THE OTTOMAN SUL&#x1e6c;&#x0100;NS AND CALIPHS, 1290-1924 AD

The Shihābī Amīrs of Lebanon, 1697-1842 AD

The House of Muḥammad ʿAlī in Egypt, 1805-1953 AD

The Sanūsī Amīrs & Kings of Libya, 1837-1969 AD

Return to the Fall of Constantinople

Copyright (c) 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved

The Ottoman Sulṭāns and Caliphs, Note 1

A recent correspondent indignantly claimed that the Imperial burials had already been completely destroyed by the Crusaders. Well, the Fourth Crusade was not above looting the dead, but even if they had the energy to open all the tombs, back to Constantine, it is hard to imagine that they would have been so interested in destroying the burials that there would not have been plenty left for the Greeks to subsequently reinter. The Crusaders, after all, were looking for valuables, since the tax base of their domain was pitiful and they were always short of money. Vandalism was not beyond them, but it was not their main concern.

Indeed, on one account, when the Crusaders opened the sarcophagus of Justinian, they "found that his corpse was miraculously uncorrupted after over 600 years. Consequently, they left it alone..." [Jonathan Harris, Constantinople, Capital of Byzantium, Hambledon Continuum, London, New York, 2007, p.161]. An incorruptible body, of course, has been a mark, not just in Christianity but also in Buddhism (and The X-Files), of sainthood. Anyone knowing much about Justinian, whose personality has been compared to that of Richard Nixon, might find that surprising. But Justinian is regarded as a Saint in the Orthodox Church.

And even if the Crusaders then did loot the bodies of all other Emperors, there were almost two hundred years under the Palaeologi to do proper burials of new Emperors, which likely would have used such empty sarcophagi as might have been left from the depredations of the Crusaders. My suspicion therefore, with the most charitable regard for Meḥmed II, is that some of the burials may still lie under the great mosque. Some future archaeology may be allowed to test this.

An interesting assertion has now come to my attention. Peter Sarris says:

Moreover, Mehmed and his heirs were determined to literally build on the achievements of the rulers of Byzantium: beneath the Topkapi palace from which they ruled, they buried the sarcophagi of Byzantine rulers, including Heraclius, whose tombs had originally been placed in the Church of the Holy Apostles, while that Church was demolished and replaced by a mosque honouring Mehmed Fatiḥ [Byzantium: A Very Short History, Oxford University Press, p.126]

This is the first that I have heard of this. Sarris is a "Reader in Late Roman, Medieval, and Byzantine History and a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge." So his academic credentials are impressive, but he does not tell us the source of this information -- something probably due to the format of the Oxford "Very Short Introductions" series, of which the Sarris book is number 437. Things are not footnoted here as in full format scholarly works. The reference to Heraclius indicates some specificity in the source.

However, this is an intriguing possibility. There are some imperial sarcophagi lying around Istanbul, but nowhere near as many as we would expect from a 1000 year history of burials, unless many others were broken up or adapted for building material. My thought was that some might still be left under the Fatih mosque, but what Sarris says opens more possibilities. Burying the Roman Emperors, or at least their sarcophagi, under Topkapi not only dramatically appropriates the Imperial tradition, it prevents attempts to recover the burials or make claims that Emperors, like Constantine XI, have risen from the dead. It also prevents the Imperial burials from becoming sites of Christian veneration or pilgrimage, which is probably why the Church of the Holy Apostles was demolished, and the Fatih mosque built, in the first place. This is altogether reasonable, but I would like to know the source that Peter Sarris has used.

Peter Sarris has been kind enough to respond to my inquiry, with the answer that he has derived his information from the lectures of Byzantinist Cyril Mango. There is no contemporary reference for the Ottoman removal of Imperial burials or sarcophagi. However, Mango discusses the issue in a paper, "Three Imperial Byzantine Sarocophagi Discovered in 1750," in the Dumbarton Oaks Papers [Vol. 16, 1962, pp.397-402]. It seems that three porphyry sarcophagi were discovered in 1750 buried on the grounds of the Topkapı palace, as witnessed by the French merchant Jean-Claude Flachat. There seems little doubt that the sarcophagi had been moved to the site of the palace at the time of the demolition of the Church of the Holy Apostles, although any memory of this act had been lost in the two centuries that by then had already passed.

Now, in his work De Ceremoniis, the scholar Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogentus had described 60 some burials of Emperors and Imperial family members in the Church and at locations nearby. Ten of the sacrophagi described by him and in other accounts were porphyry, and eight actually survive. One of the finds of 1750 seems to have been the sarcophagus of the Emperor Manuel I Comnenus, which post-dates Constantine VII, was described by the historian Nicetas Choniates, was attested by him as laid in the monastery of the Pantocrator (which was demolished by the Ottomans like the Church), and whose form features seven domes on the lid, apparently like the Church of the Holy Apostles itself. This extraordinary artifact has since gone missing.

What remains obscure, of course, is the fate of the actual burials, if it was only the sarcophagi that were removed to the Topkapı, not to mention the two score tombs described by Constantine that did not contain porphyry sarcophagi. There seems to be some particular interest by the Ottomans in the porphyry artifacts, which perhaps is not surprising, since the stone was regarded as commensurate in status with the Imperial office, and, having only been obtainable, ultimately, from Egypt, its probable rarity signified just that status. If the Ottomans did not perceive any symbolic or numinous force in the stone used for other sarcophagi, they may have been recycled for building material rather than buried at the Topkapı.

We might be sensible of the possibility that the correspondent might have wanted the Crusaders to despoil all the burials, and not the Ottomans, out of a notion that the Crusaders were bad and the Ottomans good. Of course, many Crusaders, especially in the Fourth Crusade, were bad; but the Ottomans were bad also. All were engaged in looting and vandalism, and the Ottomans had particular reasons to go after churches, monasteries, burials, and statuary, as they did. The satuary that existed in Constantinople, which we know from accounts, is all gone; and not all of it has ended up in Venice. The Ottomans did their part.

The Ottoman Sulṭāns and Caliphs, Note 2

When I was taking a Linguistics class at the University of Texas, probably in 1976, we had just had a unit on rules like this in languages. On the test, we were given examples of Turkish, and the problem was to figure out the rules of vowel harmony.

I knew the rules already. I had even already found Hagopian's 1907 Turkish grammar in the UCLA Research Library. I was, after all, a graduate student; and I had already taken Arabic and Persian.

Was this cheating? If I raised my hand and said, "Professor, I know the rules already," would this be a kind of boasting? Is this note a kind of boasting? Would he have given me a different problem? Well, if the test was testing my knowledge, I was certainly passing a test of knowledge. I didn't say anything. Nothing like that happened again in that class.

Sitting next to me in this same class was a Chinese girl, who I asked about the authenticity of my Chinese name, 克利.

Applying the kind of phonetic rule that was being tested is something I have otherwise tried to do with the pronunciation of "Hawai'i."

The following table is adapted from Hapogian's list of the names of dice combinations [op.cit., p.264]. Constructing this involved some difficulties, since Hagopian uses his own transcription equivalences for Turkish and does not, in this case, give the names in Arabic script. I have given the names in Modern Turkish phonology but with some modifications to the modern orthography (e.g. "j" for "c" -- since "c" is used for English "j" in no other language that I know of). Atatürk's orthography can easily be restored using the chart in the table at below right. Below the names in the Arabic alphabet is their original pronunciation in Persian or Turkish, identical to the images in the number tables above. The Turkish names themselves are from The Oxford Turkish Dictionary [H.C. Hony, A.D. Alderson, and Fahir Iz, Oxford, 1992, 1995]. The reference for Persian is Persian Vocabulary, by A.K.S. Lambton [Cambridge University Press, 1954, 1969, 32s 6d].

The Ottoman Sulṭāns and Caliphs, Note 3;
Perso-Turkish Backgammon Dice Combinations

The letter و is from Persian, pronounced in that language as va or o, but ultimately from Arabic wa; and it just means "and." Hagopian glosses this as "ou means 'and'." Although Hagopian consistenty writes the word as "ou," in Modern Turkish it becomes subject to vowel harmony; and so و gets vocalized, as shown in the table, with ü, i, or ı. It does not seem to be realized anywhere as an actual u. There are some other phonetic changes in vowels and some consonants.

A couple other difficulties concern sebayüdü (3-2) and dubara (2-2). These have elements that are not numbers. Hagopian gives the former as "sé-ba-dū" and the latter as "dū-baré" (he does not use umlauts for the appropriate vowels). In the first instance, Modern Turkish has introduced an extra syllable, yü, while what we see in Hagopian is liable to be the Persian word بِه, which just means "with." So we're saying, "3 with 2." But what the yü would be just defeats me.

The second word, dubara is worse. The bara or "baré" element seems likely to be Persian بَرَاىِ, bæraye, but it has lost a syllable and semantically seems unsuitable -- the word means "for." I can't say what is going on here.

Then there is a case that is not puzzling in the same ways. Hepyek (1-1) clearly uses the Turkish word hep, meaning "all"; but my writing of it as هپ, hep is a guess. I cannot find the word written in Arabic in Hagopian, whose English-Turkish vocabulary does not give the Arabic writings and who is lacking a Turkish-English vocabulary.

The final issue may be whether these words should all be written as one word. I have written them as separate words largely for convenience, just using the Persian and Turkish names of the numbers directly from the separate treatments; but we also have the evident practice in Hagopian that where he writes "ou," he actually leaves a space between the words. This is where the Arabic script versions of the names would again have settled the problem.

Perso-Turkish Backgammon Dice Combinations
	6	5	4	3	2	1
1
2
3
4
5
6

Note that, while there are three cases here that add up to "7," for purposes of probability, the complete table should be filled out, so that the combinations 3-4, 2-5, and 1-6 would also occur, giving six chances out of 36 of rolling a "7." Thus, one is in the best position at the beginning of a dice game ("Craps"), where the best chance exists of rolling "7," a winner, and the lowest of rolling "2" or "12," which are losers. Afterwards, "7" is the loser. Curious phenomena of probability carry over into quantum mechanics.

The Ottoman Sulṭāns and Caliphs, Note 4

Not all who deny the existence of the Armenian genocide are Turkish, as I have heard from recent correspondents. Anyone sincerely sceptical or confused about the matter should consult Death by Government [Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1995, pp.209-239], by R.J. Rummel, one of the greatest living experts on mass murder. Rummel estimates the number of Armenians murdered in the main organized genocide program (there were others), from 1915-1918, as 1,404,000 persons.

Some of the eyewitness testimony to this included reports by the American Ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau, Sr. (whose son, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., would be Franklin Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury), and by other American consular officials, at a time when the United States was still neutral in World War I. Morgenthau's account was published in 1919 as Ambassador Morgenthau's Story. I believe there is an accusation that Morgenthau's book was ghost-written by Armenians. Even if that were true, it still does not mean that the accounts were not correct (Armenians in exile would tend to be living evidence of what the Turks did), and much of the evidence associated with Morgenthau consists of diplomatic records that are contemporaneous with the events.

Morgenthau said:

When the Turkish authorities gave the orders for these deportations, they were merely giving the death warrant to a whole race; they understood this well, and, in their conversations with me, they made no particular attempt to conceal the fact. ["The Diplomat Who Called Out Mass Murder," The Wall Street Journal, May 4, 2015, A13]

This doesn't sound like some Armenian ghost-writer putting (uncontradicted) words in the mouth of Morgenthau. In turn, Morgenthau quotes Interior Minister Talaat Pasha:

Why are you so interested in the Armenians anyway? You are a Jew; these people are Christians... Why can't you let us do with these Christians as we please?

Morgenthau answered:

I am not here as a Jew, but as American ambassador. My country contains something like 97 million Christians and something less than three million Jews. So, at least in my ambassadorial capacity, I am 97% Christian. But after all, that is not the point. I do not appeal to you in the name of any race or religion, but merely as a human being...
Our people will never forget these massacres. They will always resent the wholesale destruction of Christians in Turkey.

Even though Atatürk himself condemned the Ottomans for the massacres of Armenians (while doing nothing in recompense), the Turkish government still denies, denies, denies.

Americans were not the only neutral diplomats in Turkey during World War I. Norway, Denmark, and Sweden were neutral countries all through World War I, and information is now emerging from their diplomatic archives about what the Scandinavians observed of the Armenian genocide, as well as of Ottoman treatment of Greeks and the Aramaic speaking communities. In addition to this, there were Scandinavian Christian missionaries who had been operating among Ottoman Armenians, and they reported to their embassies what they had been seeing out in the countryside. Hitherto, I don't think that the existence of this evidence has been generally recognized, even by Rummel.

The Ottoman Sulṭāns and Caliphs, Note 5

Nor need we dismiss the endless pornographic fantasies that revolve around the Harīm of the Sulṭān's Topkapı Palace. Fascination with this is now often disparaged as "Orientalism," i.e. the projection of unrelated and hostile imaginings onto misunderstood institutions; but there is no doubt of the extraordinary and bizarre characteristics of the Imperial Harīm. I think some Turks are torn between condemnation of what can be seen as a dated and decadent insitutition, everything bad about the Ottomans (indeed, it was disbanded in 1909 after the Young Turks took over), and a defensiveness that is both politically correct and nationalistic, despite its incommensurability with Atatürk's reforms. But if it was diverting for the Sulṭān, I don't see why it should not continue to be so to the curious modern. An honest and informed treatment of this can be found in Harem, The World Behind the Veil [Abbeville Press, New York, London, Paris, 1989], by a woman who grew up in Turkey, Alev Lytle Croutier, many of whose own relatives had lived in traditional harīms. The book contains photographs from the Ottoman era (including her relatives) as well as historical drawings and the sort of lush and sensual paintings by Western artists that infuriate the anti-"Orientalism" crowd. The image above is a 19th century photograph. It is given by Croutier [p.74], but I also remember it from many years ago in Time magazine, at the time that the Topkapı Harīm was first opened to the public. Recent apologetics that life in the Harīm represented some sort of progressive political power for women are simply ridiculous, and they disturbingly parallel justifications for the horrors of the status of women in many contemporary Islamic states.

Languages with more than 30,000,000 Speakers as of 2005

The Altaic and Uralic Languages

The Altaic and Uralic languages are the most widespread and important families of languages after the Indo-European, Afro-Asiatic (Hamito-Semitic), and the Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian) languages. Just how important they are, however, depends on some questionable judgments about what languages belong in the family. This begins with whether the Altaic and Uralic languages themselves belong to the same family, the Ural-Altaic. For all the subtleties that must be involved in such judgments, I would tend to take seriously the impression of one of my colleagues, who is Turkish, that when he hears Finnish spoken, he feels like he should be able to understand it. I'm not sure I can say the same thing about languages closely related to English, like Dutch or German.

More intriguing is the question of Korean and Japanese. If Korean and Japanese are related to anything, or even to each other, the Altaic family is the most promising option. There is even a book I have, Japanese and Other Altaic Languages, by Roy A. Miller [U. of Chicago Press, 1971], which wears its decision in the title. The matter, however, remains contentious. The least I can say is that Korean and Japanese sound similar to me, and I might not be able to tell them apart, but for Japanese word endings like -masu and -mashita that I can recognize. But then my background for such a subjective impression is pretty shallow.

The extent of the Ural-Altaic languages is impressive, from Eastern Europe to the Pacific. The Uralic languages are named after the Ural Mountains, at whose northern end we get a convergence of Finnic, Ugric, and Samoyed languages. Their northern range looks to be autochthonous and probably used to be continuous, before Russian settlement broke it up, especially across a broad area in northern Russia. The original southern limit of Finnic speech is probably still represented by Estonian. The Ugric speech area is probably not much different from what it always had been, except for the Magyars, who adopted a steppe culture, swept into Europe, terrified a broad area in the 10th century, but then settled down to become the Kingdom of Hungary -- named after the earlier Huns, whose language was probably Mongolian or Turkic but is so poorly attested that we can't even be sure of that.

Nevertheless, the recent One Thousand Languages, Living, Endangered, and Lost, by Peter K. Austin [University of California Press, 2008] asserts that the Turkic Chuvash "is related to mediaeval Volga Bolghar, Khazarian, and Hunnic" [p.153]. The Khazars and Bulgars appear in Southern Russia after the disappearance of the Huns and the departure of the Avars. The Khazars, converts to Judaism and stauch allies of Constantinople, remained on the lower Volga until the arrival of the Cumans in the 11th century. The Bulgars (Bolghars) stretched from the upper Volga (the Volga Bulghars), through the Ukraine (the Onogur Bulgars), into modern Bulgaria (the Danube Bulgars). Austin probably cites "Volga Bolghar" because this peristed the longest, in the area where Chuvash is spoken today, while Onogur Bulgar disappeared, and Danube Bulgar was replaced with a Slavic language, leaving its name on the Kingdom of Bulgaria.

The Altaic languages are named after the Altai Mountains, which are at the extreme north-eastern limit of the Turkic language area. Most of the extent of the Turkic languages is the result of migration in the Middle Ages, which split the Indo-Iranian languages off from the other Indo-European languages and overwhelmed originally Indo-European speaking peoples in Turkistan and modern Turkey. Migration and conquest also left a small area of Mongolian speakers, Kalmyk, on the far shore of the Caspian Sea. The earliest information on Altaic speakers is from the Chinese, who were partially overrun by them during the period of the Sixteen Kingdoms of the Five Barbarians; but, as I note there, it is extremely hard to identify the languages and affinities of these groups with any precision. Part of the problem is that Turkic and Mongolian languages may not have yet become differentiated, so we may be dealing with people speaking a kind of Proto-Altaic. The Hsiung-nu, , had long troubled the Chinese, and are usually thought to be the group that turned up in Europe and India later as the Huns (Huna in India). Subsequent Mongolian or Altaic peoples on the western Steppe, such as the Avars, Bulgars, Kazars, Patzinaks, and Cumans, have disappeared or been ethnically and linguistically assimilated (e.g. the Danube Bulgars). The Tungusic and Samoyed languages and Yakut actually consist of small pockets of people in areas that are either empty of habitation or that also now have small pockets of Russian speakers. The map thus indicates a range rather than solid habitation.

Looking at Turkish, which I have already discussed elsewhere, there are striking characteristics that belong to the family, such as vowel harmony and the agglutinative grammar. "Agglutination" is the device by which grammatical morphemes (parts of words with distinct meanings) are attached, one after another, unchanged (except for vowel harmony), to a root. For instance, both Latin and Turkish have an ablative case, meaning, in general, "from" or motion away from. In Latin "from the girls" is puellīs, while in Turkish it is kızlardan. In Turkish -lar is the plural ending and -dan is the ablative ending; but in Latin -īs, the plural and ablative elements have melted together and are indistinguishable. From these Turkish forms, we can predict the ablative singular, kızdan, and the nominative plural, kızlar, in Turkish, but not in Latin -- there they are puellā and puellae, respectively, neither of whose endings have anything in common with puellīs.

Some Indo-European experts think that originally the source of languages like Latin had an agglutinative grammar also, which is reasonable, but this is not directly attested anywhere. Another important agglutinative language in history was Sumerian, the very first written language. When we then notice that the Turkish word for "father," ata, looks like adda, the Sumerian for "father," this adds to evidence, such as it is, that Sumerian, which is neither Semitic nor Indo-European (but part of a number of anomalous isolated languages now confined to the Caucasus), may be part of a larger family that includes the Altaic languages.

Indeed, when we notice that the Hittite word for father was attas and the Gothic word was atta, this could feed enthusiasm for theories combining Indo-European languages, Altaic languages, and Sumerian into a super-family, as examined elsewhere. This also helps out a bit with Turkish nationalism: If Turkish and Hittite have (more or less) the same word for father, then maybe there is a Turkish connection to Anatolia that long antedates the actual first Turkish invasion of 1071 AD. Even if the Altaic and Indo-European languages are related, however, this doesn't imply any pre-historical Turkish presence in Anatolia.

Below are links to the webpages at this site that concern Uralic or Altaic speaking peoples. The page on the Mongol Khāns also includes Central Asian states with Mongolian or Turkic languages, such as Kazakhstan. Even tiny Tuva, the special hobby of the physicist Richard Feynman, has its own Turkic language (Tuvinian or Tuvan). The Manchu conquest of China in 1644, although a historic humiliaton for the Chinese, nevertheless turned out to be suicidal for Manchu identity. The language only survives in tiny pockets in Manchuria, which otherwise is dominated by the settlement of the Chinese and their language.

The list of languages here is based on The Languages of the World, by Kenneth Katzner [Routledge & Kegan Paul, revised 1986, Third Edition, 1995, 2002, 2006]. The map is based on the Rand McNally New Cosmopolitan World Atlas [1965, p.146 -- at the time they did not regard the Tungusic languages, let alone Korean or Japanese, as Altaic]. Additional information, though by no means with the detail available, was derived from some ethnographic maps from the National Geographic Society, "A Cultural Map of the Middle East" [July 1972], "Peoples of the Soviet Union" [February 1976], and "The Peoples of China" [July 1980]. Not everything matches up from the older sources with the more recent ones.

