Paper 2004/331
Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs and the Security of Triple Encryption
Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway
Abstract
The game-playing technique is a powerful tool for analyzing cryptographic constructions. We illustrate this by using games as the central tool for proving security of three-key triple-encryption, a long-standing open problem. Our result, which is in the ideal-cipher model, demonstrates that for DES parameters (56-bit keys and 64-bit plaintexts) an adversary's maximal advantage is small until it asks about $2^{78}$ queries. Beyond this application, we develop the foundations for game playing, formalizing a general framework for game-playing proofs and discussing techniques used within such proofs. To further exercise the game-playing framework we show how to use games to get simple proofs for the PRP/PRF Switching Lemma, the security of the basic CBC~MAC, and the chosen-plaintext-attack security of OAEP.
Note: An earlier version of this paper was entitled "The Game-Playing Technique." The current version is substantially different.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Cryptographic analysis techniques
- Contact author(s)
- mihir @ cs ucsd edu
- History
- 2008-11-29: last of 16 revisions
- 2004-11-30: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/331
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/331,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway},
title = {Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs and the Security of Triple Encryption},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/331},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/331}
}