Paper 2023/1923
Differential Fault Attack on Ascon Cipher
Abstract
This work investigates the security of the Ascon authenticated encryption scheme in the context of fault attacks, with a specific focus on Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). Motivated by the growing significance of lightweight cryptographic solutions, particularly Ascon, we explore potential vulnerabilities in its design using DFA. By employing a novel approach that combines faulty forgery in the decryption query under two distinct fault models, leveraging bit-flip faults in the first phase and bit-set faults in the second, we successfully recover the complete Ascon key. This study sheds light on the impact of key whitening in the final permutation call and discusses potential threats when this safeguard is absent. Additionally, we consider the implications of injecting multiple bit-flip faults at the S-box input, suggesting alternative strategies for compromising the state space. Our findings contribute valuable insights into the gray-box security landscape of Ascon, emphasizing the need for robust defenses to ensure the integrity and resilience of lightweight cryptographic primitives against diverse fault attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- CAESARNISTLwCAuthenticated EncryptionSide-channel AttacksDifferential Fault AttackFaulty ForgeryAscon
- Contact author(s)
- janaamit001 @ gmail com
- History
- 2023-12-18: approved
- 2023-12-17: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1923
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1923,
author = {Amit Jana},
title = {Differential Fault Attack on Ascon Cipher},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1923},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1923}
}