The Spread of Indo-European and Turkish Peoples off the Steppe

The Jalāyirids, 1340-1432

The Mongol Khāns

The Qara Qoyunlu, 1351-1469

The Timurids, 1370-1500

The Aq Qoyunlu, 1396-1508

Shibānid Özbegs, 1438-1599

Kazakhs, 1394-1748

Toqay Temürids, 1599-1758

Mangıts of Bukhara, 1747-1920

The Manchu Ch'ing Dynasty, 1644-1911

The Kings of Hungary

Finland and Estonia

The Emperors of Japan

The Kings of Korea

Philosophy of Science, Linguistics

Philosophy of Science

Phoenician Commerce & Colonization

Copyright (c) 2008 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved

The Shihābī Amīrs
of Lebanon, 1697-1842 AD

The Shihābī Amīrs
of Lebanon

Bashīr I 1697-1707

Ḥaydar 1707-1732

Mulḥim 1732-1754

Manṣūr 1754-1770

Yūsuf 1770-1788

first Maronite Amīr, 1770

Bashīr II 1788-1840

overthrown by Britain
& Turkey, 1840

Bashīr III 1840-1842

direct Turkish Rule, 1842-1918;
French Rule, 1920-1943

Republic of Lebanon

Bishara al-Khuri President,
1943-1952

Camille Chamoun 1952-1958

Fuad Chehab 1958-1964

Charles Hélou 1964-1970

Sulayman Franjieh 1970-1976

Elias Sarkis 1976-1982

Amin Gemayel 1982-1988

Selim al-Huss 1988-1989

Elias Hrawi 1989-1998

Émile Lahoud 1998-2007

Fuad Siniora acting,
2007-2008

Michel Suleiman 2008-2014

Tammam Salam acting,
2014-2016

Michael Aoun 2016-present

The Golden Age of Lebanon, Lubnān, , in Arabic, is considered by many to have come in the reign of the Amīr Bashīr II Shihābī. The Shihābīs were originally Sunnī Moslems, but they came to rule an area dominated by the Druzes,

Umbrella Pine near Ras al-Matn,
Mount Lebanon, 1969

practioners of a religious off-shoot of Islām and regarded by many Moslems as apostates from Islām. When the Amīrs themselves converted to Maronite Christianity, this effected an alliance, sometimes uneasy, between the largest communities in Lebanon, the Maronites and the Druzes, who stood in some danger of persecution by the orthodox Moslem Turkish authorites.

The Shihābī Amīrs of Lebanon
Bashīr I	1697-1707
Ḥaydar	1707-1732
Mulḥim	1732-1754
Manṣūr	1754-1770
Yūsuf	1770-1788
first Maronite Amīr, 1770
Bashīr II	1788-1840
overthrown by Britain & Turkey, 1840
Bashīr III	1840-1842
direct Turkish Rule, 1842-1918; French Rule, 1920-1943
Republic of Lebanon
Bishara al-Khuri	President, 1943-1952
Camille Chamoun	1952-1958
Fuad Chehab	1958-1964
Charles Hélou	1964-1970
Sulayman Franjieh	1970-1976
Elias Sarkis	1976-1982
Amin Gemayel	1982-1988
Selim al-Huss	1988-1989
Elias Hrawi	1989-1998
Émile Lahoud	1998-2007
Fuad Siniora	acting, 2007-2008
Michel Suleiman	2008-2014
Tammam Salam	acting, 2014-2016
Michael Aoun	2016-present


Umbrella Pine near Ras al-Matn, Mount Lebanon, 1969

Still symbolic of the success of this alliance and the prosperity of the period is the beautiful Bayt ad-Dīn (or Beit ed-Din, "House of Religion") Palace, begun by Bashīr II in 1788 and not completed for 30 years. Unfortunately, Bashīr II moved to consolidate his power through an alliance with Muḥammad ʿAlī of Egypt. This would have been an excellent strategy were it not for the intervention of Britain to drive the Egyptians out of Syria and restore Ottoman authority. Bashīr II was deposed in the process. Also, the influence of France, especially, to protect the Christians in Lebanon, was not exerted successfully to preserve Lebanese autonomy, and tended to alienate the non-Christians anyway. The Turks managed to rid themselves of the Shihābīs altogether, which at times resulted in the persucution and even massacre of Christians.

After Lebanese independence from France itself in 1946, Bayt ad-Dīn became a residence for the President of the Republic. For many years Lebanon prospered as the "Switzerland of the Middle East," and Beirut as the "Paris of the Middle East"; but by the 1970's the communal differences that had been a source of strength when the communities needed to unite against outside persecution began to be a source of weakness, as sometimes had happened before, when the communities fell out among themselves and the issue came to be the distribution of political privileges and patronage to each "confessional" community. Things were particularly destablized by the large number of Palestinian refugees, who had no political standing in Lebanon at all,

Beit ed-Din Palace, 1969

and whose activities against Israel drew Israeli retaliation on Lebanon. Since the Maronites were politically and economically dominant, everyone united against them and full civil war broke out in 1975. This ended up bringing the Syrians into Lebanon in 1976. The Druzes, and much of the anti-Maronite cause, were led by the charismatic Kamal Jumblatt, whose assassination in 1977, widely rumored to have been ordered by the Syrians, symbolically ended the first phase of the Lebanese "troubles." Jumbalatt had made a mistake, and he certainly paid dearly for it.


Beit ed-Din Palace, 1969

The shakeup of the civil war then brought to the surface something new: The Shi'ite community, always the poor relation in Lebanese politics, predominant in the South and in the Bekaʿa Valley (areas originally peripheral to Mount Lebanon), had not only quietly grown into the largest community in Lebanon (from the third) but now was thoroughly radicalized and activized, in a natural alliance with the Palestinians, and, ominously, with the more distant Shi'ite coreligionists, the Iranian Islāmic Revolutionaries. The Israelis, who invaded Lebanon in 1982 to get rid of the Palestinians, more or less accomplished that task, with the PLO leaving for Tunisia, but then discovered, as the Syrians had already, that the communal rivalries of the Lebanese themselves, especially with the Shi'ites adopting Iranian suicide and terror tactics, made the place a tar baby for any outsiders who wanted to exert control by force.

With the foreign powers chasened, the Lebanese began to patch things up with some needed political compromises; and as the 1990's progressed, some peace and prosperity seemed to be returning to the country. It remains to be seen, however, if a modus vivendi can be found to produce another golden age of communal alliance against the outside.

Subsequent experience has not been encouraging. Shi'ite autonomy and terrorism in the South again drew in the Israelis, and the Syrians seem to be exerting their influence by assassinations and bombings. This still leaves Lebanon at the mercy of foreign powers and foreign influences.

When I lived in Beirut myself, 1969-1970, some favorite books in town were Lawrence Durrell's Alexandria Quartet (Justine, 1957, Balthazar, 1958, Mountolive, 1959, & Clea, 1960). No one had any difficulty recognizing the ways that Beirut at the time was like the cosmopolitan Alexandria of Durrell's story. And there were pure touches of the '60's: Women students from Saudi Arabia headed for the American University would change into see-through blouses on the flights from Jiddah. Veils were rare. That Beirut (let alone the see-through blouses) is now as long gone as Durrell's Alexandria.

Maronite Patriarchs of Lebanon

Egyptian interventions in Arabia in 1818-1822 and 1838-1843 very nearly exterminated the House of Saʿūd and its fundamentalist Wahhābī movement, which much later would create a united and independent Saʿūdī Arabia -- and later much international mayhem when Wahhābī radicalism spread elsewhere, especially to India and Afghanistan.

Copyright (c) 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2016, 2018 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved

The House of Muḥammad ʿAlī
in Egypt, 1805-1953 AD

Egypt was abruptly pulled into modern history with the invasion of Napoleon in 1798. Although Egypt had been conquered by the Turks in 1517, the strange slave dynasty of the Mamlūks had continued and by Napoleon's time had reestablished de facto authority in the declining Empire. After the French were driven from Egypt in 1801, Muḥammad ʿAlī arrived, supposedly to reëstablish Turkish authority.

The House of
Muḥammad ʿAlī
in Egypt

Muḥammad ʿAlī
Pasha,
1805-1848

Ibrāhīm 1848

ʿAbbās Ḥilmī I 1848-1854

Muḥammad Saʿīd 1854-1863

Suez Canal Started, 1859

Ismā'īl 1863-1867

Khedive,
1867-1879,
d. 1895

Suez Canal Opened, 1869
Britain buys Khedive's
share in Canal, with loan
from the Rothschilds, 1875

Muḥammad Tawfīq 1879-1892

Ibn Arabi Revolt, 1879-1882;
British Occupation, 1882

ʿAbbās Ḥilmī II 1892-1914,
d. 1944

British Protectorate,
1914-1922

Ḥusayn Kāmil
Sulṭān,
1914-1917

Aḥmad Fu'ād I 1917-1922

King,
1922-1936

Fārūq 1936-1952,
d. 1965

Aḥmad Fu'ād II 1952-1953

Republic of Egypt, 1953-

Muhammad Naguib President,
1953-1954

Gamal Abdel Nasser 1954-1970

Suez Crisis, 1956;
1967 War; Suez Canal
closed, 1967-1975

Anwar as-Sadat 1970-1981

Yom Kippur War, 1973;
Peace Treaty with Israel, 1979

Mohammed
Hosni Mubarak 1981-2011

Military Rule, 2011-2012

Muhammad Morsi,
Muslim Brotherhood 2012-2013

Coup against Morsi, 2013;
Military Rule, 2013-2014

ʿAbdal Fattah Saʿid
Hussain Khalil as-Sīsī 2014-
present

The House of Muḥammad ʿAlī in Egypt
Muḥammad ʿAlī	Pasha, 1805-1848
Ibrāhīm	1848
ʿAbbās Ḥilmī I	1848-1854
Muḥammad Saʿīd	1854-1863
Suez Canal Started, 1859
Ismā'īl	1863-1867
Khedive, 1867-1879, d. 1895
Suez Canal Opened, 1869 Britain buys Khedive's share in Canal, with loan from the Rothschilds, 1875
Muḥammad Tawfīq	1879-1892
Ibn Arabi Revolt, 1879-1882; British Occupation, 1882
ʿAbbās Ḥilmī II	1892-1914, d. 1944
British Protectorate, 1914-1922
Ḥusayn Kāmil	Sulṭān, 1914-1917
Aḥmad Fu'ād I	1917-1922
King, 1922-1936
Fārūq	1936-1952, d. 1965
Aḥmad Fu'ād II	1952-1953
Republic of Egypt, 1953-
Muhammad Naguib	President, 1953-1954
Gamal Abdel Nasser	1954-1970
Suez Crisis, 1956; 1967 War; Suez Canal closed, 1967-1975
Anwar as-Sadat	1970-1981
Yom Kippur War, 1973; Peace Treaty with Israel, 1979
Mohammed Hosni Mubarak	1981-2011
Military Rule, 2011-2012
Muhammad Morsi, Muslim Brotherhood	2012-2013
Coup against Morsi, 2013; Military Rule, 2013-2014
ʿAbdal Fattah Saʿid Hussain Khalil as-Sīsī	2014- present

Brilliant, ruthless, farsighted, and probably the most important Albanian in world history, Muḥammad ʿAlī very quickly established his own authority instead. The final Mamlūks were massacred in 1811, and Muḥammad ʿAlī moved to create a modern state, and especially a modern army, for Egypt. In this he was as successful as any non-European power at the time. By the time the Greeks revolted against Turkey in 1821, it was Muḥammad ʿAlī who turned out to have the best resources to put down the revolution and was called on by the Sulṭān in 1824 to do so. He very nearly did, until Britain intervened and sank the Egyptian fleet at the Battle of Navarino in 1827.

Frustrated in that direction, Muḥammad ʿAlī was successful in his conquest of the Sudan (1820-1822), probably advancing further up the Nile than any power since Ancient Egypt, though at a terrible cost to the Sudanese in massacre, mutilations, and slaving (of which the American boxer Cassius Clay was probably unaware when he adoped the name "Muhammad Ali" upon his conversion to Islām).

British
Consul Generals
for Egypt

Edward Malet 1879-1883

Evelyn "Over" Baring,
Earl of Cromer 1883-1907

Sir Eldon Gorst, Plenipotentiary 1907-1911

Herbert Kitchener, 1st Viscount Kitchener, Plenipotentiary 1911�1914

British
High Commissioners

Sir Milne Cheetham (acting) 1914-1915

Sir Henry McMahon 1915-1917

Sir Reginald Wingate 1917-1919

Edmund Allenby, 1st Viscount Allenby 1919-1925

George Lloyd, 1st Baron Lloyd 1925-1929

Sir Percy Loraine 1929-1933

Sir Miles Lampson 1934-1936

British Ambassadors to Egypt

Miles Lampson,
1st Baron Killearn 1936-1946

Sir Ronald Campbell 1946-1950

Sir Ralph Stevenson 1950-1955

Sir Humphrey Trevelyan 1955-1956

Suez Crisis, 1956

British Consul Generals for Egypt
Edward Malet	1879-1883
Evelyn "Over" Baring, Earl of Cromer	1883-1907
Sir Eldon Gorst, Plenipotentiary	1907-1911
Herbert Kitchener, 1st Viscount Kitchener, Plenipotentiary	1911�1914
British High Commissioners
Sir Milne Cheetham (acting)	1914-1915
Sir Henry McMahon	1915-1917
Sir Reginald Wingate	1917-1919
Edmund Allenby, 1st Viscount Allenby	1919-1925
George Lloyd, 1st Baron Lloyd	1925-1929
Sir Percy Loraine	1929-1933
Sir Miles Lampson	1934-1936
British Ambassadors to Egypt
Miles Lampson, 1st Baron Killearn	1936-1946
Sir Ronald Campbell	1946-1950
Sir Ralph Stevenson	1950-1955
Sir Humphrey Trevelyan	1955-1956
Suez Crisis, 1956

When Muḥammad ʿAlī moved into Syria in 1831, however, this was a threat to the authority and perhaps even the existence of the Ottoman Empire. When war broke out in 1839, Britain intervened to support the Empire and to throw Muḥammad ʿAlī out in 1841.

The most formative subsequent event for Egyptian history was certainly the construction of the Suez Canal. Although Britain had nothing to do with the project, and it was the French Emperor Napoleon III who attended the lavish opening ceremonies, the collapse of Egyptian financies led to the purchase by Britain of all Egypt's shares in the Canal Company. Benjamin Disraeli simply borrowed the money from the Rothschilds, on the security of no more than the full faith and credit of the Government of Britain.

This did not solve Egypt's financial problems, which got worse. The Khedive Ismā'īl also wasted resources on disastrous campaigns against Ethiopia in 1875-1876. With its interests now in danger, Britain occupied Egypt, without French support, in 1882. Ironically, the Occupation was undertaken under Prime Minister William Gladstone, who was opposed to British Imperialism. He was not, however, going to endanger British finances just because the Khedive didn't know how to handle his. Meanwhile, the British had already occupied Cyrpus in 1878, to anchor British forces in the Eastern Mediterranean.

This made Egypt a de facto part of the British Empire, indeed one of the most important parts, with the Suez Canal an essential strategic link between Britain and India. Some of the most colorful episodes in British Imperial history occured because of this. In 1881 a revolt had started in the Sudan, led by a man claiming to be the Apocalyptic Mahdī of Islāmic tradition. Gladstone was not going to spend British money, or Egyptian, in trying to suppress the rebellion. Consequently, Charles Gordon, known as "Chinese Gordon" for his part in putting down the Taiping Rebellion in China (1860-1864), and who had already been governor-general of the Sudan from 1877-1880, was sent back in order to evacuate the Egyptian garrison.

Once there, Gordon decided to stay and resist the Mahdī. By 1885 this insubordination stirred up public opinion back home and forced Gladstone to send a relief expedition; but it missed rescuing Gordon by two days, as the Mahdī's forces overran Khartoum and killed Gordon. This made Gordon one of the great heroes of the day, humiliated Britain, and resulted in the fall of Gladstone's government. However, the Sudan was, for the time being, abandoned -- much as the United States abandoned Afghanistan in 2021.

When the British returned in 1898, in the heyday of imperial jingoism, Lord Kitchener, with a young Winston Churchill along, calmly massacred the mediaeval army of the Mahdī's successor at the Battle of Omdurman, avenged Gordon, and made himself one of the immortal heroes of the British Empire too. Although formally in Egyptian service, Kitchener reconquered the Sudan as an Anglo-Egyptian "condominium." The theory of British and Egyptian joint rule in the Sudan continued until Sudanese independence in 1956, though between 1924 and 1936 the British didn't even allow Egyptian forces or authorities into the Sudan.

British High Commissioners for Cyprus

Lord John Hay (acting) 1878

Sir Garnet Joseph Wolseley 1878-1879

Sir Robert Biddulph 1879-1886

Sir Henry Ernest Gascoyne Bulwer 1886-1892

Sir Walter Joseph Sendall 1892-1898

Sir William Frederick Haynes Smith 1898-1904

Sir Charles Anthony King-Harman 1904-1911

Hamilton Goold-Adams 1911-1915

Sir John Eugene Clauson 1915-1918

Sir Malcolm Stevenson acting, 1918-1920, 1920-1925

British
Governors
of Cyprus

Sir Malcolm Stevenson 1925-1926

Sir Ronald Storrs 1926-1932

Sir Reginald Edward Stubbs 1932-1933

Sir Herbert Richmond Palmer 1933-1939

William Denis Battershill 1939-1941

Charles Campbell Woolley 1941-1946

Reginald Fletcher, 1st Baron Winster 1946-1949

Sir Andrew Barkworth Wright 1949-1954

Sir Robert Perceval Armitage 1954-1955

Sir John Alan Francis Harding 1955-1957

Sir Hugh Mackintosh Foot 1957-1960

Cyprus Independent, 1960

British High Commissioners for Cyprus
Lord John Hay (acting)	1878
Sir Garnet Joseph Wolseley	1878-1879
Sir Robert Biddulph	1879-1886
Sir Henry Ernest Gascoyne Bulwer	1886-1892
Sir Walter Joseph Sendall	1892-1898
Sir William Frederick Haynes Smith	1898-1904
Sir Charles Anthony King-Harman	1904-1911
Hamilton Goold-Adams	1911-1915
Sir John Eugene Clauson	1915-1918
Sir Malcolm Stevenson	acting, 1918-1920, 1920-1925
British Governors of Cyprus
Sir Malcolm Stevenson	1925-1926
Sir Ronald Storrs	1926-1932
Sir Reginald Edward Stubbs	1932-1933
Sir Herbert Richmond Palmer	1933-1939
William Denis Battershill	1939-1941
Charles Campbell Woolley	1941-1946
Reginald Fletcher, 1st Baron Winster	1946-1949
Sir Andrew Barkworth Wright	1949-1954
Sir Robert Perceval Armitage	1954-1955
Sir John Alan Francis Harding	1955-1957
Sir Hugh Mackintosh Foot	1957-1960
Cyprus Independent, 1960

All this took place with Egypt still legally part of the Ottoman Empire. Right down until 1914 the Turkish flag was dutifully flown and Turkish passports issued, for Egypt, Cyrpus, and the Sudan. When Turkey repaid a century of British support by throwing its lot with Germany in World War I, however, the fiction came to an end, and Egypt de jure came under British rule as a Protectorate, with the Sulṭānate, abolished by the Turks in 1517, reëstablished.

Directors-General of Antiquities

Auguste-Édouard Mariette 1858-1880

Gaston Maspero 1881-1886

Eugène Grébault 1886-1892

Jacques Jean Marie de Morgan 1892-1897

Gaston Maspero 1899-1914

Pierre Lacau 1914-1936

Étienne Drioton 1936-1952

Mostafa Amer 1953-1956

Abbas Bayoumi 1956-1957

Moharram Kamal 1957-1959

Abd el-Fattah Hilmy 1959

Mohammad Anwar Shoukry 1960-1964

Mohammad Mahdi 1964-1966

Gamal Mokhtar 1967-1971

Director, Egyptian Antiquities Organization

Gamal Mokhtar 1971-1977

Mohammad Abd el-Qader Mohammad 1977-1978

Shehata Adam 1978-1981

Fuad el-Oraby 1981

Ahmed Khadry 1982-1988

Mohammad Abdel Halim Nur el-Din 1988

Sayed Tawfik 1989-1990

Mohammad Ibrahim Bakr 1990-1993

Director of the
Supreme Council of Antiquities

Mohammad Abdel Halim Nur el-Din 1993-1996

Ali Hassan 1996-1997

Gaballa Ali Gaballa 1997-2002

Zahi Hawass 2002-2011

Mohamad Abdel Fattah 2011

Moustapha Amine 2011-2013

Mohammad Ibrahim 2013-?

Mostafa Waziri 2017-present

Historically as significant as the actual rulers of Egypt during this period was the development of Egyptology, with the rise of scientific archaeology in the systematic excavation of Egyptian sites. After a free-for-all era in which excavation was little better than looting and vandalism -- a true Indiana Jones approach -- we get an official Department of Antiquities to supervise the digs and return artifacts to the new Cairo Museum -- in 1855 a previous collection had actually been given to the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna.

Directors-General of Antiquities
Auguste-Édouard Mariette	1858-1880
Gaston Maspero	1881-1886
Eugène Grébault	1886-1892
Jacques Jean Marie de Morgan	1892-1897
Gaston Maspero	1899-1914
Pierre Lacau	1914-1936
Étienne Drioton	1936-1952
Mostafa Amer	1953-1956
Abbas Bayoumi	1956-1957
Moharram Kamal	1957-1959
Abd el-Fattah Hilmy	1959
Mohammad Anwar Shoukry	1960-1964
Mohammad Mahdi	1964-1966
Gamal Mokhtar	1967-1971
Director, Egyptian Antiquities Organization
Gamal Mokhtar	1971-1977
Mohammad Abd el-Qader Mohammad	1977-1978
Shehata Adam	1978-1981
Fuad el-Oraby	1981
Ahmed Khadry	1982-1988
Mohammad Abdel Halim Nur el-Din	1988
Sayed Tawfik	1989-1990
Mohammad Ibrahim Bakr	1990-1993
Director of the Supreme Council of Antiquities
Mohammad Abdel Halim Nur el-Din	1993-1996
Ali Hassan	1996-1997
Gaballa Ali Gaballa	1997-2002
Zahi Hawass	2002-2011
Mohamad Abdel Fattah	2011
Moustapha Amine	2011-2013
Mohammad Ibrahim	2013-?
Mostafa Waziri	2017-present

It is noteworthy that every single one of the Directors of Antiquities during the period of the House of Muḥammad ʿAlī is French. This may involve a certain anti-British political statement, since the French were seen as allies during the building of the Suez Canal and did not join the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. The educated Egyptian elite remained Franophile for many years. Of course, when France joined Britain at Suez in 1956, that was the end of that, as the office of Director had ceased going to foreigners with the overthrow of King Fārūk.

