Talk:Battle of Ia Drang

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The article says "Both sides routinely exaggerated the number of casualties inflicted on the other, and figures vary considerably depending on source" And then states that the Vietnamese claims 1500-1700 US causalities and 1,228 (559 killed and 669 wounded) own causalities. This seems to be an american exaggeration about the vietnamese claims. According to Vietnamese wikipedia there was: 208 killed and 146 wounded on the Vietnamese side 234 killed and 245 wounded on the US side

The figure of 559 killed and 669 wounded Vietnamese is the figures from the South Vietnamese Liberation army for the whole La Drang campaign according to Vietnamese wikipedia

This unsigned "contribution" is placed in the wrong place. It should be at the bottom of the Talk page and is not signed at all. Please follow Wikipedia conventions when adding to any page. The casualties figures are bound to be exaggerated, especially Vietnamese Wikipedia. Viet Nam is hardly a democratic country. Wikipedia should not be used as a reliable source, unless backed-up with reliable, secondary, sources. David J Johnson (talk) 18:47, 2 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@Dino nam: Your tags you inserted here [2][3][4][5] are bogus since the sources provided are verifiable and there is no synthesis. Tnguyen4321 (talk) 22:23, 21 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

There is no synthesis because each fact is independent and backed up by verifiable source.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 12:49, 22 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

An example of bogus synthesis tagging.

At 18:50 hours, General Kinnard discussed with Gen Larsen the possibility of having a B-52 strike at the area of LZ X-Ray. At 21:00 hours: 1st Air Cavalry selected coordinates for B-52 strike in Code – YA 870000, YA 830000, YA 830070, YA 870070 with alternative targets (in Code) YA 8607, YA 9007, YA 9000, YA 8600.[59][improper synthesis?]

Direct quote from source G3 Journal/IFFV:

November 14, 1965

- 18:50H: 1st Air Cav Div (Lt Col Buham) Gen Kinnard discussed with Gen Larsen the possibility of having a B-52 strike in the Long Reach area “X” Gen Larsen was in favor of this.

- 21:00H: 1st Air Cav (Capt Parham) Coord for B-52 strike in Code – YA 870000, YA 830000, YA 830070, YA 870070.

- 21:00H: 1st Air Cav (Capt Parham) Alt Target for B-52 strikes (in Code) YA 8607, YA 9007, YA 9000, YA 8600. Target area approved by Col Barrow and Col McCord.

End quote. Tnguyen4321 (talk) 14:38, 23 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

@Tnguyen4321:

• About citation #59, may be that's a mistake of mine and you can remove it.
• About [6][7][8][9], it's quite surprising when you can call the tags "bogus", after some kind of sources that talks about something happened hundreds of miles away from Ia Drang at an unknown time, yet are still cited by you as something happened at the battle like Meylan, page 9 and 23. Dino nam (talk) 17:56, 24 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

• Glad that you admit it was a mistake. I have removed it, although I would prefer that you should have reverted it yourself upon seeing it was your mistake.
• You might want to read the given references more carefully: it's about the 5 consecutive day B-52 airstrike at Ia Drang in support of Operation Silver Bayonet. These airstrikes were all located within less than 12 kilometers from LZ X-Ray. (see B-52 strike on NVA troop positions, November 15–20 map: the length of the side of each square is equivalent to 1km).Tnguyen4321 (talk) 23:39, 24 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Note: you might be befuddled by the mention of Binh Duong Province - that was "hundreds of miles away from Ia Drang" (Scheduled strikes in Binh Duong Province were deferred) in the context.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 00:13, 25 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

The issue of bogus tagging stems from the fact you are looking for "verbatim quote" - which by the way is prohibited by Wiki because it infringes on copyright - instead of being content with paraphrasing.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 12:42, 25 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

@Tnguyen4321:

• I've never required any "verbatim quote" on the article. I just require some here, on this talk page in order to verify the info. After we've reached consensus on that, you can write whatever you want.
• The combination of Melyan, p. 9 and p. 23 itself is a WP:SYNTH. In fact, it's also a wrong SYNTH. Let's see Meylan p. 9: "When I a request was initiated, approval for the strike, MACV said, would be expedited to allow a TOT not later than 24 hours after the initial message was transmitted." So there's nothing called "reduction" here; 24 hours was just the time limit for an air strike to come, and 14 hours 57 minutes (not 17 minutes) was a very normal duration, as it was less than the 24 hour limit.
• I've just said you can remove the tag on the #59 citation, not all the tags. Dino nam (talk) 15:51, 28 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

