Dec 5, 2019 · In fact, a subsidy of at most one dollar per agent is sufficient to guarantee the existence of an envy-free allocation. Further, we prove that ...

Jul 13, 2020 · We prove that for general monotonic valuation functions an envy-free allocation always exists with a subsidy of at most 2(n-1) dollars per agent.

In fact, a subsidy of at most one dollar per agent is sufficient to guarantee the existence of an envy-free allocation. Further, we prove that for general ...

Jul 13, 2020 · It follows that agent 2 must receive a payment of at least v2 to eliminate its envy. But then, because v2 > v1, agent 1 is envious of the bundle ...

Dec 5, 2019 · Soc. Choice Welf. 2002. TLDR. It is shown how the procedure eliminates envy by compensating envious players, ...

Dec 5, 2019 · In fact, a subsidy of at most one dollar per agent is sufficient to guarantee the existence of an envy-free allocation. Further, we prove that ...

Jun 30, 2020 · For additive valuations there is an envy-freeable allocation where the subsidy to each agent is at most one dollar. (This allocation is also EF1 ...

Duration: 18:35
Posted: Jul 9, 2020

... When WEF allocations do not exist, it may still be possible to achieve weighted envy-freeness if a third party is willing to subsidize the envious agents.

Duration: 1:07:20
Posted: Jul 24, 2020