Recently, among the successors in the office has most conspicuously been Zahi Hawass, who became the international face of Egyptian archaeology, is responsible for significant discoveries in his own right, and does not suffer gladly the sort of fools who promote or are entranced by the endless crackpot theories about Egypt.

Indeed, Egyptology has now larged passed into the hands of Egyptians. They are prominent in recent excavations and with striking discoveries at Saqqara and elsewhere. Thus, Mohammad Yussef, in charge of a site at Saqqara, and Mostafa Waziri, Director of Antiquities, have found many shaft tombs in the Bubasteion, Βουβαστειών, an originally Saite temple of the cat goddess Bastet, (see Dynasty XXII), situated at the eastern edge of the Saqqara necropolis. Multiple well preserved tombs with coffins, mummies, and other funerary equipment, including statues, some much older than the XXVI Dynasty, some well into the later periods, including under the Ptolemies, have been uncovered.

Monument of Auguste-Édouard Mariette, at his birthplace, Boulogne-sur-Mer, France, 2019; his actual tomb is at the Cairo Museum

Multiple burials have caused some tombs to be characterized as "megatombs."


Monument of Auguste-Édouard Mariette, at his birthplace, Boulogne-sur-Mer, France, 2019; his actual tomb is at the Cairo Museum

Nearby, south of the pyramid of Unas, excavations by Ramadan Hussein, who actually is affiliated with Tübingen University, has concentrated on Saite tombs. The mummies discovered there seem less well preserved than those in the Bubasteion, but Dr. Hussein topped that off with a unique and spectacular discovery.

One burial shaft led down, not to a tomb, but to a room apparently used for mummification, with spaces to work on bodies and channels cut in the rock to drain away bodily fluids. The depth of the room kept the heat of the desert, up above, away, slowing decomposition. What looks like a large pot was actually used to burn incense, in the first place so that the smoke would keep away insects, but, we might imagine, also to cover some of the smells of bodies and chemicals. Herodotus commented on the bad smell that tended to cling to embalmers.

But there was more. Foundations adjacent to the top of the shaft were apparently for a tent or shelter erected as part of the mummification site. Dr. Hussein remembered an actual image of such a place in an Old Kingdom tomb at Giza. Pictured in some detail, with a distinctive entrance ramp, the shelter was called an , an "ibu." Despite the Old Kingdom image, no actual "ibu" has otherwise ever been found in Egypt, so this was a discovery of epic proportions, even if it didn't produce objects that people might like to look at in museums. In turn, we might wonder if this site handled mummification for the entire Saqqara necropolis, over a period of centuries.

The term for the "ibu" is a curiosity in its own right. What we get in the dictionaries of Alan Gardiner and Bill Petty (Hieroglyphic Dictionary, A Middle Egyptian Vocabulary, Museum Tours Press, 2012) are words that are glossed as meaning "refuge," or , and nothing else. The determinative in the dictionaries is the glyph for "house."

However, in a National Geographic documentary, we actually see Ramadan Hussein reading the word off the wall of the Old Kingdom tomb, and the three phonetic glyphs are followed, not by "house," but by the "offering table" glyph, , although a non-standard form that is missing the actual offerings. Neither Gardiner nor Petty list the non-standard form, but the Hieroglyphica font does. It must not occur very often. I do not see the discussion that this warrants at any of the treatments of Dr. Hussein's work on line, including those from the National Geographic Society.

The end of Muḥammad ʿAlī's dynasty resulted from the humiliation of continuing British occupation, the mortification of Egyptian failure in the war against Israeli independence in 1948, and from the failure of King Fārūq, who was rather more successful as a playboy than as a leader, to deal with any of it. The army, soon led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, swept away the monarchy, got British forces to leave Egypt, nationalized the Canal, and then won a great political victory when Britain and France (74 years late) reoccupied the Canal, Israel invaded the Sinai, and both the United States and the Soviet Union told them all to leave in no uncertain terms, in the Suez Crisis of 1956 (just as Soviet tanks were rolling into Hungary!). Thus, Egypt became a player in the Cold War, and the heritage of Muḥammad ʿAlī, the Ottoman Empire, and British imperialism faded rapidly.

After Nasser provoked Israel into war in 1967, and lost the Sinai, the Canal was closed for many years. Anwar Sadat launched a surprise attack across the Canal in 1973. This was at first successful, but Egyptian forces ended up cut off and surrounded in the Sinai before a cease-fire was called. It was close to the consensus of opinion, among both Arabs and Israelis, that Sadat engaged in this war simply to give himself enough credibility to make peace with Israel, which he did. Expelling the Soviets and contracting an American subsidy, this has remained the basis of Egyptian foreign policy ever since, even after Sadat's assassination.

Egypt, however, has begun to simmer with Islamic radicalism, some of whose roots are in the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt. Nasser had no patience for such people, and the hand of his police state lay on them heavily. Sadat, of course, was assassinated by them. Today, the worst sign is the increasing level of attack on the Copts, the native Christians of Egypt. From perhaps 10% of the population of Egypt in recent times, the Copts are now down to less than 6%, with a steady stream of them fleeing the country. Christian villages and churches are shot up, in one case actually at Christmas, people murdered, women and children kidnapped and forcibly converted to ʾIslām and "married" to Muslims against their will, and the government does not even allow churches to be built or repaired without its permission, which is effecively never given. Thus on 24 November 2010, Egypt security forces actually stormed the St. Mary and St. Michael churches, which were under construction in Giza, occupying them and firing live ammunition at Coptic demontrators, killing at least four. The official complaint was that a permit for the construction had not been obtained, although actually it had. Either way, a paramilitary attack, shooting civilians, is not the reasonable response to people building churches.

The Western Press pays little attention to these atrocities, both because the Western secular elite is hostile to Christianity, and generally kills stories about the persecution of Christians, and because the political Left is effectively an ally of Islamic Fascism. Since State Security forces fail to protect Christians and often appear to cooperate in their persecution, including this recent case of shooting Christian demonstrators, this bodes ill for the future of a pro-Western Egyptian government -- although with such friends, one might wonder, what might enemies look like? Of course, we know. The United States encouraged Hosni Mubarak to democratize his rule; but this may be a case, familiar from elsewhere, that a genuinely popular government would plunge Egypt into the savage Mediaeval theocracy familiar from Irān and Afghanistan. Indeed, the first elected President after the overthrow of Mubarak is a representative of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization previously illegal in Egypt, since the days of Nasser, and associated with Terrorism. We are likely in for a rough ride, and Brooklyn may end up with a largely Coptic demographic.

The Muslim Brotherhood President, Muhammad Morsi, soon wore out his welcome. He was clearly intent on imposing an Islamic regime in Egypt, including moves to consolidate dictatorial power. The Army overthrew him in 2013; and in 2014 a general with the unfortunate name of as-Sīsī (usually rendered "al-Sisi" by the Press, when they could have made it just like "Assisi," like the town of St. Francis) was elected President. This reproduces a now familiar pattern in the Arab world. A dictatorship is overthrown. Islamists are voted in. They soon manfest themselves to be worse than the dictatorship. So there is then a coup, with a new military dictatorship installed. The paradigm for this was some years ago in Algeria. Unfortunately, the pattern was not repeated in Iran, which retains its dangerous and vicious theocracy. Since Iranians aren't Arabs, one wonders about the cultural or political differences involved. In Egypt, it is not clear what the effects of all his are going to be, especially on Christians; but the Brotherhood itself has been outlawed, as under Nasser, and many of its members sentenced to death.

The Coptic Patriarchs of Alexandria

Index of Egyptian History

Copyright (c) 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2019, 2021 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved

The Sanūsī Amīrs & Kings
of Libya, 1837-1969 AD

The Sanūsī Amīrs & Kings
of Libya

Muḥammad as-Sanūsī 1837-1859,
Cyrenaica, 1841

Muḥammad al-Mahdī 1859-1902

Aḥmad ash-Sharīf 1902-1916,
d.1933

Italian occupation, 1911

Muḥammad Idrīs 1916-1949;

Amir,
1949-1951;

King,
1951-1969,
d.1983

Mu'ammar al-Qaddhāfī dictatorship,
1969-2011

Libya begins as two domains in the Ottoman Empire, Tripolitania in the west and Cyrenaica in the east. Eventually, lands in the deeper desert, Fezzan, were brought under control. Most of the desert, however, is uninhabitable. Cyrenaica entered history originally as a place of Greek colonies. It is mountainous and, especially in the past, reasonably well watered. Tripoltania clings to the Mediterranean coast around the city of Tripoli. Just a few miles down the coast from Tripoli is Labdah, Roman Leptis Magna, which was the home town of the Roman Emperor Septimius Severus (b.145).

The Sanūsī Amīrs & Kings of Libya
Muḥammad as-Sanūsī	1837-1859, Cyrenaica, 1841
Muḥammad al-Mahdī	1859-1902
Aḥmad ash-Sharīf	1902-1916, d.1933
Italian occupation, 1911
Muḥammad Idrīs	1916-1949; Amir, 1949-1951; King, 1951-1969, d.1983
Mu'ammar al-Qaddhāfī dictatorship, 1969-2011

This was a thinly populated backwater for the Turks, noteworthy mainly for Roman ruins and piracy (with U.S. Marines landing at Derne in Cyrenaica in the First Barbary War, 1801-1805). It all achieved greater significance when Italy displaced the Ottomans in 1911 (ceded in 1912). Indeed, Libya became one of the most important strategic theaters of World War II. The Italians tried invading Egypt from Libya in September 1940 but by February 1941 had been thrown completely out of Cyrenaica, with 130,000 soldiers captured. Alarmed, Hitler sent Erwin Rommel with a couple of divisions to prevent the Italian position from collapsing completely. Rommel, however, went on the offensive. For more than a year, things surged back and forth, with Cyrenaica recovered, lost, and recovered again. By July 1942, Rommel was deep into Egypt, barely stopped at El Alamein, 60 miles from Alexandria. By then, however, the United States was in the War; and the strongly reinforced British began an offensive in October. They broke through and soon swept the Germans and Italians entirely out of Libya. Retreating into Tunisia, they were caught against the Americans who had landed in Morocco and Algeria in November.

After the War, Libya formally became independent in 1951, under the Sasūnī Amīr of Cyrenaica. The long lived King Idrīs was eventually overthrown in 1969. This was under the leadership of the erratic and megalomaniacal Mu'ammar al-Qaddhāfī. Along with armed clashes with Egypt and Chad, Libya became a sponsor of terrorism. Blamed for a bombing in Berlin in 1986, Libya was bombed by Ronald Reagan in retaliation. Later blamed for a bomb that brought down Pam Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, sanctions were imposed on Libya until accused operatives were surrendered. This eventually happened, Qaddafi may have thought better of his ways, and sanctions were lifted in 2003. Meanwhile, Qaddafi had dressed up his dictatorship with an idiosyncratic political theory. Libya became the "Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya." Jamahiriya, similar to the Arabic word for "republic," jumhūrīya, was a term coined by Qaddafi for his political system, which was supposed to be a kind of direct, mass democracy, but was no more democratic than similar arrangements in the Soviet Union. Like Mao's little red book, Qaddhāfī produced a little green book. Qaddhāfī seemed secure enough, like many other dictators (one thinks of Castro), but increasingly anachronistic (Castro, again). At the same time, Qaddhāfī became an object of humor, as his appearance was oddly altered by either aging or plastic surgery, he usually appeared in outlandish costumes, and he created a personal bodyguard consisting entirely of women. Much of his family seemed happy to enjoy the benefits of an international jet-set lifestyle abroad and dictatorship at home.

In 2011, with the revolts of the "Arab Spring" well underway, Qaddhāfī himself was perhaps within days of putting down a revolt in Cyrenaica when NATO contributed air power to the defense of the rebels. Slowly, the tide of battle turned, and Tripoli itself was captured in August. Qaddhāfī apparently fled to his hometown of Sirte. As the town was falling in October, Qaddhāfī attempted to flee to the South. Captured, he seems to have been beaten, tortured, and finally killed by rebel forces. One figure, wearing a New York Yankees baseball cap, is seen on video shooting Qaddhāfī with what he claimed were the fatal shots. This treatment of the fallen leader was an embarrassment, although few doubted that it paled besides the treatment that Qaddhāfī had often given to his own enemies. As in Iraq, a culture of violence and terror had been fostered that left little room for respect, either for the fallen or even for the dead. It remains to be seen how moderate or sensible the new government will prove to be.

Just as Charlie Chaplin parodied Adolf Hitler and Fascist dictatorship in The Great Dictator [1940], Sacha Baron Cohen parodies Mu'ammar al-Qaddhāfī in The Dictator [2012]. Although Cohen's dictator keeps his country poor by refusing to sell oil, which Qaddhāfī never did, his eccentric behavior and clothing, his ruthless tyranny, and especially his all female bodyguard, unmistakeably link the parody to the Libyan.

Since Qaddhāfī was already dead by the time the film was released, one might think that the whole project would be in poor taste. However, the film was certainly well in production before the end-game of the Libyan revolution, and poor taste has never inhibited Sacha Baron Cohen in any case -- although he does carefully avoid any references to ʾIslām, as he had also previously done in Borat [2006], despite that film's purported source in Muslim Kazakhstan. Although this movie was entirely scripted, and Cohen did not film it, like his previous movies, by approaching in character unknowing people in public; he nevertheless publicized his movie by appearing in character in public situations. He was allowed to do this at the Oscars when he agreed that he would perpetrate no stunts during the telecast. Instead, we got a stunt on the Red Carpet outside, where Cohen appeared with an urn that he said contained the ashes of the late North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Il, who supposedly had always wanted to attend the Oscars. Showing the urn to E! television host Ryan Seacrest, Cohen, accompanied by some of his female bodyguards, "accidentally on purpose" spilled "ashes" all over Seacrest's clothing.

An intriguing feature of the movie is Cohen's speech about democracy near the end. Although supposedly in praise of democracy, which the dictator will now supposedly bring to his country, we nevertheless find the speech reproaching American democracy with a long wish list of Leftist complaints, including the "Occupy Wall Street" slogan that 1% of the popular control the wealth and probably the government of the country. When I saw the movie in Los Angeles, this part was actually cheered by the audience, which apparently consisted mainly of the sort of California brain-dead Democrats who reelected Jerry Brown and Barbara Boxer in 2010. And one might wonder if these sentiments happened to be Cohen's own, breaking through the pose of his character.

Or, Cohen may be deriving humor from his habit of putting on and hoaxing his audience, like Andy Kaufman, and deceiving their expectations. For, in the context of the movie, the Leftist complaints are reasons why democracy does not work and is not desirable. And while Cohen's dictator returns to his country and stages an election, he of course steals the election and happily returns to his old dictatorial habits. He has never been sincere; and the heartfelt repentance that he expresess to his new American girlfriend (Anna Faris), who now awkwardly turns out to be Jewish (with an anti-Semitic implication but without, as also in Borat, the real world Islamist context where that would make sense), may have been just as much a cynical ploy as everything else. It therefore looks like the dictator's endorsement of "Occupy Wall Street" propaganda was just Sacha Baron Cohen's clever way of getting his audiences to cheer for dictatorship.

Copyright (c) 2005, 2012, 2015 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved

MODERN ROMANIA

Ottoman Successor States in the Balkans

Princes, Kings, and Presidents of România, Montenegro, Greece, Serbia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, Macedonia, Armenia, and Georgia

"Romania" means the area in the Balkans and Middle East with successor states to the Mediaeval Roman Empire. It might be called Greater or Former Romania (Romania Maior, Prior) in contrasted to the later Kingdom and Republic of România (Romania Minor, Posterior). Romania is thus distinguished from historic Francia (the land of the "Franks" to Greeks or Muslims), which means Western, Central, and Northern Europe originally subject to the Latin, Roman Catholic Church in Rome, and from historic Russia in Eastern Europe, subject to the Russian Orthodox Church (still in doctrinal union with the Patriarch of Constantinople). The map below thus roughly corresponds to the territories covered by the Roman Empire at the mid-11th century, except for modern România and Georgia. These were outside the Empire, but in culture and religion they are historically linked to Constantinople.

This will be an unfamiliar use of the name "Romania" for most, and the reason for it is explained in "Decadence, Rome and Romania, the Emperors Who Weren't, and Other Reflections on Roman History," "The Vlach Connection and Further Reflections on Roman History," and the "Guide and Index to Lists of Rulers." The double headed eagle of the Palaeologi symbolized the European and Asian sides of the Empire. This now represents a significant historical and cultural divide. The Asian side, and the center of the Empire at Adrianople and Constantinople, is still largely Turkish. This is a rather different Turkey from the Ottoman Empire, however, secularized and Westernized by Kemal Atatürk, with things like the Arabic alphabet actually outlawed, now hoping to join the European Union. On the European side, the successor states to Rome in the 12th and 13th centuries have reemerged. This is also the case to the east, where Georgia and Armenia, kept from the Ottomans by Russia, are now independent.

Thus, "Modern Romania" here means the modern successor states, first to Rome ("Romania" to itself, "Byzantium" to the historians), second to the Ottoman Empire, which in the 14th and 15th centuries established its domination over all former Roman possessions, and more, in the Eastern Mediterranean. As the Roman successors emerged in the 12th century, so do the Ottoman successors emerge in the 19th century. Familiar states from the earlier period are Serbia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, and even Bosnia. The earlier states of the Vlach speaking Romanians, Wallachia and Moldavia, continue from the past, subject to special achievements in Ottoman misrule, ultimately to unite as the modern state of România, the only country in Europe to preserve the proper name of the Roman Empire. Turkey is still the largest and most powerful state in the region.

Entirely new states are Montenegro and Greece itself. Montenegro, the "Black Mountain" (قَرَه دَاغ, Qara Dagh in Turkish and Crna Gora, Црна Гора, in Serbian), like many remote areas of the Ottoman Empire, began to drift out of central control as Turkish power went into its long decline. "Greece" itself was something that, in a sense, didn't exist in the Middle Ages. What the Ancient Greeks had called themselves, "Hellenes," came to be used in Late Roman times to mean Greek pagans. Greek Christians were "Romans," Rhômaioi in Greek. This distinction was maintained through the Middle Ages, and was remembered well into the 19th, if not the 20th, century (a Greek can still be Rum in Turkish). A modern Greece, Hellas, that was not an heir to Rome, was an entirely new phenomenon.

The politically, religiously, and culturally dominant language of Mediaeval Romania was Greek, whose alphabet today, however, is only used for Greek. Other alphabets, nevertheless, were developed, based on the Greek, for other languages, from Gothic, to Armenian, Georgian, and Cyrillic. The Armenian alphabet was in use by Armenians both in Romania and in the often separate kingdoms of Armenia. Under the Ottomans,

Europa est omnis divisa in partes tres, quarum unam Romaniam, aliam Franciam, tertiam Russiam.

Europa 1. Romania 2. Constantinople

2. Francia 1. Rome

3. Russia 3. Moscow

Turkish was sometimes even written in the Armenian (as in the Greek) alphabet; but that era is long gone, and the Armenian alphabet today is only seen in the former Soviet Republic of Armenia and in Armenian exile communities, as in Syria, Lebanon, and the United States. The alphabet of the Christian Georgians dates from the same era as the Armenian, and now continues to be used in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. Both the Armenian and the Georgian alphabets, although based on Greek, have their own striking and distinctive styles. The conversion of the Slavs resulted in the introduction of a new alphabet, the Cyrillic, which has remained the alphabet of choice for Slavs who belong to Orthodox Churches, like the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Russians. When modern Romanian (Vlach) first began to be written, it also used the Cyrillic alphabet, but eventually both Romanian and Albanian (also for many centuries unwritten) were rendered in the Latin alphabet, which thus came to be used for spoken languages in the Balkans for the first time since Latin speaking Roman colonists, and the Imperial Court in Constantinople, would have used it many centuries earlier. Since one's alphabet usually went with one's religion in the Middle Ages, the Turks, and other local converts to Islām, used the Arabic alphabet; and Jews, especially Jews arriving after Spain expelled them in 1492, used the Hebrew alphabet. We have already seen some exceptions to the religion rule, however. Orthodox Christian Churches could be found using different alphabets, Greek, Armenian, and Cyrillic (as well as, more distantly, Coptic, Syriac, and Ethiopic), which already had introduced an ethnic or national dimension to the issue. This is also evident when the Orthodox Romanians and the largely Moslem Albanians turn to the Latin alphabet, neither with the slightest intention of entering into religious communion with Papal Roman (i.e. Frankish) Catholicism. The Turks themselves, directed by Kemal Atatürk, followed suit. The Jews of Turkey also fell into this, and it became possible to find Ladino, the language of the 15th century Jewish refugees from Spain, being written in 20th century Istanbul synagogues using the Turkish version of the Latin alphabet. Thus the ancient prestige of Latin Rome, and the modern dominance of Latinate Francia, has exerted itself in modern Romania over Orthodox Christianity, Islām, and Judaism -- even while the old Hebrew alphabet is now used for Hebrew revived as a spoken language in modern Israel.

