Plan W: Difference between revisions

{{Use dmy dates|date=OctoberDecember 20132020}}

Irish-British co-operation was a controversial proposal for both sides, as most members of the Irish political establishment had been combatants in the [[Irish War of Independence]] between 1919 and 1921. However, because of the threat of German occupation and seizure of Ireland and especially the valuable Irish ports, Plan W was developed. [[Northern Ireland]] was to serve as the base of a new [[British Expeditionary Force (World War II)|British Expeditionary Force]] that would move across the [[Irish border]] to repel the invaders from any beach-head established by German [[paratrooper]]s. In addition, coordinated actions of the [[Royal Air Force]] and [[Royal Navy]] were planned to repel German air and sea invasion. According to a restricted file prepared by the [[British Army]]'s "Q" Movements Transport Control in Belfast, the British would not have crossed the border "until invited to do so by the Irish Government,"<ref>Fisk pp. 237–238.</ref> and it is not clear who would have had the operational authority over the British troops invited into the State by [[Éamon de Valera]].<ref name="ReferenceA">de Valera had agreed to the plan "wholeheartedly" although was more reluctant in private about which would be worse – a German or a British occupying force.</ref> The document added that most people in Ireland probably would have helped the British Army, but "there would have been a small disaffected element capable of considerable guerrilla activities against the British."<ref name="autogenerated1">Fisk Ppp.237-238 237–238. This is certainly true. While the IRA of the time considered de Valera and the rest of those who had accepted partition of the island as traitors, the act of extending an invitation to British troops back into the 26 counties would have emboldened them even further.</ref>

However it was not so different from de Valera's position in 1921. During the debates on the [[Anglo-Irish Treaty]] in late 1921, de Valera had submitted his ideal draft, known as "Document No.2"<ref>{{cite web|url=http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/DT/D.P.A.170001.html|title=APPENDIX 17 PROPOSED TREATY OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN IRELAND AND THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH PRESENTED BY PRESIDENT DE VALERA TO THE SECRET SESSION OF AN DÁIL|publisher=Historical-debates.oireachtas.ie|accessdate=21 February 2012|url-status=dead|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20120218222359/http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/DT/D.P.A.170001.html|archivedate=18 February 2012|df=dmy-all}}</ref> which included:

After the [[German invasion of Belgium|invasion of Belgium]] and [[Battle of the Netherlands|the Netherlands]], the British were convinced that an invasion of Ireland would come from the air, via [[paratrooper]]s. They were not satisfied with the Irish government's defence capability, particularly against airborne troops. The topic of reoccupying the 26 counties of Ireland had been a matter of political conversation in Britain since the beginning of the war. In June 1940, [[Malcolm MacDonald]] offered to "give back" the six counties comprising [[Northern Ireland]] – an offer of [[Irish reunification|Irish unity]] – if Ireland would join with the Allies, but the offer was not taken seriously. The same month Major General [[Bernard Montgomery|Bernard "Monty" Montgomery]] was busy planning the seizure<ref>See [[Robert Fisk]]'s ''In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality, 1939–1945'' (1996). London: Gill & Macmillan. {{ISBN|0-7171-2411-8}} — (1st ed. was 1983) Pp. 241. Cobh was to be attacked by the [[British 3rd Infantry Division]] so that the [[Cork Harbour]] could be used as a naval base for the anti-submarine war in the Atlantic, the plan was eventually dropped as one division was not considered enough of a force to reoccupy this part of the State.</ref> of what he referred to as "Cork and Queenstown ([[Cobh]]) in [[Southern Ireland (1921–22)|Southern Ireland]]" ''(sic)''. [[Winston Churchill]] was to also refer to the "... most heavy and grievous burden placed upon Britain by the Royal Navy's exclusion from the three [[Treaty ports (Ireland)|Treaty Ports]] [in Ireland]."<ref name="fisk242">Fisk p. 242</ref> ''[[The Economist]]'' reported that Britain should seize the ports if they become "a matter of life and death".<ref name="fisk242"/> The remarks were made in the face of mounting losses in the [[Battle of the Atlantic]].