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The problem of induction is often called Hume's problem. [[David Hume]] studied how human beings obtain new knowledge that goes beyond known laws and observations, including how we can discover new laws. He understood that deductive logic could not explain this learning process and argued in favour of a mental or psychological process of learning that would not require deductive logic. He even argued that this learning process cannot be justified by any general rules, deductive or not.{{sfn|Thornton|2007}} Popper accepted Hume's argument and therefore viewed progress in science as the result of quasi-induction, which does the same as induction, but has no inference rules to justify it.{{sfn|Popper|1959|loc=Sec. 85}}{{sfn|Watkins|1984|loc=Sec. 7.2}} [[Philip Johnson-Laird|Philip N. Johnson-Laird]], professor of psychology, also accepted Hume's conclusion that induction has no justification. For him induction does not require justification and therefore can exist in the same manner as Popper's quasi-induction does.{{sfn|Johnson-Laird|2006|loc=Chap. 13}}
The problem of induction is often called Hume's problem. [[David Hume]] studied how human beings obtain new knowledge that goes beyond known laws and observations, including how we can discover new laws. He understood that deductive logic could not explain this learning process and argued in favour of a mental or psychological process of learning that would not require deductive logic. He even argued that this learning process cannot be justified by any general rules, deductive or not.{{sfn|Thornton|2007}} Popper accepted Hume's argument and therefore viewed progress in science as the result of quasi-induction, which does the same as induction, but has no inference rules to justify it.{{sfn|Popper|1959|loc=Sec. 85}}{{sfn|Watkins|1984|loc=Sec. 7.2}} [[Philip Johnson-Laird|Philip N. Johnson-Laird]], professor of psychology, also accepted Hume's conclusion that induction has no justification. For him induction does not require justification and therefore can exist in the same manner as Popper's quasi-induction does.{{sfn|Johnson-Laird|2006|loc=Chap. 13}}


When Johnson-Laird says that no justification is needed, he does not refer to a general inductive method of justification that, to avoid a circular reasoning, would not itself require any justification<!-- as is hoped for in sophisticated falsificationism (see {{section link|Falsifiability|Sophisticated falsificationism: a natural search for a method of justification}})-->. On the contrary, in agreement with Hume, he means that there is no general method of justification for induction and that's ok, because the induction steps do not require justification.{{sfn|Johnson-Laird|2006|loc=Chap. 13}} Instead, these steps use [[Inductive reasoning|patterns of induction]], which are not expected to have a general justification: they may or may not be applicable depending on the background knowledge. Johnson-Laird wrote: "[P]hilosophers have worried about which properties of objects warrant inductive inferences. The answer rests on knowledge: we don't infer that all the passengers on a plane are male because the first ten off the plane are men. We know that this observation doesn't rule out the possibility of a woman passenger."{{sfn|Johnson-Laird|2006|loc=Chap. 13}} The reasoning pattern that was not applied here is [[Inductive reasoning#Enumerative induction|enumerative induction]].
When Johnson-Laird says that no justification is needed, he does not refer to a general method of justification that, to avoid a circular reasoning, would not itself require any justification<!-- as is hoped for in sophisticated falsificationism (see {{section link|Falsifiability|Sophisticated falsificationism: a natural search for a method of justification}})-->. On the contrary, in agreement with Hume, he means that there is no general method of justification for induction and that's ok, because the induction steps do not require justification.{{sfn|Johnson-Laird|2006|loc=Chap. 13}} Instead, these steps use [[Inductive reasoning|patterns of induction]], which are not expected to have a general justification: they may or may not be applicable depending on the background knowledge. Johnson-Laird wrote: "[P]hilosophers have worried about which properties of objects warrant inductive inferences. The answer rests on knowledge: we don't infer that all the passengers on a plane are male because the first ten off the plane are men. We know that this observation doesn't rule out the possibility of a woman passenger."{{sfn|Johnson-Laird|2006|loc=Chap. 13}} The reasoning pattern that was not applied here is [[Inductive reasoning#Enumerative induction|enumerative induction]].