A characteristic of imperial states is an easy mixing of peoples and languages. They all have too much to fear from the imperial power for too much trouble to develop between them. When the heavy imperial hand is withdrawn, however, serious trouble can result. Thus, the end of the British Empire resulted in the partitions, amid war and massacre, of India, Palestine, and Cyprus. The decline of Turkish power similarly uncorked more than a century of conflict, continuing even in the 21st century, in the Balkans. Border areas end up with the most ambiguous identities and so can provoke the greatest conflict.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been swapped back and forth between Hungary and Romania and Serbia in the 12th and 13th centuries, and then were long held by the Turks, ended up with a mixed population of Croats (Latin/Catholic Christians), Serbs (Orthodox Christians), and Moslem Bosnians (Bosniacs). All, as it happened, spoke the same language, Serbo-Croatian, but written in different alphabets. The disintegration of Yugoslavia, with the lifting of the heavy imperial hand of Communism in the 1990's, led to terrible fighting, massacres, and atrocities, most famously carried out by the Serbs against the others, but not unheard of from the Croatians, Bosniacs, and Kosovar Albanians also. A famous bridge in Mostar in Herzegovina, which had linked, actually and symbolically, the Christian and Moslem parts of the city, was destroyed (evidently by Croatians) in the fighting.

With a peace settlement patched up for Bosnia, the Serbs then turned their hand against the restless Albanian majority of Kosovo, which the Serbs regarded as the Serbian heartland but which had contained few Serbs for a long time. It is enough to make one yearn for the return of the Palaeologi. The first map above shows the situation in 1817, after the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812, rebellions, and a final grant of autonomy to Serbia. The Ionian Islands had originally belonged to Venice but were seized by Britain in the Napoleonic Era and ceded to Britain by the Congress of Vienna. The continuing concern of Russia for Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, and the proximity of a phil-Hellene Britain to Greece, set the stage for a long century of revolt and intervention against the tottering Ottoman Empire.

Index

Introduction
România, 1599-present
Montenegro, 1697-1918
- 1908
Greece, 1821-present
Serbia & Yugoslavia, 1817-present
- 1913-1914, after the Balkan Wars, & before World War I
Bulgaria, 1879-present
- 1925, after World War I
Albania, 1914-present
- 1943, Axis Occupation in World War II
- 1947, after World War II
Macedonia, 1991-present
- 1999, Ethnic Cleansing
Kosovo, 2002-present
- 2006, Kosovo Independent
Armenia, 1991-present
Georgia, 1991-present
- Culmen Europae

The second maps shows the situation after the Crimean War (1853-1856). In the Crimean War, Russia began with an intervention in România, preliminary to an invasion of Turkey; but Britain and France joined Turkey against Russia, with some cooperation from Austria, with much of the fighting taking place, as one might expect from the name, in the Crimea. This pretty much preserved the status quo for Turkey, though the borders were extended against Russia along the Black Sea. One change we see, however, was the unification of Wallachia and Moldavia into the state of România.

The first map shows the situation after the War of Greek Independence (1821-1829). To save Greece, all the Great Powers were drawn in against Turkey. In addition to traditional concerns about the treatment of Christians under Ottoman rule was now added the fruit of an 18th century Neo-Classical love of Greece. This drew enthuasiasts like Lord Byron (1788-1824), who arrived in Greece in 1823 and drew both financial aid, political support, and the attention of a new popular press to the revolt. In perfect Romantic form, Byron then died in the midst of the struggle.

Against the feeble Ottomans, the Greeks did well enough; but the Sultān then appealed for aid to the modernizing Muḥammad ʿAlī of Egypt. The Greeks were then defeated, but this lead to the intervention of the Powers. The British sank Muḥammad ʿAlī's fleet at Navarino in 1827, and that spelled victory for the Greeks. With Greek independence went increased territory for Serbia, autonomy for Wallachia and Moldavia, and border concessions to Russia.

My source for these lists was originally the Kingdoms of Europe, by Gene Gurney [Crown Publishers, New York, 1982], which had some errors and obscurities and, especially, the list of the Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia was incomplete. Now, however, I have been able to fill things out, including the list for România, using the Regentenlisten und Stammtafeln zur Geschichte Europas by Michael F. Feldkamp [Philipp Reclam, Stuttgart, 2002], Bruce R. Gordon's Regnal Chronologies, and articles at Wikipedia, which are usually up to date on recent changes. The maps are based on The Penguin Atlas of Recent History (Europe since 1815) [Colin McEvedy, 1982], The Anchor Atlas of World History, Volume II [Hermann Kinder, Werner Hilgemann, Ernest A. Menze, and Harald and Ruth Bukor, 1978], The Penguin Historical Atlas of Russia [John Channon with Rob Hudson, 1995], and various prose histories, such as The Ottoman Centuries (Lord Kinross, Morrow Quill, 1977).

1. ROMÂNIA

The Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia have a continuous institutional history back to the 14th Century, which means that this table simply continues the table of Princes begun on the Rome and Romania page. Turkish rule initially meant that the Princes served at the pleasure of the Ottoman Sultān. Before long the Princes, however, were of value to the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman government) mainly as tax farmers, a lovely institution in which the government expected a certain revenue, and the farmer could keep any surplus revenue he could manage to collect. This was a recipe for a simple looting of the population.

After the middle of the 17th century, appointments begin to feature Greeks, the Phanariots, Φαναριώτες (singular Φαναριώτης, Attic plural Φαναριώται) as Princes (indicated with the Greek letter φ below). This name is from the Phanar section (Φανάριον, "streetlight"; Modern Greek, Φανάρι; Turkish, Fener) of Constantinople. Their job was simply to get as much money out of the land as possible, both for the Sultān and for themselves (the reason to be a tax farmer). This was not good for the Principalities, nor popular, but not much could be done about it until the influence of some friendly Christian power, like that of Russia, began to be felt in the region. Or, the Princes, Phanariots or not, began to sympathize with those, like themselves, subject to the evils of Ottoman rule.

Phanariots can be identified by family, like the prominent Mavrocordats, Μαυροκορδάτοι (singular Μαυροκορδάτος), and sometimes these are familiar from earlier history, such as the houses of Dukas, Δούκας (Ducas), and Cantacuzino, Καντακουζηνός (Cantacuzinus) -- Greeks of Mediaeval derivation who figure early in the Phanariot period. These rulers, while enjoying the benefits of tax farming, nevertheless began to experience flashes of anti-Ottoman nationalism, leading to collaboration with the Russians, imprisonment in Constantinople, defection to the Russians, and finally to leadership, by both Mavrocordats and Ypsilanti, ᾿Υψηλάντες (singular ᾿Υψηλάντης, Attic plural ᾿Υψηλάνται), of the revolt and independence of Greece.

The multiple terms of the Princes here are fiendishly complicated and sometimes extend to the neighboring Principality. Rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia are numbered separately, but this does not always seem to be done consistently. There is some overlap here with the previous table. See there for discussion of the language, the names of the Principalities, and the titles of the Princes.

Рȣмѫниа, ROMÂNIA
Continued from "Rome and Romania," "Romanians"; Ottoman Sovereignty, unless otherwise noted
Валахиа, WALLACHIA, Ottoman conquest, 1395		Мωлдова, MOLDAVIA, Ottoman conquest, 1455
воевода, Voivode, Prince, Governor, 1593-1600, d.1601	Michael (Mihail) II the Brave		Transylvania, 1599-1600
воевода, Voivode, Prince, Governor, 1593-1600, d.1601	Michael (Mihail) II the Brave		воевода, Voivode, Prince, Governor, 1600
Nicholas I Patrascu	co-regent, 1599-1600	Ieremiah Movila	1600-1606
son of Michael II		Ieremiah Movila	1600-1606
1600-1601	Simeon Movila		1606-1607
1601-1602, 1611, 1611-1616, 1620-1623	Radu Mihnea Basarab		1616-1619, 1623-1626
Radu (VII) Serban Craiovescu-Basarab	1602-1610, 1611	Mihail II Movila	1607, 1607
Radu (VII) Serban Craiovescu-Basarab	1602-1610, 1611	Constantin I Movila	1607, 1607-1611
to Transylvania, 1610-1611		Stefan X Tomsa Mushatin	1611-1615, 1621-1623
Gabriel Movila	1616,1618-1620	Alexandru V Movila	1615-1616
Alexandru IV Ilias Basarab	1616-1618, 1627-1629	Gaspar Gratiani	1619-1620
Alexandru IV Ilias Basarab	1616-1618, 1627-1629	Alexandru V Ilias Mushatin	1620-1621
Alexandru V Basarab the Child-Prince	1623-1627	Myron Barnovschi-Movila	1626-1629, 1633
Leon Mushatin	1629-1632	Alexandru VI Coconul Basarab	1629-1630
Leon Mushatin	1629-1632	Moses Movila	1630-1631, 1633-1634
Radu VIII Ilias Basarab	1632	Alexandru Ilias Mushatin	1631-1633
Matthew Basarab Craiovescu-Brancoveanu	1632-1654	Basil Lupu	1634-1653, 1653
1654-1658, d.1661	Constantin (II of Moldavia) Serban Craiovescu-Brancoveanu		1659, 1661
Mihnea III Craiovescu-Brancoveanu	1658-1659	George Stefan Ceaur	1653, 1653-1658
1659-1660	George/Gheorghe I Ghica, Γκίκας, Ghika		1658-1659
Gregory I Ghica	1660-1664, 1672-1673	Stephanito Lupu	1659-1661, 1661
Radu Leon Mushatin	1664-1669	Istrate Dabija	1661-1665
Anthony Voda din Popesti	1669-1672	Ilias Alexander Basarab	1666-1668
Anthony Voda din Popesti	1669-1672	Stefan X Petriceicu	1672-1673, 1673-1674, 1683-1684

While Phanariot tax farmers do not begin with the Mavrocordatoi, that family constitutes one of the most prominent and significant. They begin here with Alexander, who was the Grand Dragoman, δραγομάνος, or principle translator, for the Ottoman Sultan. Alexander's son, Nicholas, first continued in this capacity but then moved to ruling the Danubian principalities. Although these positions were sources of great wealth, it was a precarious existence; and it was not unusual for family members to be imprisoned and/or pay ranson to the Ottoman government, or seek refuge in the French Embassy in Constantinople.

Alexander is often identified as a "Doctor," because he actually had Doctor of Philosophy and of Medicine degrees from the University of Bologna. This made him him as much a European figure as a personage of the Balkans or the Ottoman Empire. He was made a Prince of the Holy Roman Empire, a Reichsgraf, by Leopold I in 1673 -- a hereditary title retained by the Mavrocordatoi. As part of the Ottoman government, he drafted the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, by which the Ottomans acknowledge that they had lost possession of Hungary, after 150 years, and adjacent territories -- defeats begun at the failure of the Ottoman attack on Vienna in 1683.

Eventually, many Mavrocordatoi, like the Ypsilanti, fled to Russia. While we find a branch of the family then participating in the Greek Revolt, so that one actually became a President of Greece (before the Monarchy was established), others, and in-laws, continued to serve the Ottomans right up to the 20th century.

The genealogy of the Mavrocordatoi is given by Philip Mansel [Constantinople, City of the World's Desire, 1453-1924, John Murray, London, 1995, p.444]. The value of Mansel's book is compromised by his decision to eliminate all diacritics for Turkish, Arabic, Greek, etc. This makes it difficult to identify or reconstruct the spelling of many names and words. Wikipedia is now a good resource for such research. Many scholars should now be ashamed that Wikipedia has assumed a responsibility that they, with specious explanations (or none), have abandoned.

Some of the Princely families are not, of course, Phanariots, or have anomalous origins. Thus, the Ghicas are Românian (perhaps ultimately even Albanian, as Gjika), whom we see before the beginning of the Phanariot period; but they are said to have undergone "Hellenization," with the Greek name Γκίκας (where Modern Greek γκ is used to write "g" as a stop), assimilating them to the Phanariots. It ended up that Gregory V Alexander Ghica was the last Prince of Moldavia before the unification of România (while Wallachia was occupied by Austria).

While six Mavrocordatoi served as Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia, no less than ten of the Ghica family did so. Also, they began earlier and continued right down to the last day of the separate existence of the Principalities. Gregory V was the last Prince of either state. My particular attention to the family, however, was because of descendants who had nothing to do with the Principalities. Costanza Ghika (1835-1895) married an Italian of a noble family, Gioacchino Rasponi (1829-1877), who for some years was the Mayor of Ravenna, Italy, including the year, 1865, when the bones of Dante Alighieri were discovered where they had been hidden by Franciscan monks, who did not want them removed to Dante's birthplace, Florence.

After Napoleon expelled the Franciscans from the city in 1810, the location of the bones, and even the fact that they were not in Dante's tomb, was forgotten. After the discovery, examination, and reburial, there were rumors that relics of Dante had been kept by some of the discoverers. These rumors, in all but one verified case, turned out to be false. However, Costanza was given a gold medallion that was purported to contain some kind of relic. It is still not known what it does contain, but the artifact ended up in the possession of the Senate of the Kingdom of Italy, where Costanza's brother-in-law, Achille, served. Whether it will ever be examined in a good question.

Another Ghica woman, remarkable for qualities more intrinsic to her than her marriage, was Elena Ghica (1818-1888), otherwise the Duchess Helena Koltsova-Massalskaya, who wrote under the pen name "Dora d'Istria." Like Alexander Mavrocordatos, Elena benefited from a European education, in Dresden, Vienna, Venice, and Berlin, and she apparently ended up speaking, not just her native Romanian, but Italian, German, French, Latin, Classical and Modern Greek, and Russian. This is already pretty impressive. Marrying a Russian Duke, she found life in St. Petersburg rather too oppressive; and, with her husband's consent, explored Europe a bit more before settling down in Florence -- not unlike Dr. Edith Farnsworth, whose interesting life I have just examined elsewhere.

Elena, as Dora d'Istria, was a prolific author, producing novels, political tracts, history, and even some travel writing. Politically, she was liberal enough to favor women's emancipation and even the abolition of monasticism -- something not likely to be popular with her Romanian or Russian relatives. Among her political causes was a unique interest in Albania, probably inspired by her convication that the Ghica family derived from there. She wrote about the history of the family and advocated Albanian independence. However, for all her many languages, she did not learn Albanian. Although the cause thus may be have been a bit idiosyncratic, it was a considerable inspiration to the Albanians themselves, whose independence would need to wait until 1914. Otherwise, she had gotten the idea that 19th century Germany was a civilizing and progressive force in Europe, a serious mistake made by others, to be calamitously falsified in the 20th century. On the other hand, her hopes for a Ghica King of România were dashed by the imposition by the Powers of a Hohenzollern Prince on the country in 1866.

Assembling the genealogy of the Ghicas has proven difficult since it only exists in fragmentary form in the on-line recources I have found. A page at Wikipedia lists Gregory III as the father of Dimitrie (d.1803); but other pages and sources, with much more detail, have him as Dimitrie's brother instead. It may be particularly noteworthy that all the Ghicas of the Phanariot period are descendants of the daughter, Roxandra, of no less than Alexander Mavrocordato. Two 19th Century Prime Ministers of România were from the Ghica family. The crowns here, as with the Mavrocordatoi, are separetely numbered for Wallachia and Moldavia.

Another interesting case of Phanariot families is that of the Rosetti, whose name turns up as "Ruset" or "Rosset" in Românian. The Rosettis are Phanariots, but their name is obviously Italian. They are, in fact, of Genoese origin, which is not surprising for the ethnic mix in Constantinople. I have not seen, however, the way "Rosetti" is written in Greek. Several branches of the family, under different names, continued to live in Wallachia, Moldavia, and România.

Similarly noteworthy are the Mavrogenes, Μαυρογένης, who were Greek but not Phanariots, and the Hangerli, who, curiously, are not always listed as Phanariots. I see that the name "Hangerli" is Turkish, but without explanation of what the word would mean. "Hančer" (with "-i" or "-li" as a suffix) means "dagger," and I do not see a lot of alternatives. But the name, whatever it means, appears to have been added, as an epithet, to the Greek name Chatzeris, Χατζερής. Since Constantine Hangerli (Wallachia, 1797-1799) claimed descent from the Palaeologi, this is the kind of thing we might expect if there was some serious question about the origin of the family.

Phanariot Greek Tax Farming, φ
Валахиа, WALLACHIA		Мωлдова, MOLDAVIA
1673-1678	George II Dukas, Δούκας, Ducas, φ		1665-1666, 1668-1672, 1678-1683
Serban Cantacuzino, Καντακουζηνός, φ	1678-1688	Dumitrascu Cantacuzino, φ	1673, 1674-1675, 1684-1685
		Antioh I Rosetti, φ	1675-1678
		Constantin III Cantemir	1685-1693
Constantin I Brancoveanu	1688-1714	Demetrius Cantemir	1693, 1710-1711
		Constantin III Dukas, φ	1693-1695, 1700-1703
		Antioh II Cantemir	1695-1700, 1705-1707
		Michael III Racovita	1703-1705, 1707-1709, 1715-1726 d. 1744
1715-1716, 1719-1730	Nicholas II (of Wallachia)/I (of Moldavia) Mavrocordat, Μαυροκορδάτος, φ		1709-1710, 1711-1715 d. 1730
Stefan II Cantacuzino, φ	1714-1715	Occupied by Russia, 1739
1716-1719	John Mavrocordat, φ		1743-1747
1730, 1731-1733, 1735-1741, 1744-1748, 1756-1758, 1761-1763, d.1769	Constantin II (of Wallachia)/IV (of Moldavia) Mavrocordat, φ		1733-1735, 1741-1743, 1748-1749, 1769
1730-1731, 1741-1744	Michael I (of Wallachia)/III (of Moldavia) Racovita		1703-1705, 1707-1709, 1715-1726 d. 1744
1733-1735, 1748-1752, d.1752	Gregory II Ghica, Γκίκας, Ghika		1726-1733, 1735-1739, 1739-1741, 1747-1748, d. 1752
1752-1753	Matthew Ghica		1753-1756
George III Racovita	1753-1756	Constantine V Racovita	1749-1753, 1756-1757
1758-1761, 1765-1766	Scarlat I Ghica		1757-1758 d. 1766
Constantin III Racovita	1763-1764	John Theodore Callimachi, Καλλιμάχης, φ	1758-1761
Stefan III Racovita	1764-1765	Gregory III Callimachi, φ	1761-1764, 1767-1769
Alexandru VI Ghica	1766-1768	Gregory III Callimachi, φ	1761-1764, 1767-1769
1768-1769	Gregory III (of Wallachia)/IV (of Moldavia) Ghica		1764-1767, 1774-1777
Occupied by Russia, 1769-1774; Russian right of intervention, Treaty of Kuchuk Karinarji, 1774
Emanuel Giani Rosetti (Ruset), φ	1770-1771	Constantine VI Mourouzis (Moruzi), Μουρούζης, φ	1777-1782
1774-1782, 1796-1797	Alexandru VII (of Wallachia)/IX (of Moldavia) Ypsilanti, ᾿Υψηλάντης, φ		1786-1788, d.1797
Nicholas III Caragea	1782-1783	Alexander VII Mavrocordat, the Mad Prince, φ	1782-1785
Mihail II Drakos Soutzos, Σούτζος (Suţu), φ	1783-1786, 1791-1793, 1801-1802	Alexander VIII Mavrocordat, the Fugitive, φ	1785-1786
Nicholas IV Mavrogenes, Μαυρογένης (Mavrogheni); from Paros rather than Phanar	1786-1790	Occupied by Austria, 1787-1788
		Emanuel Giani Rosetti (Ruset), φ	1788-1789
		Occupied by Russia, 1789
Occupied by Austria, 1789-1791
1793-1796, 1799-1801, d.1807/1816?	Alexander VIII (of Wallachia)/X (of Moldavia) Mourouzis (Moruzi), φ		1792, 1802-1806, 1806-1807
Constantin IV Chatzeris, Χατζερής (Hangerli), φ	1797-1799	Michael IV Soutzos (Suţu), d.1864, φ	1792-1795, 1819-1821
Constantin IV Chatzeris, Χατζερής (Hangerli), φ	1797-1799	Alexander XI Callimachi, φ	1795-1799
1802-1806, 1806-1807	Constantin IX (of Wallachia)/VII (of Moldavia) Ypsilanti, φ		1799-1801, d.1807
1806, 1818-1821	Alexander IX (of Wallachia)/XII (of Moldavia) Soutzos (Suţu), φ		1801-1802, d.1821
Occupied by Russia, 1806-1812
John George Caragea	1812-1818	Alexander XIII Chatzeris (Hangerli), φ	1807
1821	Scarlat (II of Wallachia) Callimachi, φ		1806, 1807-1810, 1812-1819, d.1821
Gregory IV Ghica	1822-1828	Direct Ottoman military administration, 1821-1822
Gregory IV Ghica	1822-1828	Ionita (John VIII) Sandu Sturza	1822-1828
Occupied by Russia, 1828-1834; Governor Count Kisselev
Autonomy for Wallachia and Moldavia, 1834
Alexander X Ghica	1834-1842	Michael V Sturza	1834-1849
George IV Bibescu	1842-1848
Revolution in Wallachia, 1848
Russian Occupation, 1848-1851
Barbu Ştirbei	1849-1853, 1854-1856	Gregory V Alexander Ghica	1849-1853
Crimean War, 1853-1856; Russian Occupation, 1853-1854
Occupied by Austria, 1854-1856		Gregory V Alexander Ghica (again)	1854-1856
Ottoman Occupation, 1856-1859, Sovereignty until 1881

ROUMANIA, ROMÂNIA
Alexander (XIV) John Cuza of Moldavia	1859-1866, d.1873
Charles Eitel Frederick of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Carol I	1866-1881
	King, 1881-1914
Russo-Turkish War, 1876-1878; Russian Invasion, România proclaimed independent, 1877; Congress of Berlin, 1878; România Independent, 1881
Ferdinand	1914-1927
Michael	1927-1930, 1940-1947
Carol II	1930-1940
Ion Antonescu, pro-German dictator	1940-1944
Communist takeover, 1947
Constantin Parhon	President, 1948-1952
Petru Groza	1952-1958
Ion Georghe Maurer	1958-1961
Georghe Georghiu-Dej	1961-1965
Chivu Stoica	1965-1967
Nicolae Ceauçescu	1967-1989, overthrown & executed
Ion Iliescu	1989-1996, 2000-2004
Emil Constantinescu	1996-2000
Nicolae Vacaroiu	interim, 2007
Traian Băsescu	2004-2007, 2007-2014
Klaus Iohannis	2014-present

The Russian wars against Turkey in the 19th Century led several times to the occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia. After the Crimean War (1853-1856) and, for a change, Austrian occupation (1854-1857), and a bad experience with a local candidate for rule of the unified country, a European prince, as in Greece and Bulgaria,

was brought in, Karl of Hohenzollern. The Congress of Berlin recognized Karl (Carol) and Romanian independence (1878).