• You read wrong: the normal time required was 24h, at Ia Drang the time was 14 hours and 57 minutes. That's a reduction. I don't see any synthesis here.
• Do I really need your permission to revert your wrong edits?Tnguyen4321 (talk) 16:03, 28 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

@RDCullen: You recently replaced "air assaulted" with "air lifted". Can you clarify and justify your choice of words?Tnguyen4321 (talk) 12:33, 8 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]

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I've removed the following statement from the Background section...
These coordinates in military terminology indicates the three regiments were located in their respective assembly areas that were each in less than one kilometer-square,<ref>Note:4-digit coordinate is equivalent to 1 km-sq; 6-digit coordinate to 100 m-sq</ref> which constituted suitable targets for B-52 airstrike.<ref>Melyan, page 56</ref>
It seems dubious to me on a number of counts...
1. If you check the Meylan ref, it says that the neither the "narrow limits" nor the total target area should be less than a kilometre. The above statement specifically says that all three assembly areas were less than 1km sq, and the note shows that 2 of the 3 coords given in the preceding sentence were only 100m sq.
2. The embedded note is not sourced.
3. The information in this sentence is generic, and not specific to the battle.
Happy to discuss. FactotEm (talk) 10:42, 29 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

1. Meylan just states that a target for B-52 strike must be at least 1 km-sq. 66th Regiment size is about 1 km-sq; 32nd and 33rd Regiment sizes are about 100 m-sq, which are less than 1 km-sq. They became suitable for B-52 strikes.

2. 66th center mass vic 9104; 32nd YA 820070; 33rd YA940010 (Source:Kinnard, Pleiku Campaign page 76)

3. The info in this sentence is not generic; it's specific to the battle plan on November 10, 1965.

Btw you should discuss first and get consensus prior to remove, not the other way around.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 16:41, 2 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Hi. Tnguyen4321. I don't understand. "At least 1km sq" means no smaller than, which 100m sq patently is. My point about the info being generic is that the statement did not demonstrate any relationship to the subject of this article, a battle which began on November 14. Factotem (talk) 17:46, 2 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

When it was determined that the 3 NVA regiments were concentrated enough and became available targets for B-52 strike on Nov 10, the 1/7 Air Cav Bn was ordered to go in LZ X-Ray to fix the targets on Nov 14, allowing the B-52s to strike on Nov 15 at 1600H. BG Knowles states that the Air Cav troops were sent in LZ X-Ray "to grab the tiger by the tail' then were moved to LZ Albany "to grab the tiger by the tail from another direction" (see http://www.generalhieu.com/lzxray_knowles-2.htm).Tnguyen4321 (talk) 01:12, 3 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I don't see anything in that source that says the 1/7 was ordered to X-Ray "to fix the targets". On page 3 we're told that the primary mission was "Find the enemy and go after him", and on page 4 we're told that the "...object of the exercise is to find the enemy...". Neither of these mention fixing the enemy in place for the B-52s. The B-52s are mentioned twice, once on page 4, saying that B-52 strikes were laid on to support Hal Moore's battalion, and then on page 6, to say that delayed-fuse bombs dropped by B-52s that had aborted a strike in another area prevented the Americans from taking the high ground. Also, Knowles does not say the AirCav was sent to X-Ray to grab the tiger's tail, he simply says that they had the tiger by the tail once the battle had started. Factotem (talk) 09:59, 3 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Knowles said that the Air Cav troops were sent to LZ Albany "to grab the tiger by its tail". What for? To hold it, to fix it in order to hit him, right? But hit him with what, with other Air Cav elements? No, with B-52 strikes. Prior to this phase, the 1/7 Air Cav Bn was officially sent in LZ X-Ray. Was it to find and destroy the enemy? Not really, since after finding the enemy, the 1/7 withdrew and did not stay to destroy the enemy along with the 2/7 and the 2/5. Hit the tiger was left to the B-52 strikes. Furthermore, these two reinforced battalions, after replacing the 1/7, did not go after the enemy. They rather went to LZ Albany "to grade the tiger by its tail from another direction" and allowed the B-52's to hit the enemy instead.

