Working Papers by Eoghan Stafford
The great powers appear to be entering an era of heightened competition to master
security-relev... more The great powers appear to be entering an era of heightened competition to master
security-relevant technologies in areas such as AI. This is concerning because deploying
new technologies can create substantial shared risks, such as inadvertent crisis
escalation or uncontrolled proliferation. We analyze a strategic model to determine
when states deploy technologies before learning how to minimize their risks. When
competitors are moderately adversarial or the technology laggard is not very capable,
the laggard does not use a risky technology unless it catches up to the technology
leader. By contrast, if competitors are highly adversarial and the laggard is closer to
the leader’s capability level, the laggard is willing to cut corners to gamble for advantage,
so that the shared risk falls if the laggard catches up. Further, when competitors
are not deploying the riskiest technologies, steps to make those technologies safer will
be attenuated or reversed by risk compensation.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
The world appears to be entering an era of heightened great power technological competition in ar... more The world appears to be entering an era of heightened great power technological competition in areas such as artificial intelligence. This is concerning because deploying new technologies often involves private benefits and broadly distributed risks. We analyze a dynamic model of a technology competition with negative externalities. Competitors can sometimes reduce risks through a self-enforcing pact in which a laggard agrees not to pursue one kind of technology and in exchange the leader shares other technical discoveries. When the rewards from technological preeminence are high, rivals can only avoid a race if the gap between them is neither too large nor too small. Tech-sharing bargains preserve the laggard's threat to resume racing if the leader reneges, and therefore can work when the leader cannot credibly promise to simply pay the laggard not to race. We further show that tech-sharing bargains do not require perfect monitoring capability by either party.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Why do dictators sometimes allow and sometimes forbid opposition media? I propose a theory that d... more Why do dictators sometimes allow and sometimes forbid opposition media? I propose a theory that dictators allow opposition media when their regimes are most likely to survive an uprising, in order to signal their strength to citizens and discourage them from protesting. To test the implications of the theory, I construct a panel dataset on ten Arab countries with authoritarian regimes during 1992-2017. The data measure which regimes allowed opposition groups to produce media in which years and reflect a wide range of opposition groups (of various ideologies and legal statuses) and of media (including newspapers, websites, and TV channels). I find that, in years when authoritarian regimes experience strong economic performance — including low unemployment, high economic growth, and plentiful revenue from oil and natural gas — they are far more likely to permit opposition media. After the “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2011 revealed that the region’s authoritarian regimes were more vulnerable to mass unrest than they previously appeared, those regimes became much less likely to tolerate opposition media. By advancing a new theory and analyzing original empirical evidence, this study contributes to our understanding of why media freedom varies in authoritarian regimes.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
I propose a capture-recapture (Multiple Systems Estimation) method to estimate the share of prote... more I propose a capture-recapture (Multiple Systems Estimation) method to estimate the share of protests reported by the media in each of multiple country-years, using hierarchical Bayesian models. By observing patterns in whether a protest reported by one outlet is reported by other outlets, we can make inferences about the number of protests in a given country and year that went unreported by any of the outlets in our dataset. Because of the hierarchical nature of the models, the reporting patterns observed in each country-year improve the estimates of the number of protests in all other country-years. The approach also utilizes data on the predictors of protest to improve the accuracy of the estimates. I discuss how this measure could in turn be used to test theories about the causes of censorship by governments. This is the first study to apply capture-recapture techniques to multiple populations, extending the applicability of such techniques to comparative social science research with event data.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
How can we explain why some authoritarian regimes censor mass media much less than others? Unfett... more How can we explain why some authoritarian regimes censor mass media much less than others? Unfettered news media can make it easier for a regime's opponents to engage in collective action against it, so it is puzzling that many authoritarian regimes choose to loosen previous restrictions on the media. I argue that, precisely because media freedom facilitates collective action, it can serve as a commitment device for authoritarian regimes when they make policy concessions. Thus liberalizing the media can enable a regime to make policy promises that would otherwise be non-credible, and thereby strike bargains with opponents who threaten to overthrow them. I discuss some empirically testable implications of this model.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Published by Eoghan Stafford
Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 2017
Why did Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali partially relax restrictions on
the press when he took power in T... more Why did Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali partially relax restrictions on
the press when he took power in Tunisia in 1987, only to
claw back these new freedoms two years later? The article
presents a general theory of such cases, arguing that dictators
who face both powerful rivals within their governments and
threats of social unrest are more likely than other authoritarian
rulers to reduce restrictions on the news media. Freedom
of the press acts as a commitment device, bolstering the
credibility of the concessions that dictators in such circumstances—
frequently new dictators—often promise to opposition
groups. The article tests the theory on the case of Tunisia
during Ben Ali’s first five years in office, from 1987 to 1992,
detailing the threats he faced from inside and outside his
government, and how he used press freedom to consolidate
power while containing social unrest. Finally, the study shows
how unforeseen political developments upended the bargain
between Ben Ali and the opposition, leading to the end of
Tunisia’s brief experiment with press freedom.