With the Allies in World War I, winning Transylvania from Hungary and Moldova from Russia, Romania was the biggest long term winner of the War in the Balkans. However, after much internal strife, she switched to the Axis in World War II, losing Moldova to the Soviet Union (seized in 1940, actually, before Romania was a belligerent) and part of Dobruja to Bulgaria. While Moldova (traditionally called Bessarabia) is now independent, I have not noticed any discussion of reunion with Romania. The Russians tried hard to promote the idea that the language of Moldova was not Romanian, but it is.

Rejecting the Cyrllic alphabet and the Turkish influenced "Rumania" (or "Roumania") for the Latin alphabet and the pure Latin România, Romania can now claim that name as its own, with few remembering that it was the proper name of the Roman (and the "Byzantine") Empire. In the Middle Ages, "Romania" tended to refer to the contemporaneous extent of the Empire, i.e. Anatolia and the Balkans ("Asia and Europa" or "Rūm and Rumelia"). The modern state might be said to be "Lesser Romania" (Romania Minor) in contrast to that "Greater Romania" (Romania Maior); but this might be considered insulting by Romanians (though intentionally no more so than "Lesser Armenia" in Cilicia) and so is not likely to catch on. However, Romania Maior could be used for the Roman Empire without any corresponding modification of România for the modern state.

The mysterious history of Romance speakers in the Balkans, the Romanians and Vlachs, whose existence is not noticed until the 12th Century and whose language is not attested until the 16th, is treated separated in "The Vlach Connection and Further Reflections on Roman History." This is a story now charged with the nationalism both of Romania and neighbors like Hungary.

The marriages of the Romanian Royal Family quickly connected it to major European, especially British and Greek, royalty. Thus King Ferdinand was the grandson of a first cousin of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert (Ferdinand of Portugal, the brother of Augustus, Prince of Coburg, who was the father of Ferdinand of Bulgaria), and he married one of their own grand- daughters, Marie of Saxe-Coburg- Gotha. Marie was a bit of a stylish international personality in the 1920's. King Carol II then married Helen of Greece, who was a great-granddaughter of Queen Victoria, through her mother Sophia, the sister of Kaiser Wilhlem II of Germany. All these connections, of course, profited the monarchy little in the conflicts of fascism and communism that had the country under one form of dictatorship or another from 1940 to 1989.

A notable personality of modern România was Mircea Eliade (1907-1986), who fruitfully extended Rudolf Otto's ideas in history and philosophy of religion. Controversy continues over the degree to which Eliade was involved in the Fascist movement in România, but he actually avoided residence in the country during the War, by taking diplomatic posts in London (during the Blitz!) and Lisbon. After the War he was able to do what he had wanted to do before, emigrate to America.

In 2010 we have a Romanian documentary about the regime of Nicolai Ceauçescu, The Autobiography of Nicolae Ceausescu (Autobiografia lui Nicolae Ceausescu). What intrigues me more than the documentary, which I have not seen, is the review in Daily Variety, by Jay Weissberg (May 18, 2010). Weissberg says that one purpose of the documentary seems to be to, "drive home a devastating critique of both Romanian society and international realpolitik: We all let this happen" [boldface added].

Who is the "we" here? Weissberg may be young, but he would need to be remarkably clueless not to know that Romania was a member of the Warsaw Pact and a beneficiary of the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Ceausescu's regime was vicious because it was a Communist dictatorship. What were "we" supposed to do about that? Start a nuclear war?

Weissberg goes on to say, "What is important is for auds to identify Richad Nixon, Charles de Gaulle, Imelda Marcos, Mao Tse-Tung and a host of other leaders whose hands of friendship lent legitimacy and tacit support to Ceausescu's rule while knowing full well what was really happening." Well, everyone knew full well that Ceausescu (and, for that matter, Mao) was running a Stalinist police state. Duh. Similar knowledge, however, even now does not stop Hollywood leftists from extending "hands of friendship" that lend "legitimacy" to the very similar dictatorship of Fidel Castro in Cuba. Are those not, in Weissberg's words, "immoral choices?"

Perhaps Weissberg does not remember, through the fog of his liberal guilt, that in foreign policy Ceausescu was a bit of a maverick, supporting Israel and cultivating other friendships that were out of line with Soviet policy. Indeed, people wondered at the time why he did not receive the same Russian treatment as Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The answer seemed to be that his foreign policy did not imply any internal liberalization either of the economy or individual rights. The Realpolitik in part was the hope that Ceausescu was actually acting with the blessing of Moscow, in order to keep Soviet options open. Otherwise, the idea that there was anything we could have done about Ceausescu's particular regime is ridiculous.

But, speaking of "we," what does Wiessberg want "us" to do about North Korea and Iran, which are similarly vicious, and a danger to others, with the threat of nuclear weapons, in the bargain? It may always feel good to overthrow dictators, but Mr. Weissberg may want to ask his Hollywood friends how they feel about the United States overthrowing the vicious dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. He may discover that he knows people who will defend the fellow and damn America for destroying the happy lives of the Iraqis under their loving and caring leader (see Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11).

"Watching Jimmy Carter praise the dictator's leadership is particularly stomach-churning," says Weissberg. Well, yes. But how does he feel about Sean Penn or Danny Glover praising Hugo Chavez? Or Ted Turner saying that "it hasn't been proven" that Castro has imprisoned and murdered thousands of Cubans? Perhaps we can't expect very serious historical or political thought from a movie reviewer at Daily Variety, but this is ridiculous.

Examining the climate map at left, we can see the "Alpine" and "Continental Cool" zones following the crest of the Carpathian mountains. The crest also defines the borders between Transylvania and Moldavia in the East and Wallachia in the South.

We also might note, in comparison to the map of zones of the Carpathians above, that the Temperate zone in the middle of the country is rather larger than just the Transylvanian Plateau, including areas of the "inner" Carpathians in the North and the East. Indeed, the "northern" part of the Western Carpathians looks a bit isolated, with temperate areas all around it. Thus, the Transylvanian Plateau and surrounding areas were agreeable to the settlement of the Germans and Hungarians who anchored Hungarian rule in Transylvania until after World War I.

In the miraculous year 1989, the end of Nicolai Ceauçescu came swiftly and dramatically. The saying is that Poland was freed from Communism in 10 years, Hungary in 10 months, Czechoslovakia in 10 days, and România in 10 hours. Indeed, with other events in Eastern Europe going on, for a good while it looked like Ceauçescu's police state and hard line were going to make him immune to change, or even trouble.

The man was confident enough of his position that he called a mass rally in Bucharest to demonstrate his popularity. This had always come off well in the past, and at first it looked to be the same old, same old thing. However, in a moment of quiet, it appears that one man, never identified, began to boo Ceauçescu. Unthinkable in the past, and previously a sure ticket to prison, the peril of the one man disappeared as the entire crowd soon began booing. Ceauçescu and his wife, high on their Mussolini-esque balcony above the crowd, visibly quailed and shrank back into the doorway. Within hours they were both dead.

Unfortunately, his loyalists fought on, although it is hard to understand what for, at that point; and serious damage was done in Bucharest, like the tragic burning of the National Library. They were put down soon enough, and România emerged into the difficulties that have beset other governments in Eastern Europe, where the paradigm of Euro-socialism offers a poor means of economic development, and sometimes the voters bring back former Communists, as though somehow they knew how to run the economy better. By 2015, there is also the danger of renewed Russian aggression and interference. Thus, at the moment, uncertainties multiply.

Mediaeval România

The two maps above show the situation before and after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. Note that by then Britain had ceded the Ionians Islands to Greece (1864). In 1875 rebellions started in Bosnia and then Bulgaria. The brutality with which these were suppressed aroused European opinion, and after some delay Russia declared war. With some hard fighting, the Russians ended up capturing Adrianople and arriving at the outskirts of Constantinople. The Treaty of San Stephano which ended the war mostly freed the Balkans, but the Great Powers didn't like it. The Congress of Berlin rolled things back a bit. Serbia, România, and Montenegro all became independent, with increases in territory, but Bulgaria was divided and merely allowed autonomy. Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Novipazar were made protectorates of Austria. The map looked much the same for many years, with Bulgaria annexing East Rumelia in 1885.

2. MONTENEGRO

Danilo I Petrovic Prince-Bishop,
1697-1737

Sava 1737-1756
d.1782

Vasili Coadjutor,
1756-1766

Stephen
the Little Coadjutor,
1766-1774

Sava Coadjutor,
1774-1782

Peter I 1782-1830

Peter II 1830-1851

Danilo II 1851-1860

Nicholas 1860-1910

King,
1910-1918,
d.1921

Union with Yugoslavia, 1918

Presidents of Montenegro;
Republic of Yugoslavia,
1992-2003; Union of Serbia
& Montenegro, 2003-2006

Momir Bulatović 1990-1998

Milo �ukanović 1998-2002

Filip Vujanovic acting,
2002-2003

Rifat Rastoder &
Dragan Kujović acting, 2003

Filip Vujanović 2003-2006

President,
2006-2018

Independent, 3 June 2006

Milo Ðukanović 2018-present

The title of the orignal "Prince-Bishops" of Montenegro, vladika, владика, means "lord, sovereign" or "archbishop." Possessing one of the oldest traditions of local autonomy under the Turks, and a charming Italian version of its name (for the "Black Mountain," قَرَه دَاغ, Qara Dagh in Turkish and Crna Gora, Црна Гора, in Serbian), in the 20th century Montenegro was nevertheless overshadowed by its ethnic big brother, Serbia.

2. MONTENEGRO
Danilo I Petrovic	Prince-Bishop, 1697-1737
Sava	1737-1756 d.1782
Vasili	Coadjutor, 1756-1766
Stephen the Little	Coadjutor, 1766-1774
Sava	Coadjutor, 1774-1782
Peter I	1782-1830
Peter II	1830-1851
Danilo II	1851-1860
Nicholas	1860-1910
King, 1910-1918, d.1921
Union with Yugoslavia, 1918
Presidents of Montenegro; Republic of Yugoslavia, 1992-2003; Union of Serbia & Montenegro, 2003-2006
Momir Bulatović	1990-1998
Milo �ukanović	1998-2002
Filip Vujanovic	acting, 2002-2003
Rifat Rastoder & Dragan Kujović	acting, 2003
Filip Vujanović	2003-2006
President, 2006-2018
Independent, 3 June 2006
Milo Ðukanović	2018-present

After World War I, King Nicholas, who had spent the War in exile, was thrown out of office so that Montenegro could join Yugoslavia. This was effected basically by a Serbian invasion, with the Serbs then packing a custom-ordered assembly to depose the King, substitute the King of Serbia, and join Yugoslavia. Montenegro was the only Allied country to cease to exist as the result of World War I. This was vigorously protested by Nicholas and Montenegran diplomats at Versailles and elsewhere; but the Powers, although giving lip-service to self-determination, apparently decided that the actions of Serbia were self-determination enough.

When Yugoslavia collapsed, Montenegro was the only former Yugoslav republic to stick with Serbia. Religiously and lingustically (with the Serbian language) this may have been understandable, at least to the Serbs, although Montenegro had had its own autonomous Church until the Serbian Orthodox Church was imposed. But the Montenegrans became ambivalent about the contemporary Serbian government, neither entirely sympathetic nor entirely unsympathetic. Since Montenegro represented Serbia's only access to the sea, through the historic port of Kotor (Cattaro in Italian, obtained from Austria after World War I), the fear was that, should the Montenegrans decide to go their own way, the Serbs would use force, with enough local support to make resistance abortive.

Nevertheless, Montenegro voted for independence in 2006 and seems to have successfully made the transition, recognized by many governments and admitted as a member of the UN. The pretense that the two countries still constituted Yugoslavia had been abandoned in 2003, so the secession of Montenegro simply left Serbia as, well, Serbia.

The events of World War I bear some recollection. The Gulf of Cattaro, now remember as Kotor, or Котор in Cyrillic, at the time part of Dalmatia, was a natural harbor and, as noted, an Austrian Naval Base. The mountainside above the town of Cattaro, on Mt. Lovcen, Ловћен, however, was in Montenegro; and the Montenegrans were harrassing the Austrians below, with artillery. When the Austrians suppressed the fire, with naval gunfire, the Montenegrans got their French allies to bring in heavier guns. In such situations, naval assets are more vulnerable than land based guns. However, it is much easier to bring in many more and heavier naval guns than it is to bring in more or larger guns on land. The Austrians brought enough ships to suppress even the French guns, and they withdrew.

Finally, after the Austrians, Buglarians, and the Germans had defeated and occupied Serbia, they decided to turn against Montenegro. In 1916 the defenders where swept from their country. The ultimate return of the Montenegrans, as we have seen, was bittersweet, since occupation by Austria was exchanged for effective occupation by Serbia. What we can note from the maps, however, is the permanent addition of the Gulf of Cattaro to Montenegro. In terms of the territory of Yugoslavia, that wouldn't even have made a difference. Now it does make a difference, since modern Kotor otherwise would be part of Croatia instread of Montenegro.

As noted above, it is now largely forgotten even in Greece, and entirely outside of it, that in the Middle Ages the Greeks called themselves "Romans" (Rhômaioi, Ῥωμαῖοι), because, as it happens, they were -- striktly speaking, under the terms of continuously operating Roman Courts and Law. For many centuries Hellênes, Ἕλληνες, which the Ancient Greeks had called themselves, and now the modern Greeks again, meant pagan Greeks. The history of Mediaeval Greece is thus found with that of Rome and Byzantium.

1908 was a big year in the Balkans. Bulgaria became independent and Austria annexed most of its protectorate from the Congress of Berlin. Part of the territory was even returned to Turkey. This all was bitterly resented by Serbia because of the large Serb population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A casus belli was thus introduced for Serbian attempts to stir up trouble in the provinces, which ultimately meant a Serbian assassin who killed the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand and set off World War I. In Turkey, the Sultan, "Abdul the Damned," was overthrown by the Young Turks, whose impetus, unfortunately, was more merely nationalistic than liberal. As a stage in the modernization of Turkey, it was also unfortunately more militaristic than liberal, a direction that soon resulted in increasingly friendly dealings with Germany. This was not a good deal for Turkey. Meanwhile, Greece was able to add Thessaly (1881, with adjustments in 1897). A rebellion on Crete led to autonomy (1898) as a prelude to Greek control (1912).

3. GREECE

Greek War of
Independence, 1821-1829

Alexander Ypsilanti

leads revolt,
1821-1828,
d.1828

Battle of Drăgăşani, Wallachia, defeat by Ottomans, 1821

Alexandros Mavrocordatos
President, 1822-1823

First Hellenic Republic, 1822-1832, Capital at Nauplion, (Modern Greek, Nafplio, ); Ottoman expediation of Dramali, defeated, 1822

Petros Mavromichalis 1823

Georgios Kountouriotis 1823-1826

Sphaceteria seized, Battle of Maniaki, Fall of Missolonghi, Greeks annihilated by Egyptian Ibrahim Pasha, Battle of Lerna Mills, Ibrahim first defeated, 1825

Andreas Zaimis 1826-1827

Athens Acropolis surrenders to Ibrahim, last Ottoman victory, Treaty of London, Britain, France, & Russia support Greek independence, Battle of Navarino, Egyptian fleet sunk, 1827

Count Ioannis Kapodistrias Governor,
1827-1831

Russo-Turkish War, 1828-1829; Battle of Petra, Ottomans defeated, 1829; Peace of Adrianople, 1829; London Conference, recognition of Greek Independence, 1830

Augustinos Kapodistrias 1831-1832

Governmental Commission, 1832-1833

Otto of Bavaria King,
1832-1862

George I of Denmark 1863-1913

assassinated by anarchist, 1913

Constantine I/XII 1913-1917,
1920-1922

Alexander 1917-1920

George II 1922-1924,
1935-1941,
1946-1947

Second Hellenic Republic, 1924-1935

Pavlos Konduriotis President,
1924-1926,
1926-1929

Theodoros Pangalos 1926

Alexandros Zaimis 1929-1935

German Occupation, 1941-1944

Paul 1947-1964

Constantine II 1964-1973,
exile 1967
d.2023

Military Dictatorship, 1967-1974

Giorgios Zoitakis 1967-1972

Giorgios Papadopoulos 1972-1973,
President,
1973

Phaidon Gizikis 1973-1974

Third Hellenic Republic, 1974-present

Michael Stasinopoulos 1974-1975

Konstantin Tsatsos 1975-1980

Konstantin Karamanlis 1980-1985,
1990-1995

Christos Sartzetakis 1985-1990

Konstantin Stephanopoulos 1995-2005

Karolos Papoulias 2005-2015

Prokopis Pavlopoulos 2015-2020

Katerina Sakellaropoulou 2020-present

The revolt of Greeks against the Ottoman Empire was one of the sensations of the 19th century, drawing partisans, like Lord Byron (1788-1824), from far and wide. See more details about this here.

3. GREECE
Greek War of Independence, 1821-1829
Alexander Ypsilanti	leads revolt, 1821-1828, d.1828
Battle of Drăgăşani, Wallachia, defeat by Ottomans, 1821
Alexandros Mavrocordatos	President, 1822-1823
First Hellenic Republic, 1822-1832, Capital at Nauplion, (Modern Greek, Nafplio, ); Ottoman expediation of Dramali, defeated, 1822
Petros Mavromichalis	1823
Georgios Kountouriotis	1823-1826
Sphaceteria seized, Battle of Maniaki, Fall of Missolonghi, Greeks annihilated by Egyptian Ibrahim Pasha, Battle of Lerna Mills, Ibrahim first defeated, 1825
Andreas Zaimis	1826-1827
Athens Acropolis surrenders to Ibrahim, last Ottoman victory, Treaty of London, Britain, France, & Russia support Greek independence, Battle of Navarino, Egyptian fleet sunk, 1827
Count Ioannis Kapodistrias	Governor, 1827-1831
Russo-Turkish War, 1828-1829; Battle of Petra, Ottomans defeated, 1829; Peace of Adrianople, 1829; London Conference, recognition of Greek Independence, 1830
Augustinos Kapodistrias	1831-1832
Governmental Commission, 1832-1833
Otto of Bavaria	King, 1832-1862
George I of Denmark	1863-1913
assassinated by anarchist, 1913
Constantine I/XII	1913-1917, 1920-1922
Alexander	1917-1920
George II	1922-1924, 1935-1941, 1946-1947
Second Hellenic Republic, 1924-1935
Pavlos Konduriotis	President, 1924-1926, 1926-1929
Theodoros Pangalos	1926
Alexandros Zaimis	1929-1935
German Occupation, 1941-1944
Paul	1947-1964
Constantine II	1964-1973, exile 1967 d.2023
Military Dictatorship, 1967-1974
Giorgios Zoitakis	1967-1972
Giorgios Papadopoulos	1972-1973, President, 1973
Phaidon Gizikis	1973-1974
Third Hellenic Republic, 1974-present
Michael Stasinopoulos	1974-1975
Konstantin Tsatsos	1975-1980
Konstantin Karamanlis	1980-1985, 1990-1995
Christos Sartzetakis	1985-1990
Konstantin Stephanopoulos	1995-2005
Karolos Papoulias	2005-2015
Prokopis Pavlopoulos	2015-2020
Katerina Sakellaropoulou	2020-present

Against the Ottomans alone, the Greeks could well have been successful, but the Sultan called in Muḥammad ʿAlī, who had modernized the Egyptian army enough that the rebellion was being suppressed. This was too much, however, for "civilized" opinion. Not only the Russians, the traditional protectors of Orthodox Christians in Turkey, but Britain and France, inspired by all that Classical Oxbridge learning, and the propaganda of Byron's poetry, moved to help the Greeks.

The British sank Muḥammad ʿAlī's fleet at Navarino Bay in 1827. They say that the ships are still visible at the bottom of the bay, right by the island of Sphacteria, where Spartans surrendered to Athens in 425 BC, early in the Peloponnesian War, and just south of "Sandy Pylos," where a great Mycenaean city supplied wise Nestor to the Greek forces at Troy. A lot of history in that area.

The Greek revolt begins with a Phanariot family, the Ypsilantis. After periods as Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia, Constantine defects to Russia. His son, Alexander, a general in the Russian Army kicked off the Greek revolt in 1821 by invading from Russia with a group of followers. He didn't get very far, was defeated, and had to retreat to Austria. But things got going. His brother, Demetrius, continued to be involved with the revolt in Greece. The family name is now remembered in the city of Ypsilanti, Michigan.

