Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/17795.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Democracy and growth: is the effect non-linear?

Author

Listed:
  • Libman, Alexander
Abstract
The paper provides a survey of theoretical and empirical literature on non-linear impact of democracy on economic growth. First, it looks at two main approaches to the non-linearity: the U-shape and the inverse U-shape. Then it proceeds by looking at the specifics of hybrid regimes and tries to understand, whether the results could be driven by specific features of some semi-democracies and semi-autocracies. Finally, it discusses the opportunity to test the growth-and-democracy nexus using subnational data, and considers the first results of this approach.

Suggested Citation

  • Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Democracy and growth: is the effect non-linear?," MPRA Paper 17795, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17795
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17795/1/MPRA_paper_17795.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Henderson, Daniel J. & Papageorgiou, Chris & Parmeter, Christopher F., 2008. "Are any growth theories linear? Why we should care about what the evidence tells us," MPRA Paper 8767, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Peter Scott, 2006. "Path dependence, fragmented property rights and the slow diffusion of high throughput technologies in inter-war British coal mining," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(1), pages 20-42.
    3. Montinola, Gabriella R. & Jackman, Robert W., 2002. "Sources of Corruption: A Cross-Country Study," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 147-170, January.
    4. Polterovich, Victor & Popov, Vladimir, 2007. "Democratization, Quality of Institutions and Economic Growth," MPRA Paper 19152, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Witold J. Henisz & Edward D. Mansfield, 2015. "Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Edward D Mansfield (ed.), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, chapter 8, pages 145-167, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2006. "Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 319-324, May.
    7. Axel Dreher & Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Friedrich Schneider, 2014. "The devil is in the shadow. Do institutions affect income and productivity or only official income and official productivity?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 121-141, January.
    8. Khurram Jamali & Kirsten Wandschneider & Phanindra Wunnava, 2007. "The effect of political regimes and technology on economic growth," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(11), pages 1425-1432.
    9. Barro, Robert J, 1996. "Democracy and Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-27, March.
    10. Muhammed N. Islam & Stanley L. Winer, 2004. "Tinpots, Totalitarians (and Democrats): An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Economic Growth on Civil Liberties and Political Rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(3_4), pages 289-323, March.
    11. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2011. "Dictators And Their Viziers: Endogenizing The Loyalty–Competence Trade‐Off," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(5), pages 903-930, October.
    12. Witold J. Henisz, 2002. "The institutional environment for infrastructure investment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 11(2), pages 355-389.
    13. Djankov, Simeon & Glaeser, Edward & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The new comparative economics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 595-619, December.
    14. Jenny A. Minier, 2001. "Is Democracy a Normal Good? Evidence from Democratic Movements," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 67(4), pages 996-1009, April.
    15. Henisz, Witold J. & Zelner, Bennet A., 2006. "Interest Groups, Veto Points, and Electricity Infrastructure Deployment," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 263-286, January.
    16. Andrew Konitzer & Stephen K. Wegren, 0. "Federalism and Political Recentralization in the Russian Federation: United Russia As the Party of Power," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 36(4), pages 503-522.
    17. Michael T. Rock, 2007. "Corruption and Democracy," Working Papers 55, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.
    18. Kjell Hausken & Christian W. Martin & Thomas Plümper, 2004. "Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 239-259, September.
    19. Besley, Timothy & Persson, Torsten & Sturm, Daniel, 2010. "Political competition, policy and growth: theory and evidence from the United States," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121718, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    20. Mohtadi, Hamid & Roe, Terry L., 2003. "Democracy, rent seeking, public spending and growth," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 445-466, March.
    21. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Thierry Verdier, 2004. "Alfred Marshall Lecture: Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 162-192, 04/05.
    22. Leone Leonida & Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti & Pietro Navarra, 2007. "Towards an equilibrium level of market reform: how politics affects the dynamics of policy change," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(13), pages 1627-1634.
    23. Frye, Timothy & Mansfield, Edward D., 2003. "Fragmenting Protection: The Political Economy of Trade Policy in the Post-Communist World," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 635-657, October.
    24. Amable, Bruno, 2003. "The Diversity of Modern Capitalism," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199261147.
    25. Janine Aron, 1998. "Political, economic and social institutions: A review of growth evidence," CSAE Working Paper Series 1998-04, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    26. Dick, G William, 1974. "Authoritarian versus Nonauthoritarian Approaches to Economic Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 817-827, July/Aug..
    27. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A., 2006. "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(1), pages 115-131, February.
    28. Avinash Dixit, 2006. "Predatory States and Failing States: An Agency Perspective," Working Papers 71, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    29. Timothy Besley & Masayuki Kudamatsu, 2007. "Making Autocracy Work," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 48, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    30. Fidrmuc, Jan, 2001. "Democracy in transition economies: Grease or sand in the wheels of growth?," ZEI Working Papers B 09-2001, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    31. Wintrobe, Ronald, 1990. "The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 849-872, September.
