Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/deveco/v99y2012i2p282-291.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Mutual supervision in preshipment inspection programs

Author

Listed:
  • Dequiedt, V.
  • Geourjon, A.-M.
  • Rota-Graziosi, G.
Abstract
Preshipment inspection (PSI) programmes are implemented in many developing countries to assist governments in the collection of revenue at their borders. These programs consist of the delegation of the inspection of imports to a private firm. To study these PSI programmes, we develop a hierarchical agency model in which the government authority can rely on two supervisors, namely the private inspection firm and the customs administration, to control importers' declarations. The government's optimal contract is fully characterized. We devote some attention to the inspection policy and its comparative statics properties. In particular, we identify the situations in which PSI programmes are revenue enhancing. We also discuss the reconciliation policy, i.e. what to do in case of conflicting inspection reports by the inspection firm and the customs administration. In the optimal mechanism, mutual supervision between the inspection firm and the customs administration is used to provide adequate incentives to all parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Dequiedt, V. & Geourjon, A.-M. & Rota-Graziosi, G., 2012. "Mutual supervision in preshipment inspection programs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 282-291.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:99:y:2012:i:2:p:282-291
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2012.02.005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387812000090
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2012.02.005?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mishra, Ajit & Anant, T.C.A., 2006. "Activism, separation of powers and development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 457-477, December.
    2. Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 2005. "Contract Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262025760, April.
    3. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1996. "A prisoner's dilemma model of collusion deterrence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 117-136, January.
    4. Pritchett, Lant & Sethi, Geeta, 1994. "Tariff Rates, Tariff Revenue, and Tariff Reform: Some New Facts," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 8(1), pages 1-16, January.
    5. John S. Wilson & Catherine L. Mann & Tsunehiro Otsuki, 2005. "Assessing the Benefits of Trade Facilitation: A Global Perspective," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(6), pages 841-871, June.
    6. Roland Strausz, 1997. "Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(3), pages 337-357.
    7. Fahad Khalil, 1997. "Auditing Without Commitment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 629-640, Winter.
    8. Dean Yang, 2008. "Can Enforcement Backfire? Crime Displacement in the Context of Customs Reform in the Philippines," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(1), pages 1-14, February.
    9. Hoekman, Bernard & Nicita, Alessandro, 2011. "Trade Policy, Trade Costs, and Developing Country Trade," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(12), pages 2069-2079.
    10. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1993. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 629-656, May.
    11. Raymond Fisman & Shang-Jin Wei, 2004. "Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from "Missing Imports" in China," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 471-500, April.
    12. Anne-Marie GEOURJON & Bertrand LAPORTE, 2004. "Risk Management for Targeting Customs Controls in Developing Countries: A Risky Venture for Revenue Performance?," Working Papers 200416, CERDI.
    13. Johnson, Noel, 2001. "Committing to civil service reform : the performance of pre-shipment inspection under different institutional regimes," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2594, The World Bank.
    14. Anson Jose & Cadot Olivier & Olarreaga Marcelo, 2006. "Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption: Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-26, December.
    15. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1996. "On the optimality of allowing collusion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 383-407, September.
    16. De Wulf, Luc, 1981. "Statistical analysis of under- and overinvoicing of imports," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 303-323, June.
    17. Bac, Mehmet & Bag, Parimal Kanti, 2006. "Beneficial collusion in corruption control: The case of nonmonetary penalties," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 478-499, December.
    18. Njinkeu, Dominique & S. Wilson, John & Powo Fosso, Bruno, 2008. "Expanding Trade within Africa: The Impact of Trade Facilitation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4790, The World Bank.
    19. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
    20. Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-141, January.
    21. Dean Yang, 2008. "Integrity for Hire: An Analysis of a Widespread Customs Reform," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(1), pages 25-57, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cyril Chalendard, 2015. "Use of internal information, external information acquisition and customs underreporting," Working Papers halshs-01179445, HAL.
    2. Kambale Mirembe, Omer, 2013. "Customs reforms in eastern Congo (DRC): Between norms and practices," IOB Working Papers 2013.04, Universiteit Antwerpen, Institute of Development Policy (IOB).
    3. Gregoire Rota-Graziosi & Fayçal Sawadogo, 2021. "The tax burden on mobile network operators in Africa," Post-Print hal-03524787, HAL.