When Greece achieved independence, the island of Samos, Σάμος, logically would have been part of it. It had revolted and held out against both Ottoman and Egyptian forces. However, the Great Powers reserved some territories for Turkey to prevent the impression of the total collapse of Ottoman sovereignty. Thus, Samos became autonomous under its own Princes,

Princes of Samos

Stephanos Vogoridis 1833-1850, d.1869

Alexandros Kallimachis 1850-1854

Ion Ghica 1854-1859, d.1897

Miltiadis Aristarchis 1859-1866, d.1893

Pavlos Mousouros 1866-1873, d.1876

Georgios Georgiadis acting, 1873

Konstantinos Adosidis 1873-1874, 1879-1885, d.1895

Konstantinos Photiadis 1874-1879

Alexandros Karatheodoris 1885-1895, d.1906

Georgios Verovits 1895-1896

Stephanos Mousouros 1896-1899

Konstantinos Vagiannis 1899-1900, d.1919

Michail Grigoriadis 1900-1902

Alexandros Mavrogenis 1902-1904, d.1929

Ioannis Vithynos 1904-1906, d.1912

Konstantinos Karatheodoris 1906-1907, d.1922

Georgios Georgiadis 1907-1908

Andreas Kopasis 1908-1912, d.1912

Grigorios Vegleris 1912, d.1948

like Wallachia and Moldavia. This was called the "Hegemony" of Samos, Ἡγεμονία τῆς Σάμου. There is no perfect Greek equivalent for "prince," although ἄρχων, "ruler," is often translated that way. "Prince" may not have been the most appropriate title anyway, since the office was elective and of limited terms. Indeed, some of these names, like those in Greece, are familiar from the Phanariot Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia. Konstantinos Karatheodoris was a Mavrocordat on his mother's side, while the final prince here, Grigorios Vegleris, was his son-in-law. This all ended with the First Balkan War, when most of the Aegaean islands were joined to metropolitan Greece.

Princes of Samos
Stephanos Vogoridis	1833-1850, d.1869
Alexandros Kallimachis	1850-1854
Ion Ghica	1854-1859, d.1897
Miltiadis Aristarchis	1859-1866, d.1893
Pavlos Mousouros	1866-1873, d.1876
Georgios Georgiadis	acting, 1873
Konstantinos Adosidis	1873-1874, 1879-1885, d.1895
Konstantinos Photiadis	1874-1879
Alexandros Karatheodoris	1885-1895, d.1906
Georgios Verovits	1895-1896
Stephanos Mousouros	1896-1899
Konstantinos Vagiannis	1899-1900, d.1919
Michail Grigoriadis	1900-1902
Alexandros Mavrogenis	1902-1904, d.1929
Ioannis Vithynos	1904-1906, d.1912
Konstantinos Karatheodoris	1906-1907, d.1922
Georgios Georgiadis	1907-1908
Andreas Kopasis	1908-1912, d.1912
Grigorios Vegleris	1912, d.1948

Similiar to Samos, but shorter and sharper, was the experience of Crete. After various rebellions, the Ottoman government granted autonomy to Crete in 1878. This was revoked in 1889 and rebellion began again in 1895. This expanded until Greek troops landed in Crete and a general war between Greece and Turkey broke out in 1898. The Greeks were badly defeated, and the Turks were marching on Athens, but the Great Powers intervened.

An International Squadron, of Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Britain, was formed 1897 to stop the fighting on Crete. They forced Greek forces on Crete to withdraw and ordered Ottoman armies out of Greece. Crete was temporarily governed by the Powers, except for Germany and then Austria, who withdrew. In 1898 the remaining powers imposed a settlement on Crete, which included the explusion of Ottoman forces after Cretan Muslims masacred Christians and murdered the British vice-consul and British sailors. Crete was made an autonomous Πολιτεία under Ottoman authority. This gets translated "State," but in the Middle Ages the word translated Latin Res Publica; so Crete could be called the "Cretan Republic." In Turkish, it was the گِرِيد دَوْلَتِى, Girid Devleti, i.e. "Crete, it's State," in the characteristic Turkish grammatical construction.

A "High Commissioner," Ὕπατος Ἁρμοστής, was appointed; and this would be Prince George, a son of King George I of Greece, and, as it happens, the husband of the intriguing Marie Bonaparte, the patient, supporter, and colleague of Sigmund Freud. George governed from 1898 to 1906, contending all the way with Greek nationalists who wanted union with Greece. He was then replaced by former Greek Prime Minister Alexandros Zaimis (until 1911), under whom the last of foreign forces withdrew from Crete. In 1908 Crete voted union with Greece. But Greece actually wasn't cooperating. When Cretan deputies showed up in Athens in 1912, they were not allowed to be seated in the Greek Parliament. This changed with the First Balkan War in 1912. In 1913, Greece asserted sovereignty, and the Great Powers and Turkey conceded it. In 1923 the Muslims, in the red areas on the map, left Crete as part of the "ethnic cleansing" of the day.

Some details of this history turn up in, of all places, the book [1946] and movie [1964] of Zorba the Greek. In 1916, a half-Greek Englishman travels to Crete to take possession of his family's property. Along the way, he acquires a helper, the colorful Alexis Zorba. Arriving in Crete, they stay for a while at the "Hotel Ritz," run by a French expatriate, Madame Hortense. The aging Hortense treasures her memories of the affairs she had with all the Admirals of the International Squadron during the Cretan rebellion against Turkey, especially the Italian Admiral. In the movie, Zorba was memorably played by Anthony Quinn (1915-2001), who was himself Mexican but whom we remember, not just as Zorba, but as the dynamic ʿAudah Abū-Tāyah (1872-1924) in the story of Lawrence of Arabia.

The house of Denmark supplied most of the kings of modern Greece. The kingship itself contained an interesting ambiguity, since the Greek word βασιλεύς, basileus, only meant "king" in Classical Greek. But in mediaeval Greek, basileus was used by the Emperors of Romania to translate Latin imperator, i.e. "emperor."

So which was it? Was the ruler of Greece merely the King of the Hellenes (Ἕλληνες, Héllênes), or the Emperor of the Romans (Ῥωμαῖοι, Rhômaioi)? When the Greeks tried to seize a large part of western Asia Minor from the Turks in 1920, it looked like restoring the Empire was the objective. Also, recovering Constantinople had always been a Greek ambition, with the declining and weakening Ottoman Empire making this seem possible. During the Balkan Wars, the King of Greece, Constantine, even styled himself, "Constantine XII," in succession to Constantine XI Palaeologus, rather than "Constantine I" of no more than Greece. Although receiving credit for success in the Balkan Wars, Constantine's German wife and desire to remain neutral in World War I led to his exile.

Greece participated in the Occupation of Constantinople after the War and Greek troops even occupied Adrianople, with a restored Constantine taking credit for that. Unfortunately, Turkey remained, and remains, fundamentally stronger than Greece. The Greek invasion of 1922, with an ambitious plan of taking Ankara, came to grief on the genius of Mustafa Kemal and his veterans of Gallipoli. The Greek army was destroyed and the whole business only provoked the expulsion of all Greeks from mainland Turkey -- under the formula of an "exchange," in which the much greater numbers of Christians in Turkey were "exchanged" for Muslims, not always Turkish, in Greece. Now we call it "ethnic cleansing."

King Constantine, discredited again, abdicated and went into exile. His brother, Prince Andrew, father of Prince Philip, husband of Queen Elizabeth of England, who was a commander of the army, was actually condemned to death, until King George V of Britain pressured the Greeks to exile him instead. He died in Monte Carlo in in 1944, having not seen his son Philip since World War II began in 1939. He had not seen his wife, Alice of Battenberg, either, since she was first treated for insanity in Switizerland in 1930 and subsequently returned to Greece, where she spent the War, sheltering Jews to the extent that she was recognized by Israel as "Righteous Among the Gentiles." Living in exile in Britain from 1967 until her death, her remains were later moved to an Orthodox convent in Jerusalem. Andrew's remains had been moved back to Greece in 1946.

I haven't noticed that the last King of Greece, Constantine II, ever styled himself "Constantine XIII," and with the Monarchy now gone, it is hard to make any symbolic claim to Ῥωμανία.

Politically, Greece has swung back and forth in the 20th century. Whether the monarchy was a good thing was often in doubt, as it was briefly abolished in the 20's and almost not reinstituted after World War II. Then the Army took over in 1967, creating a dictatorship that lasted until 1974. King Constantine tried to organize a counter-coup against the dictatorship, but then fled the country when he failed. Eventually the dictators abolished the monarchy. When democracy was restored, after a stupid attempt by the generals to overthrow the government of Cyprus (provoking a Turkish invasion), the Greeks nevertheless seemed to think that Constantine had not been sufficiently vigorous in opposing the dictatorship, so the monarchy was not restored. So, ironically, Greek dictatorship and Greek democracy agree on the issue of monarchy. When we reflect that the Great Powers imposed a monarchy on the newly independence Greece to prevent the kind of radicalism that we have in fact since seen, we might think there was perhaps some wisdom there.

Since then, Greece has made a speciality of electing anti-American, socialist governments, long after that made any sense either geo-politically or economically. A good example of recent foolishness was a nationwide strike on May 17, 2001, with 10,000 protesters marching on the Parliament in Athens. Protesting what? Well, the Greek state pension system was nearly bankrupt, and the Government was considering reforms, like cutting benefits and increasing the retirement age (to 65). Even the socialist government, however, might have anticipated the offense to the (not just) Greek sense of entitlement that this would cause.

This kind of thing was all bad enough, but then 60 Minutes reported (6 January 2002) that the Greek government, and especially the dominant Socialist Party, appeared to be tolerating a radical leftist terrorist organization, "17 November," that had been responsible for bombings and murders for years. Not a single member of this organization had been arrested or even identified by the government, even though unmasked members raided a police station for weapons and could easily have been described. When members of the Greek press were threatened for reporting on the organization, and police closed the investigations even of murder cases against them, one began to wonder if a sort of tolerated leftist death squad had come into existence in Greece. This boded ill for the future of Greece, not only economically, but even as a functioning democracy.

Subsequently, however, this situation began to improve. Perhaps under pressure to straighten things out if Greece wanted to host the 2004 Olympics, the government arrested many members of "17 November," and the suspects were spilling details about the membership and operations of the organization [Los Angeles Times, Wednesday, August 7, 2002, "Toppled From Their Pedestal"]. The actual popularity of the group was damaged by the very willingness of its members to inform and cooperate in order to avoid harder sentences. Happily, the 2004 Olympics went off without incident.

Although the Greek monarchy is now gone, the Greek Royal family remains impressively connected to two of the most important centers of contemporary European royalty. The heirs of the British monarchy are now all descendants, through Prince Philip, of King George I of Greece; and all the Greek Royal Family itself is descended from both Queen Victoria and the Emperor Frederick III of Germany. Then Constantine II's sister Sophia married Juan Carlos of Spain, who was able to do in Spain what Constantine wasn't able to in Greece -- restore democracy. Now, after the abdication of Juan Carlos, the new King of Spain, Philip (Filipe) VI, is a descendant of Kings George, Constantine I, and Paul of Greece.

One might gather from this diagram that the throne of Britain is due to pass the House of Denmark and Greece, or, more precisely, the House of Schleswig- Holstein- Sonderburg-Glucksburg; but on marrying Elizabeth, Prince Philip renounced his rights to the Greek throne and his connection to the Greek Royal family, taking the name of his mother's family, Battenberg/Mountbatten, so this connection is obscured.

Now that royalty is more a matter of international celebrity than of political power, Greece, by blaming Constantine for a bunch of military dictators, is really missing out on its share of space in People magazine. Both Constantine and his son Paul have five children each, which means that the Greek Royal Family actually has a large demographic footprint. This may seem like an absurdly trivial consideration, but Greece depends heavily on foreign tourism; and foreign tourism depends heavily on international perception and publicity. Space, free space, in People magazine means millions of dollars in business for Greece. Instead, Greeks still have these ridiculous demonstrations for socialism (not to mention the frightening terrorist activity) and nurse their (legitimate but futile) historic grievance against Turkey.

A real basis for the latter concerns Cyprus. In 1974 the Greek generals tried to annex Cyprus to Greece. This provoked a Turkish invasion and the de facto partition of the Island (and, happily for Greece, the overthrow of the generals). The Turks even set up a separate Turkish Cypriot Republic, which is recognized by no one in the world but Turkey. What this all really meant was that the effort to maintain Cyprus as a bi-national Republic, since independence from Britain in 1960, had failed utterly. The obvious solution would seem to be a real partition of the island with the Greek and Turkish parts annexed, respectively, by Greece and Turkey. Since the Turks took rather more of the island than was warranted by the Turkish percentage of the population (with Turkish settlers now introduced to fill the space), Greece could expect a territorial adjustment in exchange for international recognition of Turkish separation. For some reason, however, the international community still expects a restoration of the bi-national Republic. With no real pressure on Turkey, however, and no prospect of it, the bi-national Republic is certainly dead and buried, and the realistic solution is not even being addressed.

The irrationality and folly of Greek politics seemed hit a new high (or low, perhaps) in 2010. The American and international recession of 2008-2010 imperiled the credit of several members of the European Union who had been spending beyond their means. These collectively became known as the PIIGS -- Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain. Greece, however, was in the worst shape, badly in debt, with domestic spending out of control. The EU began organizing a "bailout" for Greece, to tide it over. However, no one wishes to give Greece money unless there is more responsible restraint in spending -- and some higher taxes also. The Greek government has undertaken to control its spending, but such sensible and prudent measures have set off the lunatics in Greek politics. Led, as we might imagine, by public employee unions and anarchists, Athens on several occasions has been flooded with rioters and vandals. There has been so little in the way of merely peaceful protest that "demonstrations" is hardly the word to use. Three employees of a bank were killed, including a pregnant woman, when their office was firebombed. This insane conduct, however, is merely an exaggerated version of influences that occur elsewhere. The State of California is in nearly as bad shape as Greece, and for most of the same reasons, especially because of the power of public employee unions. The welfare state and socialists simply never have enough money. Greece would probably just be printing money if it were not already under the discipline of the Euro and its sober German bankers.

The Leftist irrationality of Greek politics unfortunately has its representatives in the form of some influential Greek-Americans. Chief among these may be Arianna Stassinopoulos Huffington and Markos Moulitsas (Zúñiga). Huffington was born in Greece, was married to Republican Congressman Michael Huffington, became a conservative political commentator after her divorce, but then flew off the tracks as a born-again Leftist. Her public comments, often dopey, seem to have increasingly marginalized her personally, but she remains influential through her "Huffington Post" website, subsidized by George Soros and then bought by a major media outlet. Markos Moulitsas was born in the United States of a Greek father. He spent years in El Salvador and in the United States Army but came out of it all to found the "Daily Kos," which has proven to be one of the most lunatic of lunatic fringe Leftist websites. I have yet to see Mr. "Kos" appear in public or make personal statements in the media, and so it has been hard to get an impression of what he is all about and why his politics should have become so vicious. I would wonder if his early experience had imbuded him with the Communist propaganda that is so prevalent in Latin America -- where there is scarcely a country that can be said to have achieved real economic success in the modern world, while explanations for this typically are of the Marxist, conspiratorial, and anti-American sort. Kos' politics thus may actually owe little to his Greek roots.

How ridiculous the radical take on events in Greece can be we see in this statement from internet blogger Chris Hedges:

Here�s to the Greeks. They know what to do when corporations pillage and loot their country. They know what to do when Goldman Sachs and international bankers collude with their power elite to falsify economic data and then make billions betting that the Greek economy will collapse. They know what to do when they are told their pensions, benefits and jobs have to be cut to pay corporate banks, which screwed them in the first place. Call a general strike. Riot. Shut down the city centers. Toss the bastards out. Do not be afraid of the language of class warfare -- the rich versus the poor, the oligarchs versus the citizens, the capitalists versus the proletariat. The Greeks, unlike most of us, get it.

Unfortunately, Mr. Hedges doesn't seem to "get it" that a welfare state of public employee parasites (the actual "power elite" of Greece with its consistently socialistic governments) living beyond its means will eventually run out of money. Greek prosperity was borrowed, often secretly and under false pretenses. A healthy economy could generate its own revenues and does not need to borrow from international banks, or be bailed out by the European Union. All that Greece needs to do to screw "Goldman Sacks" is default on its debts. Of course, it will not then be able to borrow any more money, the gravy train will be gone, and I am curious where Mr. Hedges thinks more money will then come from. Doubtless, the "proletariat" will just produce the goods, in good Marxist fashion, without money; and Greece can join the Proletarian heaven that is Cuba. Perhaps Mr. Hedges isn't old enough, or educated enough, to know that such things have been tried. Even Lenin had to resort to the New Economic Policy -- but the Modern Left would need to learn such lessons all over again, perhaps with a few more purges, terror famines, and Gulags to help out.

Indeed, Greece would be better off if it just defaulted. The EU bailouts have been given on the condition that Greece reforms its government and its economy. It is not at all clear that the will is there to do anything of the sort, and the bailouts merely create the moral hazard that the day of reckoning can be postponed. Rioters trashed the center of Athens again on February 12, 2012, to protest measures such as cutting the minimum wage 22%. But something like that only scratches the surface. With a third of the workforce employed by the government, unemployment at 21%, and the "ease of doing business" ranked 100th by the World Bank, behind Yemen, Greece is nowhere near realizing what it needs to do to return to the real world from the socialist Nirvana that leftist ideology has foisted on it. The Greeks at least can have the comfort that California has fallen for a similar leftist folly and is in similar shape -- which is probably why people like Chris Hedges can believe what they do. After all, it's what's taught in school.

In 2014, Greek unemployment is still over 26%, which has become a kind of "new normal." The "austerity" of EU conditions of financial support has included reduced spending, anti-growth higher taxes, and precious little in the way of useful recommendations to reform the economy. Radicals on both left and right, including a kind of neo-Fascism movement, the "Golden Dawn," have taken heart. Clueless comments on the situation continue to be the norm. Thus, the excellent and revolutionary Byzantinist, Anthony Kaldellis, who is here celebrated for his ground-breaking book, Hellenism in Byzantium, has come to engage in the kind of opaque political sniping that now characterizes the unrelated writing of Leftist scholars. In the otherwise excellent Ethnography after Antiquity [University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013], Kaldellis writes:

Incidentally, the reaction to the current "crisis" in Greece is shaped by perceptions that go this far back, as do the reasons why the Orthodox world is in some ways more hostile to Catholicism than to ʾIslām. [p.168]

The background of this remark was the situation in the 15th century when many Rhômaioi were ready to prefer the "turban of the Turk to the red hat of the Cardinal." However, this was never the policy of the Emperors of Romania, who were willing to sacrifice the independence of the Orthodox Church in order to obtain Western help against the Turks, or of the Russians, who inherited the conflict and never worried remotely as much about Catholicism, which was no threat, as about Turkey and ʾIslām. Catholicism was a threat to the Greeks only because of Catholic claims of supremacy, which were effected by the policy of their own Emperors and, briefly, by the occupation of Romania after the Fourth Crusade. Otherwise, the Rhômaioi resented the Latin ideological denial that they were Romans and the direct heirs of the Empire of Augustus and Constantine.

These conflicts, which are barely remembered outside Greece, and are certanly not remembered at all by modern EU politicians and bankers (who no longer have Classical educations -- which actually used to incline Westerners to sympathy for modern Greece, rather than antipathy for [the equally forgotten] Romania), are of little modern political significance; and it is not clear how Kaldellis thinks that EU "reaction" to the Greek financial collapse is "shaped" by such things. As is characteristic of Leftist political sniping, Kaldellis provides neither explanation nor argument. One is left to wonder how an EU financial bailout represents the sort of Frankish arrogance that the Greeks resented. If Greece doesn't want the bailout, or the attendant EU conditions, it can chuck the whole mess. It didn't need to join the EU. However, like all good socialists, the Greeks still want the money.

Since Kaldellis puts "crisis" in scare quotes, one might also wonder what he thinks is unreal about Greece's situation. Again, we get neither explanation nor argument. Instead, we might notice that the hostility of the "Orthodox world" is now less about Catholicism than about the relatively lack of economic success of places like Greece and Russia in modern life, a problem that a writer like Kaldellis probably blames on Capitalism rather than on the ideological claims of Charlemagne, Otto the Great, the Crusaders, or the Popes -- let alone on the actual statist and socialist policies found in Greece or Russia. Indeed, from many indications, it is clear that the true hostility of Kaldellis himself is for Capitalism, with residual resentment for Catholicism only secondary and incidental. His comment is thus not only without explanation or argument, but it is also disingenuous or dishonest -- concealing his true preferences. Sadly, this is also characteristic of the political sniping of Leftist scholars, whose remarks are never meant to persuade or demonstrate but only to signify their political allegiance and orthodoxy to readers of similar Leftist convictions. This buys them good standing in the tight community of academic Leftist ideologues. (This is rather different, on the other hand, from academics who are openly and unapologetically Marxists.)

The irony of Kaldellis's reference to ʾIslām is that Greece is now inundated with refugees from the civil war in Syria, carrying with them the sort of cultural problems from ʾIslām that have resulted in significant increases in crime in Germany and Sweden, which have taken in many such refugrees. Greece is in no shape to support large and durable refugee camps, and the Greeks have not been tolerant of ʾIslām and its practices for a long time. If the refugees include terrorists and anti-Americans, this might not be enough, despite its appeal, to win Greek hearts.

To qualify for the next tranche of aid, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and his far-left Syriza party this month raised taxes again with no accompanying liberalization of labor or product markets.
Mr. Tsipras�s statist ideology is as hostile as ever to the supply-side reforms Greece needs, and both the IMF and other creditors seem to be giving up hope that any other Greek politician could enact such reforms. Which means Greece�s crisis will drag on no matter what happens next with Greece�s debts.
"The Greek Debt Fiction," The Wall Street Journal, May 26, 2016

Although economists plead with the EU to reform their labor law, taxes, and suffocating regulation, "austerity," as in Greece, has done little but raise taxes, cut spending, and lay off some bureaucrats. The success of liberalization in formerly resolutely socialist Sweden seems to be lost even in places like France, let alone Greece. According to The Economist, in 2014 Greece remains with an economic freedom index of 55.7, little better than Russia's 51.9 and well below Germany at 74.4, Sweden at 74.1, and even Japan, which has stiffled itself for more than two decades now, at 72.4.

