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Verfasst von:Dreher, Axel [VerfasserIn]   i
 Simon, Jenny [VerfasserIn]   i
 Valasek, Justin [VerfasserIn]   i
Titel:Optimal decision rules in multilateral aid funds
Verf.angabe:Axel Dreher, Jenny Simon, Justin Valasek
E-Jahr:2021
Jahr:9 January 2021
Umfang:31 S.
Illustrationen:Diagramme
Fussnoten:Gesehen am 02.09.2021
Titel Quelle:Enthalten in: The review of international organizations
Ort Quelle:Boston, MA [u.a.] : Springer, 2006
Jahr Quelle:2021
Band/Heft Quelle:16(2021), 3, Seite 689-719
ISSN Quelle:1559-744X
Abstract:While existing research has suggested that delegating foreign aid allocation decisions to a multilateral aid fund may incentivize recipient countries to invest in bureaucratic quality, our analysis links the fund’s decision rules to recipient-country investment by explicitly modeling the decision-making within multilateral aid funds. We find that majority rule induces stronger competition between recipients, resulting in higher investments in bureaucratic quality. Despite this advantage, unanimity can still be optimal since the increased investment under majority comes at the cost of low aid allocation to countries in the minority. The qualitative predictions of our model rationalize our novel empirical finding that, relative to organizations that use a consensus rule, organizations that use majority are more responsive to changes in recipient-country quality.
DOI:doi:10.1007/s11558-020-09406-w
URL:kostenfrei: Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-020-09406-w
 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-020-09406-w
Schlagwörter:(s)Fonds   i / (s)Entwicklungshilfe   i / (s)Entwicklungszusammenarbeit   i / (s)Internationale Kooperation   i / (s)Entscheidungsverfahren   i / (s)Internationale Organisation   i / (s)Effektivität   i / (g)Erde   i
Datenträger:Online-Ressource
Sprache:eng
K10plus-PPN:1768416486
Verknüpfungen:→ Zeitschrift
 
 
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