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Apr 14, 2017 · In this work, we search for cost-sharing methods that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria in multi-commodity selfish routing games.
This work studies a generalisation of atomic selfish routing games where each player may control multiple flows which she routes seeking to minimise their ...
We study a generalisation of atomic selfish routing games where each player may control multiple flows which she routes seeking to minimise their aggregate ...
Jun 22, 2024 · Abstract. © Springer International Publishing AG 2017. We study a generalisation of atomic selfish routing games where each player may ...
We study a generalisation of atomic selfish routing games where each player may control multiple flows which she routes seeking to minimise their aggregate ...
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Feb 11, 2024 · Selfish choice is bottom path with load of 1.0, average cost is 1. Putting 1/2 the traffic on each path, average cost approaches 0.5. Optimal: ...
May 12, 2020 · First, the cost of selfish routing to network operators differs from the cost experienced by users. Since network operators are central ...
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In general such a “selfishly motivated” assignment of traffic ... In what follows, we will discuss only the results on pricing and on selfish routing that are ...
We investigate this fundamental question in the context of Nash equilibria for such a system, where each network user selfishly routes its traffic only on those ...