In this note, we prove that the known upper bounds on the price of anarchy for nonatomic selfish routing games carry over to atomic selfish routing games, pro-.

Oct 30, 2013 · This section studies atomic selfish routing networks, where each player controls a non-negligible amount of traffic. While most aspects of the ...

Atomic Selfish Routing in Networks: A Survey. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol ...

Atomic Selfish Routing in Networks: A Survey. December 2005; Lecture Notes in Computer Science. DOI:10.1007/11600930_100. Source; DBLP. Conference: Internet and ...

Anshelevich E., Dasgupta A., Tardos E., Wexler T. Near-optimal network design with selfish agents. In Proc. of the 35th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing (STOC ' ...

Apr 26, 2023 · In selfish routing network, the over-provisioning leads to decrease of POA. We can further modify the model of selfish routing network to atomic ...

Apr 25, 2006 · ATOMIC SELFISH ROUTING IN NETWORKS: A SURVEY t. The possible paths that the two players may follow are labeled in the figure. The resource ...

Abstract. In this survey we present some recent advances in the lit- erature of atomic (mainly network) congestion games. The algorithmic.

Apr 4, 2016 · This work, based on work of Roughgarden (2007), analyzes two models in routing games: the nonatomic and the atomic selfish routing models.

In this note, we prove that the known upper bounds on the price of anarchy for nonatomic selfish routing games carry over to atomic selfish routing games, pro-.