    4. Ousmane COUNDOUL & Massene GADIAGA & Anne-Marie GEOURJON & Bertrand LAPORTE, 2012. "Inspecting less to inspect better: The use of data mining for risk management by customs administrations," Working Papers P46, FERDI.
    5. Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Fayçal Sawadogo, 2020. "The tax burden on mobile network operators in Africa," Working Papers hal-03109370, HAL.
    6. Mr. Gilles Montagnat-Rentier & Mr. Gilles Parent, 2012. "Customs Administration Reform and Modernization in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, 1995–2010," IMF Working Papers 2012/259, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Ousmane COUNDOUL & Massene GADIAGA & Anne-Marie GEOURJON & Bertrand LAPORTE, 2012. "Contrôler moins pour contrôler mieux : l’utilisation du data mining pour la gestion du risque en douane," Working Papers P46, FERDI.
    8. Cyril Chalendard, 2015. "Use of internal information, external information acquisition and customs underreporting," CERDI Working papers halshs-01179445, HAL.
    9. Rota-Graziosi, Gregoire & Sawadogo, Fayçal, 2022. "The tax burden on mobile network operators in Africa," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(5).
    10. Mario Mansour & Mr. Gregoire Rota Graziosi, 2013. "Tax Coordination, Tax Competition, and Revenue Mobilization in the West African Economic and Monetary Union," IMF Working Papers 2013/163, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Fayçal Sawadogo, 2021. "The tax burden on mobile network operators in Africa," CERDI Working papers hal-03118496, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vianney Dequiedt & Anne-Marie Geourjon & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2011. "Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs," CERDI Working papers halshs-00554316, HAL.
    2. Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI & Anne-Marie GEOURJON & Vianney DEQUIEDT, 2009. "Contrats Incitatifs et Réforme des Douanes dans les PED : une Application des Modèles d’Agence Hiérarchique," Working Papers 200906, CERDI.
    3. Vianney Dequiedt & Anne-Marie Geourjon & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2011. "Contrats Incitatifs et Réforme des Douanes dans les PED : une Application des Modèles d'Agence Hiérarchique," CERDI Working papers halshs-00554331, HAL.
    4. Bernard Gauthier & Jonathan Goyette, 2016. "Fiscal policy and corruption," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 57-79, January.
    5. Velea, Irina & Cadot, Olivier & Wilson, John S., 2010. "Do private inspection programs affect trade facilitation ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5515, The World Bank.
    6. De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca, 2017. "The threat of corruption and the optimal supervisory task," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 172-186.
    7. Scholz, Julia, 2008. "Auswirkungen vertikaler Kollusionsprobleme auf die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 4581, University of Munich, Munich School of Management.
    8. Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999. "Corruption, extortion and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 395-430, December.
    9. Che, Xiaogang & Huang, Yangguang & Zhang, Le, 2021. "Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 425-442.
    10. Dean Yang, 2008. "Integrity for Hire: An Analysis of a Widespread Customs Reform," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(1), pages 25-57, February.
    11. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée, 2006. "Incentives For Corruptible Auditors In The Absence Of Commitment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 269-291, June.
    12. A. Menichini & P. Simmons, "undated". "Can Liars Ever Prosper," Discussion Papers 02/10, Department of Economics, University of York.
    13. Roberto Burguet & Juan-José Ganuza & José García-Montalvo, 2016. "The Microeconomics of Corruption. A Review of Thirty Years of Research," Working Papers 908, Barcelona School of Economics.
    14. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Sungho Yun, 2010. "Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 179-198, March.
    15. Chiappinelli, Olga, 2020. "Political corruption in the execution of public contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 116-140.
    16. Bac, Mehmet & Bag, Parimal Kanti, 2006. "Beneficial collusion in corruption control: The case of nonmonetary penalties," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 478-499, December.
    17. Anna Maria C. Menichini, 2008. "Third Parties, Information Disclosure And Monitoring Incentives," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(1), pages 31-50, February.
    18. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
    19. Cyril Chalendard, 2015. "Use of internal information, external information acquisition and customs underreporting," Working Papers halshs-01179445, HAL.
    20. Alexander Henke & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2022. "Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 762-783, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Preshipment inspection; Mutual supervision; Corruption; Customs administration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:99:y:2012:i:2:p:282-291. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.