Katinka Quintelier
Please visit my homepage: users.ugent.be/~kquintel
The main topic of my research is individual differences in morality. Please visit my homepage for up-to-date information.
Take part in online research:
http://moralpsychology.questionpro.com
We are looking for participants (over 18) who want to fill out a short survey (10 minutes). Participation is anonymous and voluntary. After completing the survey, we give more information about the research hypotheses.
http://affect.questionpro.com
We are looking for women between 40 and 60 years old to take this test about affect and judgments. You will be asked to evaluate a variety of pictures and a variety of stiuations. This is followed by questions about your menstrual cycle and/or phase in menopause transition.
www.surveymonkey.com/s/attractiveness
This survey asks you to rate women's attractiveness. It takes 15 minutes or less. Everyone over 18 is eligible to participate but we need especially male participants.
http://statements.questionpro.com
This survey aims to find patterns in individual's moral fingerprints. If you are a US resident wanting to participate, please fill out this survey. If not, please fill out the survey below.
http://moreleoordelen.questionpro.com
This survey aims to find patterns in individual's moral fingerprints. If you do not reside in the US and want to participate, please fill out this survey. If you are a US resident wanting to participate, please fill out the survey above.
Supervisors: Johan Braeckman, Luc Crevits, and Daniel Fessler
The main topic of my research is individual differences in morality. Please visit my homepage for up-to-date information.
Take part in online research:
http://moralpsychology.questionpro.com
We are looking for participants (over 18) who want to fill out a short survey (10 minutes). Participation is anonymous and voluntary. After completing the survey, we give more information about the research hypotheses.
http://affect.questionpro.com
We are looking for women between 40 and 60 years old to take this test about affect and judgments. You will be asked to evaluate a variety of pictures and a variety of stiuations. This is followed by questions about your menstrual cycle and/or phase in menopause transition.
www.surveymonkey.com/s/attractiveness
This survey asks you to rate women's attractiveness. It takes 15 minutes or less. Everyone over 18 is eligible to participate but we need especially male participants.
http://statements.questionpro.com
This survey aims to find patterns in individual's moral fingerprints. If you are a US resident wanting to participate, please fill out this survey. If not, please fill out the survey below.
http://moreleoordelen.questionpro.com
This survey aims to find patterns in individual's moral fingerprints. If you do not reside in the US and want to participate, please fill out this survey. If you are a US resident wanting to participate, please fill out the survey above.
Supervisors: Johan Braeckman, Luc Crevits, and Daniel Fessler
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Papers by Katinka Quintelier
relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful, is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning. Fourth, we discuss recent studies in moral psychology that are relevant for the philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for moral relativism can and cannot be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest how moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on the topic of moral relativism in the future.
provide input to the normative domain of ethics. Whereas defenders of a scientific normative ethics appeal to naturalism, its critics either see the naturalistic fallacy committed or argue that the relevance of science to normative ethics remains undemonstrated. In this paper, we argue that current scientific normative ethicists commit no fallacy, that criticisms of scientific ethics contradict each other, and that scientific
insights are relevant to normative inquiries by informing ethics about the options open to the ethical debate. Moreover, when conceiving normative ethics as being a nonfoundational
ethics, science can be used to evaluate every possible norm. This stands in contrast to foundational ethics in which some norms remain beyond scientific inquiry. Finally, we state that a difference in conception of normative ethics underlies
the disagreement between proponents and opponents of a scientific ethics. Our argument is based on and preceded by a reconsideration of the notions naturalistic fallacy and foundational ethics. This argument differs from previous work in scientific ethics: whereas before the philosophical project of naturalizing the normative has been stressed, here we focus on concrete consequences of biological findings for normative
decisions or on the day-to-day normative relevance of these scientific insights.
Talks by Katinka Quintelier
cooperation in a context of cooperative breeding. To test this, I translated this to an experimental setting. Men and women were asked to play an investment game. Facial similarity was used as a proxy of relatedness (DeBruine et al., 2008). A context of cooperative breeding was elicited by showing baby pictures. Unfortunately, the results were not entirely clear-cut. I will discuss the results of this experiment and their relevance for the cooperative breeding hypothesis.
relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful, is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning. Fourth, we discuss recent studies in moral psychology that are relevant for the philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for moral relativism can and cannot be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest how moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on the topic of moral relativism in the future.
provide input to the normative domain of ethics. Whereas defenders of a scientific normative ethics appeal to naturalism, its critics either see the naturalistic fallacy committed or argue that the relevance of science to normative ethics remains undemonstrated. In this paper, we argue that current scientific normative ethicists commit no fallacy, that criticisms of scientific ethics contradict each other, and that scientific
insights are relevant to normative inquiries by informing ethics about the options open to the ethical debate. Moreover, when conceiving normative ethics as being a nonfoundational
ethics, science can be used to evaluate every possible norm. This stands in contrast to foundational ethics in which some norms remain beyond scientific inquiry. Finally, we state that a difference in conception of normative ethics underlies
the disagreement between proponents and opponents of a scientific ethics. Our argument is based on and preceded by a reconsideration of the notions naturalistic fallacy and foundational ethics. This argument differs from previous work in scientific ethics: whereas before the philosophical project of naturalizing the normative has been stressed, here we focus on concrete consequences of biological findings for normative
decisions or on the day-to-day normative relevance of these scientific insights.
cooperation in a context of cooperative breeding. To test this, I translated this to an experimental setting. Men and women were asked to play an investment game. Facial similarity was used as a proxy of relatedness (DeBruine et al., 2008). A context of cooperative breeding was elicited by showing baby pictures. Unfortunately, the results were not entirely clear-cut. I will discuss the results of this experiment and their relevance for the cooperative breeding hypothesis.