Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

What a lovely hat

Is it made out of tin foil?

Paper 2021/639

Indifferentiable Signatures: High Performance and Fallback Security

Charalampos Papamanthou, Cong Zhang, and Hong-Sheng Zhou

Abstract

Digital signatures have been widely used as building blocks for constructing complex cryptosystems. To facilitate the security analysis of a complex system, we expect the underlying building blocks to achieve desirable composability. Notably, Canetti (FOCS 2001) and then Maurer et al (TCC 2004) propose analysis frameworks, the Universal Composability framework for cryptographic protocols, and the indifferentiability framework for cryptographic objects. In this paper, we develop a “lifting strategy”, which allows us to compile multiple existing practical signature schemes using cyclic group (e.g., Schnorr, Boneh-Boyen), to achieve a very stringent security guarantee, in an idealized model of the generic (bilinear) group, without introducing much extra efficiency loss. What's more interesting is that, in our design, even the involved idealized model does not exist, our compiled construction will still be able to achieve the classical notion of unforgeability. To achieve both indifferentiability and good efficiency, we develop new techniques in generic (bilinear) group model.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s)
czhang20 @ umd edu
hszhou @ vcu edu
hongsheng zhou @ gmail com
History
2021-05-17: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/639
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/639,
      author = {Charalampos Papamanthou and Cong Zhang and Hong-Sheng Zhou},
      title = {Indifferentiable Signatures: High Performance and Fallback Security},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/639},
      year = {2021},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/639}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.