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Barry R. Weingast

Personal Details

First Name:Barry
Middle Name:R.
Last Name:Weingast
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pwe334
https://www.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/cgi-bin/wordpress/
Terminal Degree:1977 Division of Social Sciences; California Institute of Technology (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Stanford University

http://www.stanford.edu/
Stanford, CA

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters Books

Working papers

  1. North, Douglass C. & Wallis, John Joseph & Webb, Steven B. & Weingast, Barry R., 2007. "Limited access orders in the developing world :a new approach to the problems of development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4359, The World Bank.
  2. Douglass C. North & John Joseph Wallis & Barry R. Weingast, 2006. "A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History," NBER Working Papers 12795, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Wallis, John & Weingast, Barry, 2005. "The Financing of 19th Century Internal Improvements," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt7nh1c6df, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  4. Mat McCubbins & Roger Noll & Barry Weingast, 2005. "The Political Economy of Law: Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies," Discussion Papers 04-035, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  5. John Joseph Wallis & Barry R. Weingast, 2005. "Equilibrium Impotence: Why the States and Not the American National Government Financed Economic Development in the Antebellum Era," NBER Working Papers 11397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Hehui Jin & Yingyi Qian & Barry Weingast, 1999. "Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style," Working Papers 99013, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  7. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives," Working Papers 97042, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  8. Yuanzheng Cao & Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese style," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 126, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  9. Romer, T. & Weingast, B.R., 1990. "Political Foundations Of The Thrift Debacle," GSIA Working Papers 1990-14, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  10. Gilligan, Thomas W. & Marshall, William J. & Weingast, Barry R., 1987. "Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887," Working Papers 628, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  11. Gilligan, Thomas W. & Marshall, William J. & Weingast, Barry R., 1987. "The Economic Incidence of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Shorthaul Pricing Constraint," Working Papers 629, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  12. Cohen, Linda & Noll, Roger G. & Weingast, Barry., 1977. "Responses to Disaster: Planning for a Great Earthquake in California," Working Papers 131, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  13. Weingast, Barry., 1976. "A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms," Working Papers 142, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  14. Cornell, N. & Noll, Roger G. & Weingast, B., "undated". "Safety Regulation," Working Papers 122, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

Articles

  1. Barry R. Weingast, 2016. "Exposing the neoclassical fallacy: McCloskey on ideas and the great enrichment," Scandinavian Economic History Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 64(3), pages 189-201, September.
  2. Albertus, Michael & Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto & Magaloni, Beatriz & Weingast, Barry R., 2016. "Authoritarian Survival and Poverty Traps: Land Reform in Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 154-170.
  3. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, 2015. "The "Reformation of Administrative Law" Revisited," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(4), pages 782-807.
  4. Barry R. Weingast, 2015. "Capitalism, Democracy, and Countermajoritarian Institutions," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 255-277.
  5. Weingast, Barry R., 2014. "Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Political Aspects of Decentralization and Economic Development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 14-25.
  6. Sonia Mittal & Barry R. Weingast, 2013. "Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to Democratic Stability In America's First Century," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(2), pages 278-302, April.
  7. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 2012. "Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 83-95, July.
  8. Weingast, Barry R., 2009. "Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 279-293, May.
  9. Rui J. P. de Figueiredo & Michael McFaul & Barry R. Weingast, 2007. "Constructing Self-Enforcing Federalism in the Early United States and Modern Russia," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 37(2), pages 160-189, Spring.
  10. Rui J. P. de Figueiredo Jr. & Jack Rakove & Barry R. Weingast, 2006. "Rationality, Inaccurate Mental Models, and Self-confirming Equilibrium," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(4), pages 384-415, October.
  11. Jin, Hehui & Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry R., 2005. "Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1719-1742, September.
  12. Barry R. Weingast, 2005. "The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 89-108, Summer.
  13. Ian Morris & Barry R. Weingast, 2004. "Introduction," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(4), pages 702-708, December.
  14. Schultz, Kenneth A. & Weingast, Barry R., 2003. "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(1), pages 3-42, January.
  15. Bates, Robert H. & Greif, Avner & Levi, Margaret & Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent & Weingast, Barry R., 2000. "The Analytic Narrative Project - Analytic Narratives. By Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry Weingast. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. 296p.," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(3), pages 696-702, September.
  16. Snyder, Susan K & Weingast, Barry R, 2000. "The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 269-305, October.
  17. Yuanzheng Cao & Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1999. "From federalism, Chinese style to privatization, Chinese style," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 7(1), pages 103-131, March.
  18. ROBERT H. BATES & RUI J. P. De FIGUEIREDO Jr. & BARRY R. WEINGAST, 1998. "The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition," Politics & Society, , vol. 26(2), pages 221-256, June.
  19. Weingast, Barry R., 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(2), pages 245-263, June.
  20. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 83-92, Fall.
  21. Weingast, Barry R., 1996. "The Myth of Demócratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are Efficient. By Donald Wittman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 240p. $29.95," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(3), pages 663-664, September.
  22. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1996. "China's transition to markets: market-preserving federalism, chinese style," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 149-185.
  23. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
  24. Barry R. Weingast, 1995. "A Rational Choice Perspective on the Role of Ideas: Shared Belief Systems and State Sovereignty in International Cooperation," Politics & Society, , vol. 23(4), pages 449-464, December.
  25. Greif, Avner & Milgrom, Paul & Weingast, Barry R, 1994. "Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 745-776, August.
  26. Cooter, Robert & Weingast, Barry R., 1992. "Editors' introduction," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 123-124, June.
  27. Ferejohn, John A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1992. "A positive theory of statutory interpretation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 263-279, June.
  28. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast*, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, March.
  29. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1990. "Slack, Public Interest, and Structure-Induced Policy," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(0), pages 203-212.
  30. Weingast, Barry R, 1990. "The Role of Credible Commitments in State Finance: Review Article," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 66(1), pages 89-97, July.
  31. Thomas W. Gilligan & William J. Marshall & Barry R. Weingast, 1990. "The Economic Incidence of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Short-Haul Pricing Constraint," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(2), pages 189-210, Summer.
  32. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1990. "Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(0), pages 307-332.
  33. Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Floor Behavior in the U.S. Congress: Committee Power Under the Open Rule," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 795-815, September.
  34. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
  35. Gilligan, Thomas W & Marshall, William J & Weingast, Barry R, 1989. "Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 35-61, April.
  36. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-163, February.
  37. Krehbiel, Keith & Shepsle, Kenneth A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1987. "Why are Congressional Committees Powerful?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(3), pages 929-945, September.
  38. Shepsle, Kenneth A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 85-104, March.
  39. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-277, Fall.
  40. Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1986. "Congress and Regulatory Agency Choice: Reply [Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission]," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 890-894, August.
  41. Shepsle, Kenneth A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1984. "Political Solutions to Market Problems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 417-434, June.
  42. Barry Weingast, 1984. "The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 147-191, January.
  43. Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October.
  44. Moran, Mark J & Weingast, Barry R, 1982. "Congress as the," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 109-113, May.
  45. Randall L. Calvert & Barry R. Weingast, 1982. "Runaway Bureaucracy And Congressional Oversight: Why Reforms Fail," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 1(3), pages 557-564, February.
  46. Shepsle, Kenneth A & Weingast, Barry R, 1982. "Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 367-371, May.
  47. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
  48. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    RePEc:nos:voprec:2012-03-1 is not listed on IDEAS