Knowles did not say sent, not in the source you provided. Factotem (talk) 10:22, 6 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Actually, Larsen ordered Knowles to send air cav troops into LZ X-Ray.

“By this time Field Force Vietnam had asked the division to consider moving this operations east of Pleime.” (Kinnard, Pleiku Campaigne, p.67)

“The movement and shift in emphasis from west to east was to further stimulate a forthcoming decision from the NVA division headquarters.” (idem, p. 73)

“With American units seemingly withdrawing to the east of Pleime, the decision was to attempt to regain its early advantage with an attack. The target once again was the Pleime CIDG Camp. The division headquarters set the date for attack at 16 November, and issued orders to its three regiments.” (idem, p. 76) Tnguyen4321 (talk) 13:57, 6 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

And again, none of these do anything to prove that the purpose of the Air Cav actions at X-Ray and Albany were to fix targets for B-52 strikes. To get back to the original question, the text stated that the NVA regiments were in areas of less than 1km sq, while the source states that B-52 target areas should not be less than 1km sq. Factotem (talk) 15:53, 6 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

The 2nd quotation says that "the movement and shift in emphasis from west to east (meaning toward LZ X-Ray) was to further stimulate a forthcoming decision from the NVA division headquarters". It was a diversionary tactic to entice NVA B3 Field Front Command to commence staging for an attack, and in so doing, gather the troops in their respective assembly areas. The three troop concentration was dense enough to become available targets for B-52 strike. "Distract", "fix", "grab by the tail" are equivalent. Tnguyen4321 (talk) 20:28, 6 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

The second quote says nothing about B-52s. You keep doing this Tnguyen4321. You provide a source, all too often a primary source, then add your own explanation as to why that source proves an assertion. Do you not see that the need to add such an explanation only proves that the source, which must directly support the assertion, does not? Factotem (talk) 10:35, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I don't add my own explanation. I just paraphrase the content of the source. In this instance, the switch of the operational direction from west to east was to lure the NVA into switching from a defensive (scattered) posture to an offensive posture (concentrated). What for? To make the positions of the NVA troops "strikeable"(available) for B-52s. I don't think it is wise to look for a verbatim match.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 12:19, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

You've just done it again. The full text of the source you cited, Kinnard p. 73, is There was little or no change in the situation as the transition between brigades continued. The movement and shift in emphasis from west to east was to further stimulate a forthcoming decision from the A-V-N division headquarters, plus some irrelevant numbers. Nowhere in that source does it say that it was "to lure the NVA" into anything, and nowhere does it answer the question "What for?" Your answer, "To make the positions of the NVA troops ... available for B-52s" is your answer, not some information provided in the source. And yes, when it comes to primary sources, we look for verbatim matches, because to do otherwise is to introduce WP:OR, which is, I believe, what you are demonstrating here. I'm sorry, but if the whole purpose of the Air Cav's action at LZ X-Ray and LZ Albany is to fix targets for B-52 strikes, why is it so difficult to find a secondary source that says this explicitly? Factotem (talk) 13:01, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Re paraphrase and verbatim quote, I was slapped by an admin for copyright infringement for sticking to verbatim quotes.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 15:41, 8 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Because the use of Arclight was highly classified in its early stage around that time at Ia Drang. Furthermore Westmoreland had to hide it from the State Department in order to execute it at Ia Drang. See The Use of B-52 Strike in Ia Drang Campaign General Westmoreland’s Best Kept Military Secret http://www.generalhieu.com/iadrang_westmoreland_best_kept_secret-2.htm .

Did you write that page? Factotem (talk) 17:38, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Yes. You can see that I have done an extensive research and study on Ia Drang with more than 60 articles produced.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 15:34, 8 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Impressive, but looks suspiciously like WP:OR to me. Has any other historian published this theory? Factotem (talk) 16:22, 8 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

How could they? They did not know it exists. Last year I sat on a panel on the topics of air war over South Vietnam(http://www.generalhieu.com/iadrang_air_war-2.htm) next to an expert on arclight. I asked his thought about arclight at Ia Drang. His answer was, I have no idea. I need to go back to my notes (http://www.navyhistory.org/2015/10/violent-skies-symposium-recap/ ).Tnguyen4321 (talk) 20:28, 8 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

