Paper 2019/414
Two-Round Oblivious Transfer from CDH or LPN
Nico Döttling, Sanjam Garg, Mohammad Hajiabadi, Daniel Masny, and Daniel Wichs
Abstract
We show a new general approach for constructing maliciously secure two-round oblivious transfer (OT). Specifically, we provide a generic sequence of transformations to upgrade a very basic notion of two-round OT, which we call elementary OT, to UC-secure OT. We then give simple constructions of elementary OT under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption or the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption, yielding the first constructions of malicious (UC-secure) two-round OT under these assumptions. Since two-round OT is complete for two-round 2-party and multi-party computation in the malicious setting, we also achieve the first constructions of the latter under these assumptions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2020
- Keywords
- oblivious transfermultiparty computation
- Contact author(s)
- wichs @ ccs neu edu
- History
- 2020-05-06: last of 3 revisions
- 2019-04-22: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/414
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/414,
author = {Nico Döttling and Sanjam Garg and Mohammad Hajiabadi and Daniel Masny and Daniel Wichs},
title = {Two-Round Oblivious Transfer from {CDH} or {LPN}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/414},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/414}
}