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Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws

Author

Listed:
  • Edward L. Glaeser
  • Jose A. Scheinkman
Abstract
Interest rate restrictions are among the most pervasive forms of economic regulations. This paper explains that these restrictions can be explained as a means of primitive social insurance. Interest rate limits are Pareto improving because agents borrow when they have temporary negative income shocks -- interest rate restrictions transfer wealth to agents who have received those negative shocks and whose marginal utility of income is high. We assume that these shocks are not otherwise insurable because of problems related to asymmetric information or the difficulties inherent in writing complex contracts. The model predicts that interest rate restriction will be tighter when income inequality is high (and impermanent) and when growth rates are low. Data from U.S. states' regulations supports a connection between inequality and usury laws. The history of usury laws suggests that this social insurance mechanism is one reason why usury laws persist, but it also suggests that usury laws have had different functions across time (eg. rent-seeking, limiting agency problems within the church, limiting overcommitment of debts, and attacking commerce generally).

Suggested Citation

  • Edward L. Glaeser & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1994. "Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws," NBER Working Papers 4954, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4954
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Posner, Eric A, 1995. "Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionablility Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(2), pages 283-319, June.
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    5. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Khan, Feisal, 2010. "How 'Islamic' is Islamic Banking?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 805-820, December.
    3. McKernan, Signe-Mary & Ratcliffe, Caroline & Kuehn, Daniel, 2013. "Prohibitions, price caps, and disclosures: A look at state policies and alternative financial product use," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 207-223.
    4. Michalopoulos, Stelios & Naghavi, Alireza & Prarolo, Giovanni, 2016. "Islam, inequality and pre-industrial comparative development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 86-98.
    5. Madeira, Carlos, 2019. "The impact of interest rate ceilings on households’ credit access: Evidence from a 2013 Chilean legislation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 166-179.
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    7. Bodenhorn, Howard, 2007. "Usury ceilings and bank lending behavior: Evidence from nineteenth century New York," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 179-202, April.
    8. Zegarra, Luis Felipe, 2017. "Usury laws and private credit in Lima, Peru. Evidence from notarized records," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 68-93.
    9. Jeffrey Clemens, 2015. "Regulatory Redistribution in the Market for Health Insurance," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 109-134, April.
    10. Kelly D. Edmiston, 2011. "Could restrictions on payday lending hurt consumers?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 96(Q I).
    11. Koyama, Mark, 2010. "Evading the 'Taint of Usury': The usury prohibition as a barrier to entry," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 420-442, October.
    12. Zinman, Jonathan, 2010. "Restricting consumer credit access: Household survey evidence on effects around the Oregon rate cap," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 546-556, March.
    13. Fekrazad, Amir, 2020. "Impacts of interest rate caps on the payday loan market: Evidence from Rhode Island," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
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    16. Reed, Clyde G. & Bekar, Cliff T., 2003. "Religious prohibitions against usury," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 347-368, October.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General

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