    32. Jenny A. Minier, 2001. "Is Democracy a Normal Good? Evidence from Democratic Movements," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 67(4), pages 996-1009, April.
    33. Page, Scott E., 2006. "Path Dependence," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 87-115, January.
    34. Raj M. Desai & Anders Olofsgård & Tarik M. Yousef, 2009. "The Logic Of Authoritarian Bargains," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 93-125, March.
    35. Plumper, Thomas & Martin, Christian W, 2003. "Democracy, Government Spending, and Economic Growth: A Political-Economic Explanation of the Barro-Effect," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 27-50, October.
    36. James Raymond Vreeland, 2008. "The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(3), pages 401-425, June.
    37. Ludovic Comeau, 2003. "Democracy and Growth: A Relationship Revisited," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, Winter.
    38. Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner, 2001. "The Institutional Environment for Telecommunications Investment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 123-147, March.
    39. W. J. Henisz, 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, March.
    40. Huynh, Kim P. & Jacho-Chávez, David T., 2009. "Growth and governance: A nonparametric analysis," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 121-143, March.
    41. Alesina, Alberto & Özler, Sule & Roubini, Nouriel & Swagel, Phillip, 1996. "Political Instability and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 189-211, June.
    42. Jennifer Gandhi & Adam Przeworski, 2006. "Cooperation, Cooptation, And Rebellion Under Dictatorships," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 1-26, March.
    43. Avinash Dixit, 2006. "Predatory States and Failing States: An Agency Perspective," Working Papers 71, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    44. Jakob Haan, 2007. "Political institutions and economic growth reconsidered," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 281-292, June.
    45. Peter Kirkow, 1995. "Regional warlordism in Russia: The case of Primorskii," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(6), pages 923-947.
    46. Alexander Libman, 2012. "Democracy, size of bureaucracy, and economic growth: evidence from Russian regions," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 1321-1352, December.
    47. Krieckhaus, Jonathan, 2006. "Democracy and Economic Growth: How Regional Context Influences Regime Effects," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(2), pages 317-340, April.
    48. repec:pri:cepsud:131dixit is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Man, Georg, 2014. "Political competition and economic growth: A nonlinear relationship?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 287-302.
    2. Sudhanshu K. MISHRA, 2017. "Trends in globalization of select Asian countries," Journal of Economic and Social Thought, KSP Journals, vol. 4(4), pages 451-466, December.
    3. Salahodjaev, Raufhon, 2014. "Институты И Экономический Рост: Результаты Эмпирического Анализа [Institutions and Economics Growth: Results of Empirical Analysis]," MPRA Paper 55628, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alexander Libman, 2012. "Democracy, size of bureaucracy, and economic growth: evidence from Russian regions," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 1321-1352, December.
    2. Timothy Besley & Masayuki Kudamatsu, 2007. "Making Autocracy Work," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 48, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    3. Alexander Libman, 2012. "Sub-national political regimes and asymmetric fiscal decentralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 302-336, December.
    4. Carl Henrik Knutsen, 2012. "Democracy and economic growth: A survey of arguments and results," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 15(4), pages 393-415, December.
    5. Man, Georg, 2014. "Political competition and economic growth: A nonlinear relationship?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 287-302.
    6. Profeta, Paola & Puglisi, Riccardo & Scabrosetti, Simona, 2013. "Does democracy affect taxation and government spending? Evidence from developing countries," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 684-718.
    7. Nobuhiro Mizuno & Katsuyuki Naito & Ryosuke Okazawa, 2017. "Inequality, extractive institutions, and growth in nondemocratic regimes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 115-142, January.
    8. Daniel Sakyi & Samuel Adams, 2012. "Democracy, Government Spending and Economic Growth: The Case of Ghana, 1960–2008," Margin: The Journal of Applied Economic Research, National Council of Applied Economic Research, vol. 6(3), pages 361-383, August.
    9. Libman, Alexander, 2013. "Natural resources and sub-national economic performance: Does sub-national democracy matter?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 82-99.
    10. Ricardo Nieva, 2021. "Heterogeneous coalitions and social revolutions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(2), pages 229-275, May.
    11. Pauline Grosjean & Claudia Senik, 2011. "Democracy, Market Liberalization, and Political Preferences," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(1), pages 365-381, February.
    12. Gehlbach, Scott & Keefer, Philip, 2011. "Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 123-139, June.
    13. Aleksandar Vasilev, 2013. "On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a Real-Business-Cycle framework," Working Papers 2013_20, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    14. Sezer Yasar & Ceyhun Elgin, 2024. "Democracy and fiscal-policy response to COVID-19," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 198(1), pages 25-45, January.
    15. Mogens Justesen & Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2013. "Institutional interactions and economic growth: the joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 449-474, December.
    16. Leonid Polishchuk & Georgiy Syunyaev, 2015. "Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 159-182, January.
    17. Mulligan, Casey B. & Tsui, Kevin K., 2015. "Political entry, public policies, and the economy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 377-397.
    18. Fernando Tohmé & M. Ángeles Caraballo & Carlos Dabús, 2022. "Instability, political regimes and economic growth. A theoretical framework," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(1), pages 291-317, February.
    19. Absher, Samuel & Grier, Robin & Grier, Kevin, 2023. "The consequences of CIA-sponsored regime change in Latin America," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    20. Thomas Apolte, 2011. "Democracy and prosperity in two decades of transition," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 19(4), pages 693-722, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    democracy; growth; U-shaped relation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17795. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.