Two major issues impacting Russia’s policy in the newly independent states (NIS) and U.S.Russia r... more Two major issues impacting Russia’s policy in the newly independent states (NIS) and U.S.Russia relations are the presence of U.S. and/or NATO troops in the territories of the NIS, and what might be defined as “new pragmatism” in Russian policy, especially with respect to the relationship between the economic and political components of Russian relations with the NIS. At least one of these issues has surfaced in three crucial regions in the NIS: Central Asia now houses U.S. troops (the insertion of U.S. troops into the NIS has long been one of Russia’s most feared scenarios); the Baltic states are likely to be invited to join NATO in the 2002 Prague summit; and Georgia will probably be the first to experience the burden of the “new pragmatism” of Putin’s foreign policy on the area.
The recent announcement by vice-premier Yuri Masliukov that Russia would produce 30-40 Topol-M (S... more The recent announcement by vice-premier Yuri Masliukov that Russia would produce 30-40 Topol-M (SS-27) single-warhead ICBMs annually put the finishing touches on Russia's defense policy under the conditions of economic crisis. This statement would have come as a surprise to anyone who expected that nuclear weapons production would be scaled down or even discontinued after August 1998. This seemingly paradoxical policy begs for an explanation.
The role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s national security policy moved to the center of attention... more The role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s national security policy moved to the center of attention last year following the new U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, which contained recommendations based, in part, on the assumption that Russia had reduced its nuclear threshold under an “escalate to de-escalate“ strategy. Many contested the U.S. claim and pointed out that the Russian doctrine did not contain those terms or that strategy, and that its nuclear weapons would only be assigned to situations when the “very existence” of the country was at stake. This certainly does not conform to the image of a lowered threshold.
Still, the passing of the ABM Treaty ushers in an era of uncertainty because the parameters of th... more Still, the passing of the ABM Treaty ushers in an era of uncertainty because the parameters of the future U.S.-Russian political-military relationship is not entirely clear. The main risk is no longer a direct confrontation between the two powers, but a crisis generated by misperception, misunderstanding, or even provocation that might upset the emerging atmosphere of partnership. The next several years appear particularly delicate and require careful handling. New opportunities have generated excessive optimism, including plans to quickly and even hastily, do away with such traditional elements of the relationship as nuclear deterrence and existing arms control treaties. Prudence dictates a considerably more cautious attitude toward these traditional elements, or old problems may return with a vengeance.
As NATO contemplates the second wave of enlargement, many wonder what the Russian response might ... more As NATO contemplates the second wave of enlargement, many wonder what the Russian response might be. The experience of 1996-98 might suggest an optimistic scenario: the first wave was met with harsh words and threats, but the actual response was mild. Russia signed the Founding Act, largely on Western terms, and has entered a cooperative relationship with NATO. For Russia, historical memory reaches back further, and offers other precedents with less promising scenarios. The emergence of the Entente Cordiale, the Russo-French-British alliance against Germany in the late 19th century, is one such precedent. Patterns of behavior change slowly, rendering a century-old experience contemporary validity.
Negotiations on a new strategic arms control treaty, proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin... more Negotiations on a new strategic arms control treaty, proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin in July 2006, are likely to be a challenging but fascinating exercise. The new treaty, which for convenience we may dub START+, is supposed to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), set to expire in December 2009. If successful, these negotiations could provide a stable long-term framework for the U.S.Russian strategic nuclear relationship.
As the United States and Russia contemplate the next stage of nuclear arms reductions beyond the ... more As the United States and Russia contemplate the next stage of nuclear arms reductions beyond the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, another issue enters the agenda—that of the impact of possible deep reductions on the shape of the global nuclear balance. As the gap between the US/Russian arsenals and the arsenals of “second-tier” nuclear weapon states narrows, the familiar shape of the global balance, which remains, to a large extent, bipolar, is likely to change. The article explores the Russian approach to the relationship between further US-Russian reductions and the prospect of “nuclear multipolarity,” and assesses the relative weight of this issue in Russian arms control policy as well as the views on the two specific regional balances—the one in Europe (including UK and French nuclear weapons) and in Asia (the possible dynamic of the Russian-Chinese nuclear balance).
... 'We do not approve of Iranian actions that are aimed at persistently demonstrating inten... more ... 'We do not approve of Iranian actions that are aimed at persistently demonstrating intentions to develop missile technology and to continue enriching uranium', said Foreign Minister SergeyLavrov a few ... 64–5; Nikita Petrov, 'Rossiya “Prozrela”' [Russia Has its Eyes Back], Strana. ...
