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Paper 2023/1697

Full Round Distinguishing and Key-Recovery Attacks on SAND-2 (Full version)

Zhuolong Zhang, School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University, Qingdao, China
Shiyao Chen, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
Wei Wang, School of Cyber Sciaence and Technology, Shandong University, Qingdao, China; Quan Cheng Laboratory, Jinan, China; Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jinan, China
Meiqin Wang, School of Cyber Sciaence and Technology, Shandong University, Qingdao, China; Quan Cheng Laboratory, Jinan, China; Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jinan, China
Abstract

This paper presents full round distinguishing and key recovery attacks on lightweight block cipher SAND-2 with 64-bit block size and 128-bit key size, which appears to be a mixture of the AND-Rotation-XOR (AND-RX) based ciphers SAND and ANT. However, the security arguments against linear and some other attacks are not fully provided. In this paper, we find that the combination of a SAND-like nibble-based round function and ANT-like bit-based permutations will cause dependencies and lead to iterative linear and differential trails with high probabilities. By exploiting these, full round distinguishing attacks on SAND-2 work with $2^{46}$ queries for linear and $2^{58.60}$ queries for differential in the single-key setting. Then, full round key recovery attacks are also mounted, which work with the time complexity $2^{48.23}$ for linear and $2^{64.10}$ for differential. It should be noted that the dependency observed in this paper only works for SAND-2 and will not threaten SAND and ANT. From the point of designers, our attacks show the risk of mixing the parts of different designs, even though each of them is well-studied to be secure.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. Inscrypt 2023
Keywords
Linear CryptanalysisDifferential CryptanalysisDistinguishing AttackKey Recovery AttackSAND-2
Contact author(s)
zhuolongzhang @ mail sdu edu cn
shiyao chen @ ntu edu sg
weiwangsdu @ sdu edu cn
mqwang @ sdu edu cn
History
2023-11-03: approved
2023-11-02: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1697
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1697,
      author = {Zhuolong Zhang and Shiyao Chen and Wei Wang and Meiqin Wang},
      title = {Full Round Distinguishing and Key-Recovery Attacks on {SAND}-2 (Full version)},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1697},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1697}
}
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