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Paper 2024/1052

A New Fine Tuning Method for FHEW/TFHE Bootstrapping with IND-CPAD Security

Abstract

Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes enable computations on encrypted data, making them as a crucial component of privacy-enhancing technologies. Ducas and Micciancio introduced the FHEW scheme (Eurocrypt '15), which was further enhanced by Chillotti et al. with TFHE (Asiacrypt '17). These schemes support low-latency homomorphic evaluations of binary (or larger) gates due to their small parameter size. However, the evaluation failure probability in these schemes is highly sensitive to the choice of parameters, resulting in a limited range of viable parameters and a trade-off between failure probability and runtime. Recently, Cheon et al. proposed a key recovery attack on the FHEW/TFHE schemes based on a novel security model for FHE, known as IND-CPA$^\text{D}$ security (CCS '24). Mitigating this attack requires achieving a negligible failure probability (e.g., $2^{-64}$). However, the limited range of parameter options in FHEW/TFHE necessitates the adoption of parameter sets with unnecessarily low failure probabilities, leading to inefficient runtime. We propose a new bootstrapping method for the FHEW/TFHE shcemes that optimizes the trade-off between runtime and failure probability while maintaining ease of implementation. The proposed method allows selecting parameter sets that achieve the desired failure probabilities at various security levels, thereby maximizing runtime efficiency.