Communication, A citizens’ agenda – delivering results for Europe, COM(2006) 211 final.
- 331.
For all the annual Reports of the Commission, see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_en.htm.
- 332.
Commission Communication, Action plan “Simplifying and improving the regulatory environment”, COM(2002) 278 final, p. 19.
- 333.
Respectively: 83, 168, 368, 250, 387, 622. These numbers concern all kinds of opinions (including the ones issued in the context of the political dialogue, that may also involve non-legislative acts).
- 334.
Less than 25 in 2009; 34 in 2010; 64 in 2011.
- 335.
European Commission, General Report on the activities of the European Union, 2011, p. 170–171.
Table of Cases
ECJ
ECJ 15.07.1963, 34/62, Germany v Commission, ECR 269 [cit. in para 56]
ECJ 01.12.1965, 16/65, Schwarze v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, ECR 1081 [cit. in para 50]
ECJ 18.03.1975, 72/74, Union Syndicale v Council, ECR 401 [cit. in para 31]
ECJ 07.07.1981, 158/80, Rewe v Hauptzollamt Kiel, ECR 1805 [cit. in para 56]
ECJ 23.02.1988, 131/86, United Kingdom v Council, ECR 905 [cit. in para 56]
ECJ 21.09.1989, Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst v Commission, ECR 2859 [cit. in para 53]
ECJ 10.12.1985, Joined Cases 240/82 et al., Stichting Sigarettenindustrie et al. v Commission, ECR 3831 [cit. in para 56]
ECJ 06.07.1993, Joined Cases 121/91 and 122/91, CT Control et al. v Commission, ECR I-3873 [cit. in para 53]
ECJ 15.06.1994, C-137/92, Commission v BASF et al., ECR I-2555 [cit. in para 56]
ECJ 09.11.1995, C-466/93, Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft et al. (II) v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft, ECR I-3799 [cit. in para 55]
ECJ 23.11.1995, C-10/95 P, Asocarne v Council (ECJ 23 November 1995) ECR I-4149 [cit. in para 31]
ECJ 02.04.1998, C-367/95 P, Commission v Sytravaland Brink’s France, ECR I-1719 [cit. in para 56]
ECJ 10.12.2002, C-491/01, British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd. and Imperial Tobacco Ltd, ECR I-11453 [cit. in para 213]
ECJ 09.11.2006, C-216/05, Commission v Ireland, ECR I-10787 [cit. in para 213]
ECJ 30.11.2006, C-32/05, Commission v Luxembourg, ECR I-11323 [cit. in para 213]
CFI
CFI 10.03.1992, T-9/89, Hüls v Commission, ECR II-499 [cit. in para 33]
CFI 06.07.1992, T-66/89, Publishers’ Association v Commission, ECR II-1995 [cit. in para 53]
CFI 18.09.1992, T-24/90, Automec v Commission, ECR II-2223 [cit. in para 53]
CFI 03.02.2000, T-46/98, CCRE v Commission, ECR II-167 [cit. in para 53, 55, 56]
CFI 14.05.2002, T-80/00, Associação Comercial de Aveiro v Commission, ECR II-2465 [cit. in para 55]
CFI 11.09.2002, T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health v Council, ECR II-3305 [cit. in para 33]
CFI 07.06.2006, T-613/97, Ufex et al. v Commission, ECR II-1531 [cit. in para 56]
CFI 11.07.2007, T-170/06, Alrosa v Commission, ECR II-2601 [cit. in para 213]
CFI 07.11.2007, T-374/04, Germany v Commission, ECR II-4431 [cit. in para 213]
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Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (2013). Protocol (No. 2). In: Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (eds) The Treaty on European Union (TEU). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31706-4_58
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