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All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction☆ One of the bidders bids at the threshold for any unit for which his valuation is below the threshold; the other bidders bid zero in this range. In the second class of equilibria there are as many bids at or above the maximum valuation as there are units.
This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders.
This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In ...
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This paper completely characterizes the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing ...
Bidders submit written bids without knowing the bid of the other people in the auction. The highest bidder wins but the price paid is the second-highest bid.
This paper completely characterizes the set of Nash equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal.
This paper completely characterizes the set of Nash equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal ...
This paper completely characterizes the set of Nash equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal ...
This paper completely characterizes the set of equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal ...
Jun 8, 2020 · Vickrey auctions were so named after Canadian economist William Vickrey who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1996 for his ground-breaking work.