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How do Governments Fare about Redistribution? New Evidence on the Political Economy of Redistribution

Author

Listed:
  • Fabio Padovano
  • Francesco Scervini
  • Gilberto Turati
Abstract
We examine whether and to what extent political institutions explain different performances in income redistribution across countries. In particular, we first review available sources of data and measures of income redistribution, discussing the pros and cons of each one. Second, we outline a conceptual framework that distinguishes traditional demand side explanations of redistribution from resources and instruments, as well as supply side factors. We then provide empirical evidence on the association between these different factors and the observed degree of redistribution. Our analysis supports the view that – for a given demand of redistribution – political (and economic) institutions contribute to explain differences across countries in the observed degree of redistribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabio Padovano & Francesco Scervini & Gilberto Turati, 2016. "How do Governments Fare about Redistribution? New Evidence on the Political Economy of Redistribution," CESifo Working Paper Series 6137, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6137
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mr. David Coady & Devin D'Angelo & Brooks Evans, 2019. "Fiscal Redistribution and Social Welfare," IMF Working Papers 2019/051, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Bellani, Luna & Scervini, Francesco, 2020. "Heterogeneity in preferences for redistribution and public spending: A cross-country analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    3. Coady, David & D’Angelo, Devin & Evans, Brooks, 2020. "Fiscal redistribution and social welfare: doing more or more to do?," EUROMOD Working Papers EM10/20, EUROMOD at the Institute for Social and Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    redistribution; ex ante and ex post Gini coefficients; political and economic institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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