Chapters

  1. Barry R. Weingast, 2017. "Adam Smith’s Theory of Violence and the Political Economics of Development," NBER Chapters, in: Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development, pages 51-81, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Margaret Levi & Tania Melo & Barry R. Weingast & Frances Zlotnick, 2016. "Opening Access, Ending the Violence Trap: Labor, Business, Government, and the National Labor Relations Act," NBER Chapters, in: Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development, pages 331-366, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Sonia Mittal & Jack N. Rakove & Barry R. Weingast, 2010. "The Constitutional Choices of 1787 and Their Consequences," NBER Chapters, in: Founding Choices: American Economic Policy in the 1790s, pages 25-56, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Kelly H. Chang & Rui J.P. de Figueiredo & Barry R. Weingast, 2001. "Rational choice theories of bureaucratic control and performance," Chapters, in: William F. Shughart II & Laura Razzolini (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  5. Thomas Romer & Barry R. Weingast, 1991. "Political Foundations of the Thrift Debacle," NBER Chapters, in: Politics and Economics in the Eighties, pages 175-214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Books

  1. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995, October.
  2. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Webb,Steven B. & Weingast,Barry R. (ed.), 2013. "In the Shadow of Violence," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107684911, October.
  3. Weingast, Barry R. & Wittman, Donald, 2008. "The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199548477.

More information

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Statistics

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
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  2. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
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  6. Number of Citations
  7. Number of Citations, Discounted by Citation Age
  8. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  9. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  10. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  13. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  15. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  16. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  17. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  18. h-index
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  27. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months
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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 5 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (3) 2005-06-14 2007-01-02 2007-09-30
  2. NEP-DEV: Development (2) 2007-01-02 2007-09-30
  3. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 1999-07-19
  4. NEP-HIS: Business, Economic and Financial History (1) 2007-01-02
  5. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2007-01-02
  6. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2007-01-02
  7. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (1) 2005-06-14
  8. NEP-PKE: Post Keynesian Economics (1) 2007-01-02
  9. NEP-PUB: Public Finance (1) 1999-07-19
  10. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2007-09-30
  11. NEP-SEA: South East Asia (1) 2002-04-03
  12. NEP-SOC: Social Norms and Social Capital (1) 2007-01-02

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