If you are the only person who is publishing this theory, then your attempts to insert it into this article are violations of WP:OR. Do you not see that? I wish you would, because I do get the impression that you are extremely knowledgeable on this subject, and could bring a lot of value to Wikipedia. But you have to, you absolutely have to do it within the constraints of Wikipedia policy. We all do. It's not a forum for you to promote your theory, it's a tertiary source that can only be itself sourced from reliable, published, secondary sources. What do I have to do to help you understand this? Factotem (talk) 21:02, 8 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I do not attempt to insert original work into this article. I only insert facts that can be verified by primary sources. I do not mind section that you deem to be OR be removed. I do request though that facts duly sourced be respected. I am keenly aware that theory can be discussed in Talk Page. Tnguyen4321 (talk) 21:26, 8 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

The use of B-52 strike as main force and ACD as as supportive force was describe in Intelligence Aspect of Pleime/Chupong Campaign http://www.generalhieu.com/pleime_intel_J2-2.htm

Tnguyen4321 (talk) 17:21, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Page number? Factotem (talk) 17:38, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I encourage you to read the whole document as to see the whole forest instead of being bogged down with the focus on a couple of trees.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 15:36, 8 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry. Spent enough time arguing in circles. I did read page 5, "Concept of the operations". It makes no mention whatsoever of the AirCav being used as a supporting force to fix targets for B-52 strikes. I also read page 56, which explicitly states that the B-52 strikes were made "in support of this operation", and not the other way around. Factotem (talk) 16:22, 8 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Agreed, we have spent enough time arguing in circles. With all due respect I have to state that I might have more knowledge than you on the subject for spending 18 years plus on the subject. Let's call it quit and come back after you have done a more in depth study.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 16:35, 8 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Fair enough. In the meantime I would recommend to you WP:OR and WP:V, with which, I get the impression from our interactions, you are not so familiar. Factotem (talk) 18:49, 8 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I am quite familiar with those notions for spending endless and fruitless time war editing with Dino nam.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 20:17, 8 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

"to further stimulate" means "to lure", "to entice" using a diversionary maneuver. The NVA falled into the trap in deciding to commence staging for the second attack of Pleime camp.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 16:35, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

To lure, no. To entice, doubtful. If we're going to get into definitions then stimulate means to arouse or prompt. This is a dead-end, though, because the source says only "stimulate a forthcoming decision". It does not say what that decision was, and it's not for us, on Wikipedia, to make assumptions about what it was. Factotem (talk) 16:55, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

That decision was to prompt the NVA B3 Command to commence staging the second attack of Pleime Camp. Staging requires assembling and setting a D-Day.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 17:40, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

The expression "grab the tiger by its tail" was not Knowles. It was a tactics called "kiềm vĩ kích thủ" (hold tail kick head) designed by ARVN II Corps for the Long Reach operation to destroy the three NVA regiments by using B-52 strike with the help of the Air Cavalry troops. Tnguyen4321 (talk) 00:38, 6 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Sources? Factotem (talk) 10:22, 6 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Do you read Vietnamese? http://www.generalhieu.com/pleime_sach.htm, in particular p.105 and on. Tnguyen4321 (talk) 13:57, 6 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

No, you have the advantage of me there, and your English is impressive. Even if that book was in English, though, you are trying to make a specific point, and I would ask that you at least point to the specific page and paragraph, if not sentence, that proves it. Factotem (talk) 15:53, 6 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Page 101, 1st paragraph before the (*): Vì vậy quyết định phải tổ chức truy kích địch.... (Long Reach)?

Translation: “Therefore the decision to organize an enemy pursuit of II Corps Command, in which 1st Air Cavalry Division is the main effort and ARVN Airborne Group is the reserved force ready to intervene when necessary, was wholeheartedly accepted by the entire division, because rarely an unit got the chance to open its first history pages with a trường chinh (Long Reach) operation.”Tnguyen4321 (talk) 20:12, 6 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Another removal...
Around 17:00, elements of 1/9 Cav Squadron went into the B-52 airstrike target area to evaluate the results of the strike.<ref name="G3 Journal/IFFV, November 15 entry">G3 Journal/IFFV, November 15 entry</ref>
&
At 18:00, Gen. Kinnard made a request for a second B-52 strike and was advised that Gen. Vinh Loc made a similar request for the same area.<ref name="G3 Journal/IFFV, November 15 entry"/>
The source for the first sentence actually says that 1/9th went in that afternoon, but doesn't give a time, and nowhere does it say why.
There is nothing at all in the source to support the second sentence. FactotEm (talk) 12:00, 29 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Journal: "November 15, 1965

- 06:00H: MACV Capt McCabe – Ref Arclight tgt, TOT is 151600H.

