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A foundation for strategic agenda voting

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Abstract
We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

Suggested Citation

  • Jose Apesteguia & Miguel Ballester & Yusufcan Masatlioglu, 2012. "A foundation for strategic agenda voting," Economics Working Papers 1302, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1302
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Plott, Charles R & Levine, Michael E, 1978. "A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(1), pages 146-160, March.
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    15. Richard D. McKelvey, 1981. "A Theory of Optimal Agenda Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(3), pages 303-321, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wagner, Alexander K. & Granic, Dura-Georg, 2017. "Tie-Breaking Power in Committees," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168187, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2020. "Agenda-manipulation in ranking," Papers 2001.11341, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
    3. Horan, Sean Michael, 2021. "Agendas in legislative decision-making," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(1), January.
    4. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2017. "Optimal Voting Rules," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 688-717.
    5. S. Nageeb Ali & B. Douglas Bernheim & Alexander W. Bloedel & Silvia Console Battilana, 2022. "Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Polity," Papers 2212.01263, arXiv.org.
    6. Andrei Gomberg, 2018. "Revealed votes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(2), pages 281-296, August.
    7. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2023. "Agenda-Manipulation in Ranking," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(4), pages 1865-1892.
    8. Guney, Begum, 2014. "A theory of iterative choice in lists," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 26-32.
    9. Barberà, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2017. "Sequential voting and agenda manipulation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
    10. Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2015. "Sequential Voting and Agenda Manipulation: The Case of Forward Looking Tie-Breaking," Working Papers 782, Barcelona School of Economics.
    11. Arlegi, Ritxar & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2020. "Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic Voting; Agendas; Committees; Institutions; Axioms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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