Popper was interested in the overall learning process in science, to quasi-induction, which he also called the "path of science".{{sfn|Popper|1959|loc=Sec. 85}} However, Popper did not show much interest in these reasoning patterns, which he globally referred to as psychologism.{{sfn|Popper|1959|loc=Sec 2}} He did not deny the possibility of some kind of psychological explanation for the learning process, especially when psychology is seen as an extension of biology, but he felt that these biological explanations were not within the scope of epistemology.<ref group="upper-alpha" name="Popperpsychologyshouldbebiology"/><ref group="upper-alpha" name="Popperepistemologywithoutbiology"/> Popper proposed an evolutionary mechanism to explain the success of science,{{sfn|Popper|1972|loc=App. 1.III}} which is much in line with Johnson-Laird's view that "induction is just something that animals, including human beings, do to make life possible",{{sfn|Johnson-Laird|2006|loc=Chap. 13}} but Popper did not consider it a part of his epistemology.{{sfn|Popper|1972|loc=App. 1.II}} He wrote that his interest was mainly in the ''logic'' of science and that epistemology should be concerned with logical aspects only.<ref group="upper-alpha" name="Popperagainstpsichologism"/> Instead of asking why science succeeds he considered the pragmatic problem of induction.{{sfn|Popper|1972|loc=Sec. 1.9}} This problem is not how to justify a theory or what is the global mechanism for the success of science but only what methodology do we use to pick one theory among theories that are already conjectured. His methodological answer to the latter question is that we pick the theory that is the most tested with the available technology: "the one, which in the light of our ''critical discussion'', appears to be the best so far".{{sfn|Popper|1972|loc=Sec. 1.9}} By his own account, because only a negative approach was supported by logic, Popper adopted a negative methodology.<ref name="Popperabouthisnegativemethodology" group="upper-alpha">{{harvnb|Popper|1972|loc=Sec. 1.8}}: "The fundamental difference between my approach and the approach for which I long ago introduced the label 'inductivist' is that I lay stress on negative arguments, such as negative instances or counter-examples, refutations, and attempted refutations—in short, criticism".</ref> The purpose of his methodology is to prevent "the policy of immunizing our theories against refutation". It also supports some "dogmatic attitude" in defending theories against criticism, because this allows the process to be more complete.{{sfn|Popper|1972|p=30}} This negative view of science was much criticized and not only by Johnson-Laird.
Popper was interested in the overall learning process in science, to quasi-induction, which he also called the "path of science".{{sfn|Popper|1959|loc=Sec. 85}} However, Popper did not show much interest in these reasoning patterns, which he globally referred to as psychologism.{{sfn|Popper|1959|loc=Sec 2}} He did not deny the possibility of some kind of psychological explanation for the learning process, especially when psychology is seen as an extension of biology, but he felt that these biological explanations were not within the scope of epistemology.<ref group="upper-alpha" name="Popperpsychologyshouldbebiology"/><ref group="upper-alpha" name="Popperepistemologywithoutbiology"/> Popper proposed an evolutionary mechanism to explain the success of science,{{sfn|Popper|1972|loc=App. 1.III}} which is much in line with Johnson-Laird's view that "induction is just something that animals, including human beings, do to make life possible",{{sfn|Johnson-Laird|2006|loc=Chap. 13}} but Popper did not consider it a part of his epistemology.{{sfn|Popper|1972|loc=App. 1.II}} He wrote that his interest was mainly in the ''logic'' of science and that epistemology should be concerned with logical aspects only.<ref group="upper-alpha" name="Popperagainstpsichologism"/> Instead of asking why science succeeds he considered the pragmatic problem of induction.{{sfn|Popper|1972|loc=Sec. 1.9}} This problem is not how to justify a theory or what is the global mechanism for the success of science but only what methodology do we use to pick one theory among theories that are already conjectured. His methodological answer to the latter question is that we pick the theory that is the most tested with the available technology: "the one, which in the light of our ''critical discussion'', appears to be the best so far".{{sfn|Popper|1972|loc=Sec. 1.9}} By his own account, because only a negative approach was supported by logic, Popper adopted a negative methodology.<ref name="Popperabouthisnegativemethodology" group="upper-alpha">{{harvnb|Popper|1972|loc=Sec. 1.8}}: "The fundamental difference between my approach and the approach for which I long ago introduced the label 'inductivist' is that I lay stress on negative arguments, such as negative instances or counter-examples, refutations, and attempted refutations—in short, criticism".</ref> The purpose of his methodology is to prevent "the policy of immunizing our theories against refutation". It also supports some "dogmatic attitude" in defending theories against criticism, because this allows the process to be more complete.{{sfn|Popper|1972|p=30}} This negative view of science was much criticized and not only by Johnson-Laird.
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