-18:15H: FFV Adv (Maj Boyle) Passed fm 1 Cav (Gen Kinnard): Elements of 1/9 Cav Sqdn went into the airstrike (arclite) target area this afternoon."

The B-52s struck at 1600H. What do you think the 1/9 Cav Sqdn entered the arclite area that afternoon (after 1600H, aka 1700H; action reported in the Journal at 18:15H) for?Tnguyen4321 (talk) 01:23, 3 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I do not know. The source says only that they went into the area and gives no reason why. The Journal cited is a primary source, and the policy says specifically that we are not to "analyze, evaluate, interpret, or synthesize material found in a primary source yourself; instead, refer to reliable secondary sources that do so." Factotem (talk) 09:59, 3 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

In the Journal, you can see that each B-52 strike was followed by an "exploitation operation" to assess the result of the strike. For example: Nov 16

"- 07:15H: To: 1st Air Cav (Capt Brady) Question: If second B-52 strike approved does Cav plan to exploit? ";

"- 08:30H: 1st Cav (Maj Anderson) 1. What are plans for Exploitation of yesterday’s strike?";

"- 09:15H: 1st Cav (Maj Anderson) Ref: exploitation of Arclight Tgt. Commander on the ground had plans to send in 1st Cav however at present all units are engaged. When En vic Points X Ray and Lime are defeated. 1/9 will make recon of area." Tnguyen4321 (talk) 13:57, 6 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Westmoreland approved<ref>G3/IFFV, 10/27 entry</ref> the II Corps' request of having the 1st Air Cavalry Division assume the execution of Operation Long Reach, with the purpose of luring the three NVA regiments into concentrating in assembly areas in Chu Pong and becoming available targets for B-52 airstrikes.<ref>Kinnard, page 67, 73, 76</ref>
I've removed the above on the following grounds...
1. G3/IFFV is in chronological order, and its use in other refs provided in this article is accompanied by the date and time. Here, however, we are given only "10/27", making the source impossible to locate.
2. The Kinnard ref does not support any of the preceding statement. FactotEm (talk) 13:59, 29 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

1. October 27 entry: "- 12:30H: Fm Capt Reich, II Corps (w/Gen Larsen): Gen's Larsen, Kinnard and Knowles, and Col Mataxis are now meeting with Gen Vinh Loc to work out extension or modification of present 1st Air Cav Div TAOR vic Plei Me to comply with MACV oral instructions to develop a big TAOR centered around Plei Me to find, fix and destroy the VC in that area. Gen Larsen called Gen Collins requesting MACV touch base with JGS so similar VN instructions can be passed to Gen Vinh Loc. 1st Cav has elements on ground vic Plei Me that are searching around the western side of the camp moving south. Opn being supported by mortars positioned 4K's due south of camp. ARVN is operating from 360 degrees to 270 degrees around camp at a radius of 3K's. Support being provided by tanks. However, the terrain is limiting this support. Gen Larsen told Gen Kinnard to stop the Tuy Hoa opn for evaluation ref COMUSMACV's order. Gen Vinh Loc plans to extract the 2 Abn Ranger Co's from Plei Me. (Passed to G3)"

Note: MACV, COMUSMACV point to Westmoreland.

2. Kinnard laid out the diversionary tactic enticing the NVA B3 Command in gathering its three regiments in assembly areas to become available targets for B-52 strikes. Tnguyen4321 (talk) 03:06, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Primary sources both. In the first, Westmoreland does not approve anything. The closest it gets to even implying Westmoreland's involvement is "MACV oral instructions to develop a big TAOR...to find, fix and destroy the VC..." (VC, not NVA) and an order to stop the Tuy Hoa operation. In the second, Kinnard does no such thing. pp. 67 and 73 simply report intelligence summaries of NVA movements, with the only statement of American intent being "...to further stimulate a forthcoming decision from the AVN division headquarters", while p. 76 is entirely about the NVA plans. Neither source makes any mention of B-52s. Have you seen WP:PRIMARY? Factotem (talk) 10:35, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Re: Westmoreland does not approve anything, see: "October 26-27 marked the turning point in the division’s operation at Plei Me. On the 26th, General Wiilliam C. Westmorelad, Commanding General, US Forces, Vietnam, visited the Brigade Forward command post at Homecoming. (…) In the conference between General Westmoreland and division officers the theme was expounded that US Forces must now do more that merely contain the enemy; he must be sought out aggressively and destroyed."(Kinnard, Pleiku Campaign, p. 28)

