Dec 16, 2016 · We study competition in matching markets with random heteroge- neous preferences and an unequal number of agents on either side.
We analyze large random matching markets with unequal numbers of men and women. Agents have complete preference lists that are uniformly random and independent.
Feb 15, 2024 · We generalize this threshold for unbalanced markets: we consider a matching market with n agents on the shorter side and n(\alpha+1) agents on ...
We study competition in matching markets with random heterogeneous preferences and an unequal number of agents on either side.
Abstract. We characterize the core in random matching markets with unequal numbers of men and women. We find that even the slightest imbalance leads to ...
May 18, 2015 · We study competition in matching markets with random heterogeneous preferences by considering an unequal number of agents on either side.
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We study competition in matching markets with random heterogeneous preferences and an unequal number of agents on either side. First, we show that even the ...
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We analyze large random matching markets with unequal numbers of men and women. Agents have complete preference lists that are uniformly random and ...
Recent findings of Ashlagi et. al. [2] demonstrate that in unbalanced random markets, the change in expected payoffs is small when one reverses which side of ...
Sep 4, 2015 · We study competition in matching markets with random heterogeneous preferences and an unequal number of agents on either side.