Paper 2020/603
Masking in Fine-Grained Leakage Models: Construction, Implementation and Verification
Gilles Barthe, Marc Gourjon, Benjamin Gregoire, Maximilian Orlt, Clara Paglialonga, and Lars Porth
Abstract
We propose a new approach for building efficient, provably secure, and practically hardened implementations of masked algorithms. Our approach is based on a Domain Specific Language in which users can write efficient assembly implementations and fine-grained leakage models. The latter are then used as a basis for formal verification, allowing for the first time formal guarantees for a broad range of device-specific leakage effects not addressed by prior work. The practical benefits of our approach are demonstrated through a case study of the PRESENT S-Box: we develop a highly optimized and provably secure masked implementation, and show through practical evaluation based on TVLA that our implementation is practically resilient. Our approach significantly narrows the gap between formal verification of masking and practical security.
Note: Adding further explanation and physical evaluation.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in TCHES 2021
- Keywords
- Side-channel resilienceHigher-order maskingProbing securityVerificationDomain-Specific-Languages
- Contact author(s)
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gjbarthe @ gmail com
marc gourjon @ tuhh de
clara paglialonga @ gmail com
maximilian orlt @ crisp-da de
lars porth @ stud tu-darmstadt de
benjamin gregoire @ inria fr - History
- 2021-09-07: last of 3 revisions
- 2020-05-22: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/603
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/603,
author = {Gilles Barthe and Marc Gourjon and Benjamin Gregoire and Maximilian Orlt and Clara Paglialonga and Lars Porth},
title = {Masking in Fine-Grained Leakage Models: Construction, Implementation and Verification},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/603},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/603}
}