Paper 2019/797
Don't forget your roots: constant-time root finding over $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$
Douglas Martins, Gustavo Banegas, and Ricardo Custodio
Abstract
In the last few years, post-quantum cryptography has received much attention. NIST is running a competition to select some post-quantum schemes as standard. As a consequence, implementations of post-quantum schemes have become important and with them side-channel attacks. In this paper, we show a timing attack on a code-based scheme which was submitted to the NIST competition. This timing attack recovers secret information because of a timing variance in finding roots in a polynomial. We present four algorithms to find roots that are protected against remote timing exploitation.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. Latincrypt 2019
- Keywords
- Side-channel AttackPost-quantum CryptographyCode-based CryptographyRoots findingConstant time
- Contact author(s)
- gustavo @ cryptme in
- History
- 2019-07-14: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/797
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/797,
author = {Douglas Martins and Gustavo Banegas and Ricardo Custodio},
title = {Don't forget your roots: constant-time root finding over $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/797},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/797}
}