Two major issues impacting Russia’s policy in the newly independent states (NIS) and U.S.Russia r... more Two major issues impacting Russia’s policy in the newly independent states (NIS) and U.S.Russia relations are the presence of U.S. and/or NATO troops in the territories of the NIS, and what might be defined as “new pragmatism” in Russian policy, especially with respect to the relationship between the economic and political components of Russian relations with the NIS. At least one of these issues has surfaced in three crucial regions in the NIS: Central Asia now houses U.S. troops (the insertion of U.S. troops into the NIS has long been one of Russia’s most feared scenarios); the Baltic states are likely to be invited to join NATO in the 2002 Prague summit; and Georgia will probably be the first to experience the burden of the “new pragmatism” of Putin’s foreign policy on the area.
The recent announcement by vice-premier Yuri Masliukov that Russia would produce 30-40 Topol-M (S... more The recent announcement by vice-premier Yuri Masliukov that Russia would produce 30-40 Topol-M (SS-27) single-warhead ICBMs annually put the finishing touches on Russia's defense policy under the conditions of economic crisis. This statement would have come as a surprise to anyone who expected that nuclear weapons production would be scaled down or even discontinued after August 1998. This seemingly paradoxical policy begs for an explanation.
The role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s national security policy moved to the center of attention... more The role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s national security policy moved to the center of attention last year following the new U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, which contained recommendations based, in part, on the assumption that Russia had reduced its nuclear threshold under an “escalate to de-escalate“ strategy. Many contested the U.S. claim and pointed out that the Russian doctrine did not contain those terms or that strategy, and that its nuclear weapons would only be assigned to situations when the “very existence” of the country was at stake. This certainly does not conform to the image of a lowered threshold.
Still, the passing of the ABM Treaty ushers in an era of uncertainty because the parameters of th... more Still, the passing of the ABM Treaty ushers in an era of uncertainty because the parameters of the future U.S.-Russian political-military relationship is not entirely clear. The main risk is no longer a direct confrontation between the two powers, but a crisis generated by misperception, misunderstanding, or even provocation that might upset the emerging atmosphere of partnership. The next several years appear particularly delicate and require careful handling. New opportunities have generated excessive optimism, including plans to quickly and even hastily, do away with such traditional elements of the relationship as nuclear deterrence and existing arms control treaties. Prudence dictates a considerably more cautious attitude toward these traditional elements, or old problems may return with a vengeance.
As NATO contemplates the second wave of enlargement, many wonder what the Russian response might ... more As NATO contemplates the second wave of enlargement, many wonder what the Russian response might be. The experience of 1996-98 might suggest an optimistic scenario: the first wave was met with harsh words and threats, but the actual response was mild. Russia signed the Founding Act, largely on Western terms, and has entered a cooperative relationship with NATO. For Russia, historical memory reaches back further, and offers other precedents with less promising scenarios. The emergence of the Entente Cordiale, the Russo-French-British alliance against Germany in the late 19th century, is one such precedent. Patterns of behavior change slowly, rendering a century-old experience contemporary validity.
Negotiations on a new strategic arms control treaty, proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin... more Negotiations on a new strategic arms control treaty, proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin in July 2006, are likely to be a challenging but fascinating exercise. The new treaty, which for convenience we may dub START+, is supposed to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), set to expire in December 2009. If successful, these negotiations could provide a stable long-term framework for the U.S.Russian strategic nuclear relationship.
As the United States and Russia contemplate the next stage of nuclear arms reductions beyond the ... more As the United States and Russia contemplate the next stage of nuclear arms reductions beyond the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, another issue enters the agenda—that of the impact of possible deep reductions on the shape of the global nuclear balance. As the gap between the US/Russian arsenals and the arsenals of “second-tier” nuclear weapon states narrows, the familiar shape of the global balance, which remains, to a large extent, bipolar, is likely to change. The article explores the Russian approach to the relationship between further US-Russian reductions and the prospect of “nuclear multipolarity,” and assesses the relative weight of this issue in Russian arms control policy as well as the views on the two specific regional balances—the one in Europe (including UK and French nuclear weapons) and in Asia (the possible dynamic of the Russian-Chinese nuclear balance).
... 'We do not approve of Iranian actions that are aimed at persistently demonstrating inten... more ... 'We do not approve of Iranian actions that are aimed at persistently demonstrating intentions to develop missile technology and to continue enriching uranium', said Foreign Minister SergeyLavrov a few ... 64–5; Nikita Petrov, 'Rossiya “Prozrela”' [Russia Has its Eyes Back], Strana. ...
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