Nov 29, 2022 · In this work, we address this issue by proposing a payment rule which combines the corresponding ones in classical VCG and GSP mechanisms in a novel way.

In this work, our goal is to design a truthful mechanism for mixed bidders while maximizing the overall welfare. Here, the mixed bid- ders could be either UMs ...

Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders. Pages 215 - 225. PREVIOUS ARTICLE. Competition on Price and Quality in Cloud Computing. Previous · NEXT ARTICLE. Session ...

We in- troduce a transitional mechanism which encourages advertisers to update their bids to their valuations, while mitigating revenue loss. In this setting, ...

Apr 1, 2016 · We introduce a transitional mechanism which encourages advertisers to update their bids to their valuations, while mitigating revenue loss. In ...

The work in (Bachrach et al. 2016 ) proposed a transitional mechanism, which is similar to ours. However, they considered all bidders as traditional utility ...

... bidders could manipulate both their values andaffiliated ... Utility Maximizer or Value Maximizer: Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders in Online Advertising.

This work proposes a truthful auction mechanism with an approximation ratio of 2 on social welfare, which is close to the lower bound of at least 5/4 that ...

The main challenge is that advertisers will need to change their bidding strategies; until they do, the auctioneer will generally lose money.

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