Published version: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21520844.2017.1401884
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Dissertation by Eoghan Stafford
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Uploads
Working Papers by Eoghan Stafford
security-relevant technologies in areas such as AI. This is concerning because deploying
new technologies can create substantial shared risks, such as inadvertent crisis
escalation or uncontrolled proliferation. We analyze a strategic model to determine
when states deploy technologies before learning how to minimize their risks. When
competitors are moderately adversarial or the technology laggard is not very capable,
the laggard does not use a risky technology unless it catches up to the technology
leader. By contrast, if competitors are highly adversarial and the laggard is closer to
the leader’s capability level, the laggard is willing to cut corners to gamble for advantage,
so that the shared risk falls if the laggard catches up. Further, when competitors
are not deploying the riskiest technologies, steps to make those technologies safer will
be attenuated or reversed by risk compensation.
Published by Eoghan Stafford
the press when he took power in Tunisia in 1987, only to
claw back these new freedoms two years later? The article
presents a general theory of such cases, arguing that dictators
who face both powerful rivals within their governments and
threats of social unrest are more likely than other authoritarian
rulers to reduce restrictions on the news media. Freedom
of the press acts as a commitment device, bolstering the
credibility of the concessions that dictators in such circumstances—
frequently new dictators—often promise to opposition
groups. The article tests the theory on the case of Tunisia
during Ben Ali’s first five years in office, from 1987 to 1992,
detailing the threats he faced from inside and outside his
government, and how he used press freedom to consolidate
power while containing social unrest. Finally, the study shows
how unforeseen political developments upended the bargain
between Ben Ali and the opposition, leading to the end of
Tunisia’s brief experiment with press freedom.
Published version: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21520844.2017.1401884
Dissertation by Eoghan Stafford
security-relevant technologies in areas such as AI. This is concerning because deploying
new technologies can create substantial shared risks, such as inadvertent crisis
escalation or uncontrolled proliferation. We analyze a strategic model to determine
when states deploy technologies before learning how to minimize their risks. When
competitors are moderately adversarial or the technology laggard is not very capable,
the laggard does not use a risky technology unless it catches up to the technology
leader. By contrast, if competitors are highly adversarial and the laggard is closer to
the leader’s capability level, the laggard is willing to cut corners to gamble for advantage,
so that the shared risk falls if the laggard catches up. Further, when competitors
are not deploying the riskiest technologies, steps to make those technologies safer will
be attenuated or reversed by risk compensation.
the press when he took power in Tunisia in 1987, only to
claw back these new freedoms two years later? The article
presents a general theory of such cases, arguing that dictators
who face both powerful rivals within their governments and
threats of social unrest are more likely than other authoritarian
rulers to reduce restrictions on the news media. Freedom
of the press acts as a commitment device, bolstering the
credibility of the concessions that dictators in such circumstances—
frequently new dictators—often promise to opposition
groups. The article tests the theory on the case of Tunisia
during Ben Ali’s first five years in office, from 1987 to 1992,
detailing the threats he faced from inside and outside his
government, and how he used press freedom to consolidate
power while containing social unrest. Finally, the study shows
how unforeseen political developments upended the bargain
between Ben Ali and the opposition, leading to the end of
Tunisia’s brief experiment with press freedom.
Published version: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21520844.2017.1401884