Paper 2024/833
INDIANA - Verifying (Random) Probing Security through Indistinguishability Analysis
Abstract
Despite masking being a prevalent protection against passive side-channel attacks, implementing it securely in hardware remains a manual, challenging, and error-prone process. This paper introduces INDIANA, a comprehensive security verification tool for hardware masking. It provides a hardware verification framework, enabling a complete analysis of simulation-based security in the glitch-extended probing model, with cycle-accurate estimations for leakage probabilities in the random probing model. Notably, INDIANA is the first framework to analyze arbitrary masked circuits in both models, even at the scale of full SPN cipher rounds (e.g., AES), while delivering exact verification results. To attain precise and extensive verifiability, we introduce a partitionable probing distinguisher that enables rapid verification of probe tuples, outperforming state-of-the-art methods based on statistical independence. Most interestingly, our approach inherently facilitates extensions to the random probing model by leveraging Fast Fourier-Hadamard Transformations (FFTs). Benchmark results show that INDIANA competes effectively with leading probing model verification tools, such as maskVerif and VERICA. Notably, INDIANA the first tool that is capable to provide cycle-accurate estimations of random probing leakage probabilities for large-scale masked circuits.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- INDIANASide-Channel AnalysisProbing SecurityRandom Probing SecuritySecurity Verification
- Contact author(s)
-
christof beierle @ rub de
jakob feldtkeller @ rub de
anna guinet @ rub de
tim gueneysu @ rub de
gregor leander @ rub de
jan richter-brockmann @ rub de
pascal sasdrich @ rub de - History
- 2024-05-31: approved
- 2024-05-28: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/833
- License
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CC BY-NC
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/833,
author = {Christof Beierle and Jakob Feldtkeller and Anna Guinet and Tim Güneysu and Gregor Leander and Jan Richter-Brockmann and Pascal Sasdrich},
title = {{INDIANA} - Verifying (Random) Probing Security through Indistinguishability Analysis},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/833},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/833}
}