Since high taxes and little economic freedom (including requirements to small businesses that they pay taxes up front, regardless of not yet having any sales, let alone profits) mean no growth, in 2015 frustrated Greek voters turned to people who are essentially communists, electing Alexis Tsipras and the socialist Syriza Party. With a quantum jump in idiocy, the Syriza promised more government spending again and also rehired all the bloated, overpaid, corrupt bureaucrats who had previously burdened Greece and had been let go. Now, of course, the bureaucrats, like American public employee unions, will happily vote for more communism. But this will require more borrowing from the EU, meaning Germany, which isn't going to be in the mood, or leaving the Euro and printing drachmas, which will receate for Greece the joys of the Weimar Republic, or the current prosperity of Zimbabwe or Venezuela. The Greek prime minister poses a threat to NATO as well as to the EU, since he is soliciting support from Vladimir Putin, who is currently in the process of conquering the Ukraine. Putin, however, is no longer in a position to subsidize Greek spending (with oil revenues way down), so he cannot be the kind of help that the Greeks might have hoped for previously; and the Greeks consequently still endeavor to reschedule their debt with the EU (now mainly held by governments rather than banks), without undertaking any real reform of their economy or their government.

As it happened, the EU called Greece's bluff; and as Greek credit collapsed, the day rapidly approached when shipments of food to Greece would have stopped. As in socialist Venezuela, actual hunger and starvation loomed. So Tsipras forgot about most of the demands he was making, his coalition of lunatics broke up, and it is not clear whether he or some other government will continue trying to avoid real reform, gaming the EU. Meanwhile, refugees and terrorist infiltrators from Syria flood into Greece, introducing whole new forms and level of crisis -- shared by Germany and other countries as well as Greece.

The level of actual delusion in modern politics is remarkable. Thus, the Greeks, who have voted for socialists for decades, and now should be able to see the obvious results of this -- crushing public debt, suffocating bureaucracy, a third of the workforce parasitically employed by the government, small business (and big business) hounded out of the country or out of existence, etc. -- nevertheless persist in blaming what it was they planned to escape from by voting for socialists in the first place, namely, capitalism -- as we see in the street art from Athens at left.

Not to worry. There is little of capitalism left in Greece. It is just that the Greeks may not have awakened to the actual logical result of this, which is impoverished slavery to the state. As we have just seen in the citation above, the Greek government still will not tolerate the kinds of liberal reforms that would allow what was once a famous Greek knack for business to revive the country. The EU and the Germans cannot and will not carry them along forever. Now that Britain has voted (June 2016) to leave the EU, the European Union is facing enough of a problem to revive its own economic fortunes, let alone its moral determination in the face of terrorism, Putin, and the militant Leftists (not just in Greece) who think that the job of government is to hand out money (which they will get some somewhere -- loot, print, or borrow). It is not a task for which huddled bureaucrats are suited. The Greeks, meanwhile, seem determined to keep banging their heads against the wall, perhaps hoping that a triumphant socialist Venezuela, where you can't even buy toilet paper anymore, will bail them out. If only American politics were free of such delusions.

Conspicuous Americans of Greek origin in recent years have been the lovely actress Melina Kanakaredes, of the late NBC drama Providence (she now appears on other popular shows), and the comedienne, actress, writer, and producer Nia Vardalos, whose 2002 movie, My Big Fat Greek Wedding, was an unexpected and astonishing success, with over $200 million in domestic boxoffice. The movie good naturedly pokes fun at the father's old world paternalism and exaggerated nationalistic claims (e.g. that the Japanese word kimono is actually of Greek origin), a familiar phenomenon in Greek nationalism. Nia's subsequent movies, including a sequel to Wedding, have not been as successful.

There are other figures of Greek derivation we might notice in American public life. The Fox Business Channel has Nicole Petallides on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange. Conservative commentator Andrea Tantaros appeared in multiple fora on the Fox News Channel, until some kind of dispute over her book, Tied Up in Knots: How Getting What We Wanted Made Women Miserable [2016], got her fired. Both of these women -- stunning beauties -- thus participated in the Fox networks of Rupert Murdoch, the bête noire of the just mentioned Leftist ideologues. American Greeks can thus be seen fighting back against the likes of Arianna Huffington and Markos Moulitsas.

The See of Athens

The Pronunciation of Greek

4. SERBIA & YUGOSLAVIA

George, "Black George," Karađorđe, Petrović leads revolt,
1804-1813

Miloš Obrenović leads revolt,
1815-1817;
Prince,
1817-1839,
1858-1860

Milan I 1839

Michael 1839-1842,
1860-1868

Alexander Karadjordjevic
(Karageorgevich) 1842-1858

Milan II Obrenovic 1868-1882

King,
1882-1889

Alexander I 1889-1903,
murdered

Peter I
Karadjordjevic 1903-1921

King of Yugoslavia,
1919-1921

Alexander II Regent,
1918-1921

1921-1934

Assassinated at Marseilles by Croatian Fascists helped by Italian Intelligence, 1934
Peter II 1934-1945

Paul Regent,
1934-1941

German & Italian Occupation, 1941-1943
German Occupation, 1943-1945

Communist takeover, 1945

Ivan Ribar 1945-1953

Josip Broz, "Tito" 1953-1980

Presidency Rotates among Republics, I

Lazar Koli�evski 1980,
Macedonia

Cvijetin Mijatovic 1980-1981,
Bosnia-
Hercegovina

Sergej Kraiger 1981-1982,
Slovenia

Petar Stambolic 1982-1983,
Serbia

Mika �piljak 1983-1984,
Croatia

Veselin Ðuranovic 1984-1985,
Montenegro
Radovan Vlajkovic 1985-1986,
Vojvodina
(Serbia)

Sinan Hasani 1986-1987,
Kosovo
(Serbia)

Presidency Rotates among Republics, II

Lazar Mojsov 1987-1988,
Macedonia

Raif Dizdarevic 1988-1989,
Bosnia-
Hercegovina

Janez Drnov�ek 1989-1990,
Slovenia

Borisav Jovic 1990-1991,
Serbia

Stjepan Mesic 1991,
Croatia

Branko Kostic 1991-1992,
Montenegro

Slovenia, Croatia, &
Macedonia secede, 1991; Bosnia, 1992

Presidents of Republic of Yugoslavia

Dobrica Cosic 1992-1993

Milo� Radulovic acting, 1993

Zoran Lilic 1993-1997

Srda Bo�ovic acting, 1997

Srdjan Bozovic 1997

Slobodan Milosevic 1997-2000

Kosovo detached by NATO, 1999

Vojislav Kostunica 2000-2003

Union of Serbia and Montenegro

Svetozar Marovic 2003-2006

Montenegro secedes, 2006

Presidents of Serbia
Србиа

Slobodan Milošević 1990-1997

Milan Milutinović 1997-2002

Boris Tadić 2004-2012

Tomislav Nikolić 2012-2017

Aleksandar Vučić 2017-present

In the shadow of the Napoleonic Wars and a Russian war with Turkey, Serbia began the Balkan independence movement against Turkey with a long revolt that led to an Ottoman grant of autonomy. The rivalry of the two leaders of the revolt, Miloš Obrenović and "Black George," Karađorđe, Petrović, however, led to a century of sometimes bloodly conflict between their two families, culminating in a coup in 1903 when King Alexander I was murdered. The Congress of Vienna in 1878 granted Serbia full independence, and the status of a Kingdom followed shortly.

The map for 1912 gives us the situation right before the Balkan Wars. Turkish holdings in Europe still extend all the way to the Adriatic, including Albania which, although largely Moslem, has already been restless for independence. When this status quo gives way, we have a conflict that is already a kind of fuse for World War I. Having mostly satisfied its ambitions in the south, Serbia will turn its attention to the north, where a bit of violence in Bosnia, the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, sets off a long line of secondary explosions, until all of Europe erupts.

4. SERBIA & YUGOSLAVIA
George, "Black George," Karađorđe, Petrović	leads revolt, 1804-1813
Miloš Obrenović	leads revolt, 1815-1817; Prince, 1817-1839, 1858-1860
Milan I	1839
Michael	1839-1842, 1860-1868
Alexander Karadjordjevic (Karageorgevich)	1842-1858
Milan II Obrenovic	1868-1882
King, 1882-1889
Alexander I	1889-1903, murdered
Peter I Karadjordjevic	1903-1921
King of Yugoslavia, 1919-1921
Alexander II	Regent, 1918-1921
1921-1934
Assassinated at Marseilles by Croatian Fascists helped by Italian Intelligence, 1934
Peter II	1934-1945
Paul	Regent, 1934-1941
German & Italian Occupation, 1941-1943
German Occupation, 1943-1945
Communist takeover, 1945
Ivan Ribar	1945-1953
Josip Broz, "Tito"	1953-1980
Presidency Rotates among Republics, I
Lazar Koli�evski	1980, Macedonia
Cvijetin Mijatovic	1980-1981, Bosnia- Hercegovina
Sergej Kraiger	1981-1982, Slovenia
Petar Stambolic	1982-1983, Serbia
Mika �piljak	1983-1984, Croatia
Veselin Ðuranovic	1984-1985, Montenegro
Radovan Vlajkovic	1985-1986, Vojvodina (Serbia)
Sinan Hasani	1986-1987, Kosovo (Serbia)
Presidency Rotates among Republics, II
Lazar Mojsov	1987-1988, Macedonia
Raif Dizdarevic	1988-1989, Bosnia- Hercegovina
Janez Drnov�ek	1989-1990, Slovenia
Borisav Jovic	1990-1991, Serbia
Stjepan Mesic	1991, Croatia
Branko Kostic	1991-1992, Montenegro
Slovenia, Croatia, & Macedonia secede, 1991; Bosnia, 1992
Presidents of Republic of Yugoslavia
Dobrica Cosic	1992-1993
Milo� Radulovic	acting, 1993
Zoran Lilic	1993-1997
Srda Bo�ovic	acting, 1997
Srdjan Bozovic	1997
Slobodan Milosevic	1997-2000
Kosovo detached by NATO, 1999
Vojislav Kostunica	2000-2003
Union of Serbia and Montenegro
Svetozar Marovic	2003-2006
Montenegro secedes, 2006
Presidents of Serbia Србиа
Slobodan Milošević	1990-1997
Milan Milutinović	1997-2002
Boris Tadić	2004-2012
Tomislav Nikolić	2012-2017
Aleksandar Vučić	2017-present

The Serbian dream was not just to unite all Serbian speakers remaining in Bosnia, Montenegro, Hungary, and Turkey, but all of the "Southern Slavs," including the Croatians, Slovenians, and perhaps even Bulgarians. In the aftermath of World War I, which began with the Serbian inspired assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo, this dream was realized in the establishment of Yugoslavia, which contained all the Southern Slavs except for Bulgaria, which had its own fiercely separate traditions and ambitions. Macedonia, however, had been wrested from Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War (1913). These benefits were substantially due to the Russians, to whom the Serbs looked as the protectors and patrons of the Orthodox Slavs. World War I formally began when Russia declared war on Austria to protect the Serbs. The flags of both Serbia and Yugoslavia are like the tricolor flag of Russia, with just a different arrangement of the stripes.

The ethnic tensions between Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Slovenes and Croatians (and others), however, manifested themselves both in World War II, when the Germans found willing allies in the Croatians, and with the Fall of Communism, when the growth of democracy unmasked the separatist hostilities again.

In World War II, other forces were at work. When the Germans invaded Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, an anti-Nazi force, of Yugoslav officers, rose against them. This group was called the "Chetniks," and it was led by the Serbian Dragoljub "Draža" Mihailović (1893-1946). There was no Communist opposition to the Germans, because Stalin at the time was Hitler's ally and gave him a free hand outside the defined Russian sphere of influence.

That, of course, changed. Hilter invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. In Yugoslavia, this got the Communists moving. But it look a while. There wasn't a real Communist force until 1942. This was led by the Croat/Slovene Josip Broz "Tito" (1892-1980). The effectiveness of Tito's force was uneven, and the Germans actually attacked his headquarters and ran him out of the country in May 1944. When the Russians finally took Belgrade, in October/November 1944, they were able to restore Tito to the country. Later, when Tito boasted of liberating Yugoslavia from the Germans, Stalin actually rebuked him. The Russians had done that.

The actual Fascist collaborators with the Germans, the Ustaše, were led by the Croat Ante Pavelić (1889-1959). He ruled a Nazi puppet state of Croatia, initially with a nominal Italian King, Aimone of Spoleto, who had the good sense to mostly stay in Italy.

Once Tito had his forces organized, in late 1942, the project to discredit and destroy Draža Mihailović began. This was one of the most successful Soviet espionage and disinformation operations of World War II. Communist agents and sympathizers in Britain and the United States, including key British intelligence officers in Cairo, and including the Allied agents sent to Yugoslavia to evaluate the situation, reported that Tito was effectively fighting the Germans while Mihailović's forces were actually collaborating with the Germans. Even Chetnik attacks on the Germans ended up reported back as carried out by Tito, the size of whose forces, and their effectiveness, was exaggerated.

As with a similar strategy in China against the Nationalists, this persuaded Allied leaders to drop support for Mihailović and to support Tito. The result, of course, was a Communist Yugoslavia (like a Communist China), while Mihailović ended up captured and executed by Tito. Lies about this are still perpetuated in the ordinary histories of Yugoslavia, including, as I see, treatments at Wikipedia. One wonders how much of that is carelessness, and how much is actual sympathy, even now, for the Communists.

None of the Soviet agents and sympathizers were ever brought to justice, although the Cambridge spy Guy Burgess (1911-1963), who helped promote the pro-Tito message, was at least exposed when he fled to Russia in 1951. The principle British intelligence officer in Cairo, who conducted the Yugoslav disinformation campaign, James Klugmann (1912-1977), although quite openly a Communist, part of the Cambridge group of Burgess, and exposed as a Russian agent, nevertheless never paid any price for it, living out a ostensibly respectable life in Britain, writing apologetics for British and Yugoslav Communism. Meanwhile, Pavelić escaped to exile in Argentina, Chile, and finally Fascist Spain.

After Tito's death, Yugoslavia broke up, with bitter fighting, atrocities, and "ethnic cleansing" as the various communities and new states sought to secure territory. Although all the groups have been guilty of offenses, the consenus of international observers and investigators, not to mention the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague, seems to be that the Serbs, seeking to maintain a dominant position and initially with a military advantage, are more guilty than others, especially in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Former Yugoslav
Republics

Slovenia

Croatia

Macedonia
Bosnia Herzegovina

Montenegro

Kosovo

Former Yugoslav Republics
Slovenia
Croatia
Macedonia
Bosnia Herzegovina
Montenegro
Kosovo

The future remains uncertain. For a long time, NATO/UN peacekeeping forces seemed like the only thing that restrained the violence from breaking out again in Bosnia, and the status of Kosovo was long open, as Serbs fled the retaliation of the Albanians, which extended to vandalizing churches and monasteries -- and the Albanians have no interest in being returned to Serbia. All that stood between "Yugoslavia" being just Serbia was the continued adherence of Montenegro. The two countries are no different ethnically, linguistically, or religiously. All that is different is history, which is enough to fuel a Montenegran independence movement, which succeeded in 2006, followed by Kosovo in 2008. Yugoslavia has now been reduced to just Serbia again and is, as such, a lead letter.

A kind of glyph that has been used to represent Serbia is a cross with four crescents drawn in it. This is borrowed, like the double-headed eagle, from Mediaeval Roman/Byzantine symbolism. The crescents come from the Greek goddess Artemis, a moon god, who was the original patron of the Greek city of Byzantium. As was common in Constantinople, a bit of pagan iconography thus survives in the Christian Empire. The addition of the Cross renders it sufficiently Christian. The background for this is discussed elsewhere. The image of the crescent may actually be the source of the use of the Crescent in Islām, which may not antedate the Turkish conquest of Constantinople. The Serbian device, drawn as graffiti, was often seen as symbolic of massacre and terror during the recent Balkan fighting, especially in Bosnia.

Mediaeval Serbia

5. BULGARIA

Russo-Turkish War, 1876-1878

Alexander of
Battenberg Prince,
1879-1886

Ferdinand of
Saxe-Coberg-Gotha Prince,
1887-1908

King or Czar,
1908-1918

Boris III 1918-1943

Simeon II 1943-1946

Cyril Regent,
1943-1944

Communist
takeover, 1946

Vasil Petrov Kolarov 1946-1947

Mintscho Naitschev 1947-1950

Georgi Damjanov 1950-1958

Dimitar Ganev 1958-1964

Georgi Traikov 1964-1971

Todor Schivkov/
Zhivkov 1971-1989

Petar Mladenov 1989-1990

Stanko Georgiev acting, 1990

Nikolay Todorov acting, 1990

Schelju Schelev/
Zhelyu Zhelev 1990-1997

Petar Stojanov 1997-2002

Georgi Parvanov 2002-2012

Rosen Plevneliev 2012-2017

Rumen Radev 2017-present

Bulgaria was the last of the mediaeval Balkan states to regain complete independence from Turkey. Although usually regarded as a Kingdom, rather more was implied when King Ferdinand (a second cousin of Edward VII of England) also called himself "Tsar." He is actually supposed to have carried around the vestments (obtained from a theatrical costumer) of a Roman (/Byzantine) Emperor. This was no less than what most of the successor states wanted, but the Bulgarians came closest to the physical heart of mediaeval Romania in the First Balkan War (1912-1913) when they occupied Adrianople and drew near Constantinople. This advantage, however, was lost in the Second Balkan War (1913), when Bulgaria took on all the other belligerents from the First War, largely in a dispute with Serbia over Macedonia (where a dialect or near relative of Bulgarian was spoken), and was overwhelmingly defeated. Adrianople went back to Turkey, Macedonia went to Serbia, and other territories went to Greece and Romania. Still stinging from this defeat, Bulgaria threw its lot with Germany in World War I, which cost it access to the Aegean Sea. The same strategy was followed in World War II, where the wartime borders show us the Bulgarian wish list, with gains from Serbia, Romania, and Greece (Turkey was not in the War). The post-War settlement erased those gains, except against Romania, which had also been a member of the Axis. Today Macedonia has broken away from Yugoslavia, but to become independent rather than a part of Bulgaria. Note that the numbering of Kings Boris III and Simeon II goes back to the original mediaeval Bulgarian Tsars.

The Balkan Wars all but eliminated Turkey in Europe. In the First War (1912-1913), everyone attacked Turkey, which even lost Adrianople to Bulgaria. Serbia was going to annex Albania, but the Great Powers required that it become an independent state. The Serbs were not happy about that, and Bulgaria wasn't happy about its share either. So the Second War (1913) featured everyone against Bulgaria, which lost Macedonia to Serbia, Adrianople to Turkey, and some territory south of the Danube to România. Meanwhile, Italy had been at war with Turkey in 1912 and had obtained Libya and, on this map, the Dodecanese Islands.

This all set the stage for, as Otto von Bismark had said, "some damn thing in the Balkans," which would set off the greatest war in history. Having disposed of the Turks, it meant that Serbia would turn its attentions to Austria.

5. BULGARIA
Russo-Turkish War, 1876-1878
Alexander of Battenberg	Prince, 1879-1886
Ferdinand of Saxe-Coberg-Gotha	Prince, 1887-1908
King or Czar, 1908-1918
Boris III	1918-1943
Simeon II	1943-1946
Cyril	Regent, 1943-1944
Communist takeover, 1946
Vasil Petrov Kolarov	1946-1947
Mintscho Naitschev	1947-1950
Georgi Damjanov	1950-1958
Dimitar Ganev	1958-1964
Georgi Traikov	1964-1971
Todor Schivkov/ Zhivkov	1971-1989
Petar Mladenov	1989-1990
Stanko Georgiev	acting, 1990
Nikolay Todorov	acting, 1990
Schelju Schelev/ Zhelyu Zhelev	1990-1997
Petar Stojanov	1997-2002
Georgi Parvanov	2002-2012
Rosen Plevneliev	2012-2017
Rumen Radev	2017-present

Mediaeval Bulgaria, Qaghans & Tsars

Old Church Slavonic

Mediaeval Bulgaria, Asens

Mediaeval Bulgaria, Terters

6. ALBANIA

Ismail Kemal Bey 1912-1914

Wilhelm of Wied King,
1914,
d.1945

Essad Pasha Toptani 1914-1916

Austrian Occupation, 1916-1918

Turchan Pasha 1919-1920

Regency Council, 1920-1924

Bishop Fan Noli 1924

Ahmet Zogu,
Zog I 1925-1928

King,
1928-1939
d.1961

Italian & German Occupation, 1939-1943
Victor Emanuel (III) King,
1939-1943

German Occupation, 1943-1945

Communist takeover,
Enver Hoxha Dictatorship,
1945-1985

Omer Nishani 1946-1953

Haji Leschi 1953-1982

Leka I Pretender,
1961-2011

Leka II Pretender,
2011-present

Ramiz Alia 1982-1992

Kastriot Islami acting, 1992

Pjet�r Arbnori acting, 1992

Sali Berisha 1992-1997

Skender Gjinushi acting, 1997

Rexhep Kemal Mejdani 1997-2002

Alfred Moisiu 2002-2007

Bamir Topi 2007-2012

Bujar Nishani 2012-2017

Ilir Meta 2017-2022

Bajram Begaj 2022-present

Just about the poorest and least educated people in Europe, the Albanians had unexpected independence thrust upon them after the First Balkan War (1912-1913) and then found themselves locked into paranoid and pauperized isolation by a particularly nasty and megalomaniacal Communist regime after World War II, under longtime Communist Party Chief Enver Hoxha.

