We consider approximate strong equilibria (SE) in strategic job scheduling games with two uniformly related machines. Jobs are assigned to machines, and each ...

We consider approximate strong equilibria (SE) in strategic job scheduling games with two uniformly related machines. Jobs are assigned to machines, ...

Sep 1, 2013 · We consider approximate strong equilibria (SE) in strategic job scheduling games with two uniformly related machines. Jobs are assigned to ...

This study considers a real firm with a flow shop manufacturing system that receives various orders from different agents so that each order belongs to a ...

Abstract. A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile resilient to unilateral deviations, and is predominantly used in the analysis of multiagent systems.

We consider approximate strong equilibria (SE) in strategic job scheduling games with two uniformly related machines. Jobs are assigned to machines, ...

Bibliographic details on Approximate strong equilibria in job scheduling games with two uniformly related machines.

We consider approximate strong equilibria (SE) in strategic job scheduling games with two uniformly related machines. Jobs are assigned to machines, and each ...

Approximate strong equilibria in job scheduling games with two uniformly related machines · Discrete Applied Mathematics 161(13-14): 1843-1858 · 2013 · Quick ...

In this paper the problem of scheduling of jobs on parallel machines under incompatibility relation is considered. In this model a binary relation between jobs ...