Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

×
Please click here if you are not redirected within a few seconds.
$129.99 Free 2–7 day delivery
The focus of this book is to explore game theoretic modeling and mechanism design for problem solving in Internet and network economics.
PDF | On Jan 1, 2009, Y. Narahari and others published Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions | Find, read and cite all ...
1.1 Motivating Problems in Network Economics. 1 ... 5.3.2 Non-Cooperative Game Theoretic Solution Methods. 231. 5.3.3 Mechanism Design Based Solution Methods.
Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions (Advanced Information and Knowledge Processing). by Narahari.
Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions

Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions

Book
This book provides a comprehensive description of mechanism design theory and its application to solving current game theoretic problems in computer science, communication networks and networked systems. ... Google Books
Originally published: February 9, 2009
$119.99 Free delivery
The focus of this book is to explore game theoretic modeling and mechanism design for problem solving in Internet and network economics. It provides a sound ...
This book provides a comprehensive description of mechanism design theory and its application to solving current game theoretic problems in computer science ...
We study the dynamics of a game-theoretic network formation model that yields large-scale small-world networks. So far, mostly stochastic frameworks have been ...
Jun 21, 2011 · What follows is a review of a monograph that focuses on game theoretic modeling and mechanism design problem solving in network economies. This ...
Narahari, D. Garg, R. Narayanam and H. Prakash: Game theoretic problems in network economics and mechanism design solutions. Author & abstract; Download ...
We offer two different solution approaches to the ICB problem using mechanism design. In the first approach, we develop a dominant strategy incentive compatible ...