Trouble over Bosnia began World War I, when a member of a Serbian "Black Hand" assassination squad killed the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Austria ended up declaring war on Serbia, Russia on Austria, and Germany on Russia. The Germans then, of course, invaded France, Russia's ally, and did so through Belgium, violating recognized Belgian neutrality and bringing Britain into the War. Turkey and Bulgaria, the losers of the Balkan Wars, sided with Germany and Austria, while the other Balkan countries went with the Allies (Greece reluctantly -- Queen Sophia was Kaiser Wilhelm's sister). The result was losses for Bulgaria and gains for all the Allies, with Serbia orchestrating the formation of Yugoslavia from Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and other remants of Austria-Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia. România got Transylvania from Hungary and also gains from Russia, which was distracted by the Russian Revolution and Civil War. Bulgaria's loss of its Aegean coast would prove fortunate for the region when it later went communist. However little Greece and Turkey liked each other, it was convenient for them as Western allies to have a land frontier.

6. ALBANIA
Ismail Kemal Bey	1912-1914
Wilhelm of Wied	King, 1914, d.1945
Essad Pasha Toptani	1914-1916
Austrian Occupation, 1916-1918
Turchan Pasha	1919-1920
Regency Council, 1920-1924
Bishop Fan Noli	1924
Ahmet Zogu, Zog I	1925-1928
King, 1928-1939 d.1961
Italian & German Occupation, 1939-1943
Victor Emanuel (III)	King, 1939-1943
German Occupation, 1943-1945
Communist takeover, Enver Hoxha Dictatorship, 1945-1985
Omer Nishani	1946-1953
Haji Leschi	1953-1982
Leka I	Pretender, 1961-2011
Leka II	Pretender, 2011-present
Ramiz Alia	1982-1992
Kastriot Islami	acting, 1992
Pjet�r Arbnori	acting, 1992
Sali Berisha	1992-1997
Skender Gjinushi	acting, 1997
Rexhep Kemal Mejdani	1997-2002
Alfred Moisiu	2002-2007
Bamir Topi	2007-2012
Bujar Nishani	2012-2017
Ilir Meta	2017-2022
Bajram Begaj	2022-present

After the schism between Communist China and the Soviet Union, for many years Albania was China's only international ally and supporter, regularly submitting the PRC for membership in the United Nations. But eventually, after membership, China began allowing Capitalism, and Albania had to retreat into its own paranoid isolation as the last surviving Stalinist dictatorship. Since Hoxha expected the Capitalists to invade at any time, the Albanian landscape became covered with small bunkers, to defend every inch.

The country, which had always been poor anyway, became even poorer in Hoxha's grip, and it is nowhere near even recovering, much less developing to the level of its European neighbors. The Fall of Communism even witnessed large numbers of Albanians attempting to flee to Italy by boat.

Among the mysterious, autochthonous peoples of the Balkans, the Albanians were strongly Latinized under Rome, Islamicized under Turkey, coveted by Italy and Serbia, and included substantial communities in Greece (denied by Greece, which officially has no ethnic minorities). Like a number of peoples in the Balkans, they may not know just what to make of themselves in the modern world, much less how their society is supposed to function.

With two maps of Albanian dialects here from Wikipedia, we see that, although centered on Albania, the language is spoken around in a number nearby counties, most of which, besides Greece, acknowledge Albanians as a linguistic minority.

The Albanians in Italy, speaking the Arbëresh dialect, date from the era of the Turkish conquest of Albania, although some are thought to have arrived earlier. These Albanians, naturally, preserve their Christian religion. Some local Italian nobility can trace their descent back to the heroic Skanderbeg.

The speakers of the Arvantika dialect, in Attica, the Peloponnese, and Euboea, are perhaps those whose existence Greece is the least willing to acknowledge. Of significant historical interest may be those speaking the Cham dialect, who occupy the coast of Epirus, in Greece between Albania and the Ambracian Gulf.

As discussed with the Dialects of Greek, a claim now is that the Ancient Epirotes were Greek speakers, when the Ancient Greeks did not regard them as Greek at all. On the other hand, the 19th century ethnograpic map reproduced on the dialect page, and below here with Macedonia (in relation to similar arguments over language), show Albanian speakers extending from the Cham area on these maps all the way over to Thessaly, with some encompassed areas of Vlach speakers.

Since it is all but indisputable that the Albanians are autochthonous to the area since Ancient times, the Greek claims to Epirus and the denial of Albanian presence in Greece seem to be based on exaggerated forms of Greek nationalism, backed up by recent ethnic cleansing.

My own, very indirect, connection to Albania was through my Persian professor, Donald Stilo, at UCLA. While doing research in Iran, he was approached by the Iranian government, in the days of the Shāh, to contact the Pretender to the Throne of Albania. This was Prince Leka, the son of the former King of Albania, Ahmet Zogu, or Zog I. In telling the story, Stilo thus referred to him as "Zog's son." Zog's son had an American grandmother and an Australian wife, so he spoke idiomatic English.

I have no recollection why the Shāh of Iran wanted to be in touch with Zog's son, but Stilo had to fly to Madrid to meet him. Iran didn't use the Spanish as intermediaries because Iran actually didn't recognize the government of Franco's Spain, which was notionally a monarchy, but from which the proper Royal Heir was excluded. This contact apparently was no help to the cause of Leka. However, Leka's own son, styled Leka II, currently resides in Albania and has held offices in the Albanian government. They all seem to get along.

Recent conspicuous Americans of Albanian heritage have been the Belushis, John and his brother Jim, and Sandra Bullock (whose mother is German and father, reportedly, of Albanian derivation). One of John Belushi's memorable roles on Saturday Night Live was in the ongoing "Greek Diner" skits. This contributed the "No Coke, Pepsi" line to popular culture. The Belushis, indeed, had run such a diner in Chicago. To most Americans, the difference between Greek and Albanian probably didn't compute. But I probably wouldn't patronize a place with "No fries, chips."

The villains in the Liam Neeson movie Taken are Albanian gangsters in Paris, dealing in human trafficking and forced prostitution. I gather that the trafficking is a problem, but I don't know if Albanians have much to do with it -- or if the traffic is tolerated by the French government or intelligence services. This began Neeson's career as an action star, which unfotunately seems to have descended into a series of forgettable B movies.

Ancient Epirus

Mediaeval Epirus

Skanderbeg, 1405-1468

On the post-World War II map, România has lost considerable territory to the Soviet Union, including what Stalin took in 1940 (now Moldova), and the territory that had been gotten from Bulgaria in 1913. Otherwise, pre-War boundaries were restored. As we have seen, Tito (a Croat), now styled "Marshall Tito," after organizing the Communist partisans against the Germans, was credited with the fighting and victory against them, although warranting neither.

As the Ottoman Empire declined in strength, and Christians in the Balkans found European allies who favored their independence, like Britain for Greece and Russia for Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria, the Balkans became the scene of one conflict after another. The Turks were not entirely out of the picture until 1913, and this still left a number of the successor states, especially Bulgaria and Serbia, not entirely happy with their shares. The Serbs also pursued a grievance against Austria-Hungary, which inspired the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand in 1914, precipitating World War I. In the end the Serbs realized their dream of "Yugoslavia," the union of all the "Southern Slavs." The dream of the Serbs, however, was not necessarily the dream of all their fellow Yugoslavs. Macedonians really spoke a dialect of Bulgarian, and would have been part of Bulgaria if the Bulgarians had had their way. Slovenia, which historically had been part of Austria, and Croatia, which historically had been part of Hungary, were divided from the Serbs by religion, Catholicism versus Serbian Orthodoxy, and history, the Latin West versus the Greek, Slavonic, and Turkish East, even though both the Serbs and Croatians really spoke the same language -- Serbo-Croatian. Bosnia-Herzegovina was a messy mixture of Serbs, Croatians, and those from both groups who had converted to ʾIslām during the long Turkish presence (the Bosniacs).

For a long time the jumble of ethnic groups in Yugoslavia didn't seem to make too much difference. A preview of the future, however, was evident when the Germans didn't have much trouble getting Croatians to kill Serbs and others in World War II. The map at right shows the boundaries the way the Germans sorted them out during the War.

Hungary, Croatia, România, and Bulgaria were all German allies. Hungary, of course, wanted Transylvania back, but this would have to be at the expense of another German ally, so Hitler compromised by giving Hungary a part (the part with the most Hungarians) of Transylvania, but then compensated România with extra territory in the Ukraine (going off the map). Bulgaria got an expanded Aegean coast and a major goal for some time, Macedonia. While Albania was occupied by Italy, it was nevertheless expanded on what would have been Albanian nationalist principles, with large pieces of Kosovo and Eprius. Banat was a Romanian speaking region of Yugoslavia which, for some reason, was made independent rather than ceded to România. The Ionian Islands were directly annexed to Italy, probably because they had belonged to Venice for some centuries. The principle of Italian irredentism in the Adriatic was that any place that had ever had an Italian name should belong to Italy.

This was accomplished through a propaganda and disinformation campaign effected by Communist agents in British (and then American) intelligence, who deceived even Winston Churchill that the non-communist guerillas, led by Draža Mihailović, were somehow allies of the Germans -- tactics we also see in contemporary China. So Tito, after murdering his enemies, got Yugoslavia put back together, broke with Stalin, helped found the "unaligned" movement in the Cold War, and for many years appeared to govern a happy and prosperous compromise between East and West -- a favorite vacation destination for Europeans.

A curious artifact of that compromise was a 1971 movie, W.R.: Mysteries of the Organism, by Serbian director Dužan Makavejev. The film promotes the psychological theories of Wilhelm Reich (1897�1957), who attributed the evils of dictatorship to sexual inhibition, whether in the case of either Nazis or Stalinists. The film also includes a somewhat more sensible take on Reich by Alexander Lowen (1910-2008), who included "bioenergetic" physical therapy with conventional psychoanalysis. We also see Reich's books burned by the United States Government in 1956. In between these parts of the movie, in English, we have a story in Serbian about a Yugoslav girl meeting a visiting Russian ice skater. She liberates his suppressed sexual drive, which unfortunately also results in him murdering her. We last seem him singing a lament for what he has done -- and we last see her, a decapitated head on an autopsy table, expressing her satisfaction with the life she has lived. Altogether, a different kind of movie, and no comfort to either Stalinists or the sexual inhibited. But in Yugoslavia we also find the international promotion of further poisonous forms of Hegelianism and Marxism.

With the Fall of Communism, however, the whole business came unglued. Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and most Bosnians wanted to go their own way. The dream of the Serbs crumbled, but their vision of destiny and grievance did not. First they moved against Croatia, either as a preemptive attack or in retaliation for the actions of the dictatorial Croatian leader, Franjo Tudjman, against resident Serbs. It is now a little hard to determine who started it; but the Serbs, tempted by military superiority, invaded in a way that looked more like conquest than humanitarianism. Later, when the Serbs were tied up in Bosnia and Croatia had built up its forces, Tudjman really did expel and massacre Serbs, but the international community was already prepared to excuse or ignore that as just retaliation. Both Serbia and Croatia, sometimes in cooperation, then turned on Bosnia, which soon became a byword for massacre and atrocities, including mass rapes, such had not been seen in the Balkans since World War II.

The Serbs, at the very least, handled their public relations very poorly. Photos of emaciated prisoners in Serbian concentration camps immediately lost them the international propaganda war. Although the Croatians and Bosniacs certainly committed some atrocities themselves, the Serbian massacres seemed larger, more blatant, and more insolent and defiant. While Tudjman might well have been prosecuted as a war criminal (he is now dead), it has mainly been the Serbs, and the former President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, who have been the targets of war crime prosecutions by the International Tribunal at the Hague. While this has not been entirely fair to the Serbs, it does not excuse them from what was indeed done. By whining about their own centuries of oppression, while slaughtering Moslems, the Serbs managed to become some of the most self-righteous war criminals within memory. Some NATO bombing, peacekeepers on the ground, arrests, and war crimes trials finally put some kind of lid on the conflict in Bosnia. But many guessed what was coming next. Because of the Croatian offensive and version of "ethnic cleansing," some Serbs then fled all the way to....Kosovo.

7. MACEDONIA

Kiro Gligorov 1991-1995,
1995-1999

Stojan Andov acting, 1995

Savo Klimovoski acting, 1999

Boris Trajkovski 1999-2004

Ljupco Jordanovski acting, 2004

Branko Crvenkovski 2004-2009

Gjorge Ivanov 2009-2019

Stevo Pendarovski 2019-2024

Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova 2024-present

Claimed by Bulgaria and seized by Serbia in the Balkan Wars, Macedonia was nevertheless allowed to leave Yugoslavia in 1991 with a minimum of hassle. Much more hassle came from Greece, which felt threatened by this tiny state using the name "Macedonia" and, apparently, identifying itself with the Macedonia of Alexander the Great. The new flag featured the "Star of Vergina," from was what originally thought to be the tomb of Philip II of Macedon (it now seems to belong to his son, Philip III). This implied Macedonian designs on northern Greece, also containing part of historic Macedonia; and indeed Macedonians did express some claims there. I even saw stickers on lampposts in New York City proclaiming "Macedonia is Greek!" What this was supposed to mean was not going to be obvious to anyone. It made it sound like Greece itself had designs on the new Republic of Macedonia. Did anyone even in New York City know, or care, what this was all about? Probably not.

7. MACEDONIA
Kiro Gligorov	1991-1995, 1995-1999
Stojan Andov	acting, 1995
Savo Klimovoski	acting, 1999
Boris Trajkovski	1999-2004
Ljupco Jordanovski	acting, 2004
Branko Crvenkovski	2004-2009
Gjorge Ivanov	2009-2019
Stevo Pendarovski	2019-2024
Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova	2024-present

As it happened, Greece initially blocked admission of Macedonia to the United Nations. The flag was modified and the country is now usually referred to as the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYRM). Bulgaria seems to have given up claims to Macedonia, but I am still not clear whether Macedonian is or is not a dialect of Bulgarian. There are ways to determine this. Otherwise, the region has simply never been anything but "Macedonia."

I have received correspondence from a couple of Greeks disputing this, contending that the territory of the FYRM was never in historic Macedonia. Well, there is going to be considerable uncertainty about all ancient boundaries, and there is no telling how far Philip II's Macedonia extended north. Chances are it was well into FYRM territory (probably the whole valley of the Vardar/Axios River). Nevertheless, for Roman Macedonia the boundaries are better known. The capital of the FYRM, Skopje (Roman Scupi), was definitely in the early Roman province of Moesia Superior (later Dacia Mediterranea). However, the boundary of Moesia was immediately south of Skopje, which itself is quite close to the northern boundary of the FYRM. One map in the Atlas of the Roman World (Tim Cornell & John Matthews, Facts on File Publications, 1982, 1988, p.75) shows the bend of the Axius (Axios/Vardar) River, with Scupi on the north bank, as the actual northern boundary of Macedonia. Other maps (pp.141, 146) show some of the bend itself in Moesia, but this still leaves most of the territory of the FYRM in Roman Macedonia. The Roman cities of Stobi (near modern Stip), Lychnidus (modern Ohrid), and Heraclea Lyncestis (near modern Bitola) were all in Roman Macedonia and in the present FYRM. There is agreement on this in the Atlas of Classical History (Richard J.A. Talbert, Routledge, 1985, 1989, p.143).

For some, Macedonian claims to Greek Macedonia may be based on the territorial integrity of the Macedonia of Philip II and on the presumed ethnic identity of the modern Macedonians with the ancient. This kind of claim cannot now be taken seriously, both because ancient boundaries are going to mean nothing in modern international law and because the modern Macedonians speak a Slavic language which certainly has nothing to do with the (albeit poorly attested) language of the ancient Macedonians.

The other basis of Macedonian claims, however, is more serious, and that concerns Macedonians living in Greece. The Greeks deny that there is any such presence; but then Greece officially denies that there are any ethnic minorities in Greece. Linguistic maps of Greece in the 19th century, like the one at right (where Macedonia is labelled "Bulgaria"), show areas of speakers of Albanian (yellow), Vlach (dark gray), Macedonian (light green), and even Turkish (red) in areas of Epirus, Macedonia, and Thessaly that are now part of Greece. The Anchor Atlas of World History, Volume II (Hermann Kinder, Werner Hilgemann, Ernest A. Menze, and Harald and Ruth Bukor, 1978) shows Macedonian speakers extending from south of Skopje (Üsküp in Turkish, in a partially Albanian speaking area, continguous with Kosovo) all the way down to Thessalonica (p.120) -- just as in the map above.

If there are no longer Macedonian speakers in the modern Greek part of this area (only acquired in 1913), then there is some explaining to do. If Greece expelled the Macedonians, suppressed their language, or got them to leave through harassment or oppressive policies, none of these are going to be admissions to the credit of Greece, or admissions likely to be made, for just such a reason. At the very least, the FYRM can reasonably ask for an accounting on this issue.

I am informed that Greeks would be happy with the FYRM simply being called "Northern Macedonia." This is a little silly and is not going to make any difference in any Macedonian claims or possible threat against Greece. A parallel situation in Europe is actually the relationship of Luxembourg to Belgium. When Belgium became independent of the Netherlands in 1830, it took with it a very large part of Luxembourg. This area of Belgium is still called "Luxembourg." I have never heard that Luxembourg, which itself became independent of the Netherlands in 1890, today makes any claims against Belgium. But even if it did, tiny Luxembourg, although with the highest per capita income in the world, would not constitute any kind of real threat.

Poor and tiny Macedonia is not going to constitute any more of a threat to Greece. If Macedonian guerillas were crossing over into Greece, this would be a matter of real concern and complaint, but I do not understand that anything of the sort has happened; and even if it did, Greece would have no difficulty knowing where to direct counter-action.

As it has happened, the problem of guerillas has troubled the FYRM itself. Albanian refugees inundated northern Macedonia in 1999, where there was already, as noted, an Albanian community. With them came armed Albanians who, having lost in battle with the Serbs, were interested in "liberating" northern Macedonia. They succeeded no better there, but for a while there was considerable danger of a wider conflict.

Meanwhile, Macedonia is the poorest of the former Yugoslav Republics, with a lower per capita income even than Albania. This puts it perilously close to being the poorest country in Europe -- though it is probably safe from that, since Moldova has a per capita income of not much over $300, while Macedonia's is more than $1500. "Room for improvement" hardly begins to tell the tale. The dispute over Macedonia's name and claims doesn't even begin to address the real problem of economic development in the FYRM and elsewhere in the Balkans.

As it happens, in 2019 Macedonia officially became "Northern Macedonia." This seems to defuse the dispute with Greece.

8. Presidents of Kosovo

Ibrahim Rugova 2002-2006

Nexhat Daci acting, 2006

Fatmir Sejdiu 2006-2010

Kosovo declares independence,
17 February 2008

Jakup Krasniqi Acting,
2010-2111

Behgjet Pacolli 2011

Jakup Krasniqi Acting,
2011

Atifete Jahjaga 2011-2016

Hashim Tha�i 2016-2020

Vjosa Osmani 2020-2021

Glauk Konjufca 2021

Vjosa Osmani 2021-present

A major part of Serbia itself since 1913, the province of Kosovo was only 10% Serb in population. Most of the rest were Albanian Moslems, who had been deprived of the autonomy they had under the old Yugoslavia and were now beginning to fight for independence through the radical Islamic "Kosova Liberation Army" (KLA). What many observers expected, then, was that the Serbs would turn the "ethnic cleansing" campaign made famous in Bosnia to the problem of too many Albanians, especially rebellious Albanians, in Kosovo. With the UN and the NATO allies already energized about Bosnia, simple defiance was not going to work for the Serbs the way it might have if action had been taken against Kosovo before all the events in Bosnia. But defiance was the approach that the Serbs took, over a land to which they emotionally claimed "historic rights," but which had mostly been occupied by others since the 17th century and had been in Serbian hands only since 1913. Although many Serbs now cite atrocities during World War II or say there was even "ethnic cleansing" against them under Tito, their claim to Kosovo is mainly as part of "historic" (i.e. 14th century) Serbia.

8. Presidents of Kosovo
Ibrahim Rugova	2002-2006
Nexhat Daci	acting, 2006
Fatmir Sejdiu	2006-2010
Kosovo declares independence, 17 February 2008
Jakup Krasniqi	Acting, 2010-2111
Behgjet Pacolli	2011
Jakup Krasniqi	Acting, 2011
Atifete Jahjaga	2011-2016
Hashim Tha�i	2016-2020
Vjosa Osmani	2020-2021
Glauk Konjufca	2021
Vjosa Osmani	2021-present

Unfortunately, in modern Europe several wars have been fought between France and Germany, Italy and Austria, Germany and Poland, etc., over many such "historic" claims. Such things made a poor rationale for dictatorial and terrorist measures, especially by an undemocratic country. When NATO decided to move against Serbian measures in Kosovo in March 1999, we ended up with the next round of the ongoing Balkans War. This time, however, the naked preference of the Russians for the Orthodox Serbs over the Moslem Albanians, and similar sentiments evidently shared by Greeks and others, left the Albanians with no local friends at all. Albania itself has been a basket case of anarchy and corruption almost the whole time since the end of Communism there. But the outcome of such a conflict was very problematic when the NATO countries would rather fight a quick, high tech war on the cheap, before body bags and anti-war sentiment upsets things at home, while the Serbs, who learned their ruthlessness from Marshal Tito, wanted nothing better than to appear as martyrs of America, even while burning villages and driving people out of Kosovo. A century of war thus ended more or less as it began, with Serbian grievance dragging others into a war, while NATO, unable to commit on the ground, ended up bombing civilian infrastructure in Serbia, contrary to international law, in a rapidly growing "total war."

In June 1999, the Serbs finally gave in, after heavy bombing of Serbia itself, and the Kosovars, driving out the remaining Serbs of Kosovo and attempting to provoke an Albanian rising in Macedonia, have behaved more or less the way the Serbs did. In February 2008 Kosovo simply declared its independence of Serbia. No one was going to allow Serbia to do anything about it, and NATO wasn't much inclined to do anything about it either, so Kosovo may just get its way by default.