Abstract. China Telecom's hijack of approximately 50,000 IP prefixes in April 2010 highlights the potential for traffic interception on the In- ternet.

This article discussed China Telecom network's incorrect paths to 50000 IP prefixes, commonly referred to as a “hijack”, which occurred in ...

China Telecom's hijack of approximately 50,000 IP prefixes in April 2010 highlights the potential for traffic interception on the Internet.

China Telecom's hijack of approximately 50,000 IP prefixes in April 2010 highlights the potential for traffic interception on the Internet.

We use the China Telecom incident as a case study, to understand (1) what can be learned about large-scale routing anomalies using public data sets, and (2) ...

China Telecom's hijack of approximately 50,000 IP prefixes in April 2010 highlights the potential for traffic interception on the Internet.

In October, 2010, Sprint severed its connection with Cogent. • These two ASes had issues with peering relationship that allowed.

Dec 5, 2016 · What can we learn about large scale routing anomalies using publicly available datasets? – How can we design scalable mechanisms to.

Characterizing large-scale routing anomalies: A case study of the china telecom incident. R Hiran, N Carlsson, P Gill. Passive and Active Measurement: 14th ...

Characterizing large-scale routing anomalies: A case study of the china telecom incident. R Hiran, N Carlsson, P Gill. Passive and Active Measurement: 14th ...