We say that an auction mechanism is revenue monotonic if the seller's revenue is guaranteed to weakly decrease as bidders are dropped.
In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In this paper we investigate the extent to which this ...
Abstract. In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by drop- ping bidders. In this paper we investigate the extent to ...
In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In this paper we investigate the extent to which this ...
Aug 20, 2010 · Abstract. In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by drop- ping bidders. In this paper we investigate ...
Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions · Kevin Leyton-brown · 2007, ACM SIGecom Exchanges ; Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions.
Feb 1, 2011 · In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In this paper we investigate the extent to ...
Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions. In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue ...
In this paper we investigate the extent to which this prob- lem can occur under other dominant-strategy combinatorial auction mechanisms. Our main result is ...
Missing: deterministic, | Show results with:deterministic,
Intuitively, one might expect that a seller's revenue from an auction weakly increases as the number of bidders grows, as this increases competition.