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Imperfect Information and Contracts Between Two Firms

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  • Sakuma, Akimitsu
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  • Sakuma, Akimitsu, 1982. "Imperfect Information and Contracts Between Two Firms," Hitotsubashi Journal of commerce and management, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 17(1), pages 25-41, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:hitjcm:v:17:y:1982:i:1:p:25-41
    DOI: 10.15057/6678
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George A. Akerlof & Hajime Miyazaki, 1980. "The Implicit Contract Theory of Unemployment meets the Wage Bill Argument," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 47(2), pages 321-338.
    2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    3. Spence, Michael & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1971. "Insurance, Information, and Individual Action," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 380-387, May.
    4. James R. Markusen, 1979. "Personal and Job Characteristics as Determinants of Employee-Firm Contract Structure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(2), pages 255-279.
    5. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
    6. Martin L. Weitzman, 1980. "Efficient Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(4), pages 719-730.
    7. Martin Neil Baily, 1974. "Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(1), pages 37-50.
    8. Azariadis, Costas, 1975. "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1183-1202, December.
    9. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April.
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