No. I saw G3/IFFV, 10/27 entry, which was sited as the source for the assertion that "Westmoreland approved", but gave no date and time, therefore making the source impossible to locate. Factotem (talk) 14:30, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

How about the following: "On the afternoon of the 26th, Generals Westmoreland, Larsen, Kinnard, and Knowles met for a conference at the 1st Brigade’s command post, at LZ Homecoming. […] In the conference between Westmoreland and the division officers, Kinnard hammered on the theme that U.S. forces must now do more than merely contain the enemy or simply reinforce the ARVN. The NVA, he felt, must be sought out aggressively and destroyed. Of course, as far as Westy was concerned, Kinnard was singing to the choir; Westmoreland long had yearned for the opportunity to go on the offensive. Kinnard and Knowles also spent considerable time at the conference explaining to Westmoreland and Larsen exactly what the division could do and how well it could do it. Westmoreland eventually turned to Larsen and said: “Give Kinnard his head.” "(Coleman, page 99)

That's a fine source for an assertion that the Americans intended to go onto the offensive. It does not support any assertion relating to how they intended to go about it. Does that source go on to explain this? Factotem (talk) 16:43, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Westmoreland acquiesced to II Corps's request of having 1ACD assisting of executing Long Reach Operation. A "jumping command post" (see Knowles' narrative of LZ battle) was established next to II Corps hdqts to control AC troops and logistics. II Corps was in charge of operation concept and intelligence.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 15:50, 8 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

You don't seem to read right the three quotations of p.67, p.73 and p.76. It just show that 1st ACD was able to lure B3 Command to concentrate their troops into available targets for arclight.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 12:42, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Then help me out, please. Paste here the statements from those pages that explicitly support those assertions. That's a primary source, so the statements must speak for themselves. If you have to explain why those statements support those assertions, it means they don't. Factotem (talk) 14:30, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I already paste the statements from those three pages. See above. Here again:

“By this time Field Force Vietnam had asked the division to consider moving this operations east of Pleime.” (Kinnard, Pleiku Campaigne, p.67)

“The movement and shift in emphasis from west to east was to further stimulate a forthcoming decision from the NVA division headquarters.” (idem, p. 73)

“With American units seemingly withdrawing to the east of Pleime, the decision was to attempt to regain its early advantage with an attack. The target once again was the Pleime CIDG Camp. The division headquarters set the date for attack at 16 November, and issued orders to its three regiments.” (idem, p. 76)Tnguyen4321 (talk) 16:40, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

And none of them support the assertion of "with the purpose of luring the three NVA regiments into concentrating in assembly areas in Chu Pong and becoming available targets for B-52 airstrikes." Factotem (talk) 16:57, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

You don't seem to know that the 1st Air Cav Brigade conducted the All the Way operation with the mission to herd the two NVA 32nd and 33rd back to Chu Pong from 10/27 to 11/9 with the result of each of the three regiments became available target for B-52 strike (at least XX,YY precision); the 3rd Air Cav Brigade conducted the Silver Bayonet I operation with the mission of stimulating NVA B3 to gather from 11/10 to 11/13 in assembly reas and to "grab the tiger by its tail" on Nov 14 to accommodate the slow reaction of B-52s which found the enemy troops immobile and struck them with the first waves on Nov 15. The 2nd Air Cav Brigade conducted the Silver Bayonet II with the mission of "grabing the tiger by it tail from another direction" from Nov 18 to Nov 26.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 21:28, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Last para in section "Three-pronged attack"...
At 09:30, Col. Brown, the commander of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), landed at LZ X-Ray to make preparation to withdraw the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, deeming its job of drawing the attention of the enemy away from attacking the Plei Me camp<ref>Nguyen Huu An, page 32</ref> done.<ref name="Moore, page 202">Moore, page 202</ref> He intended to establish a 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade forward command post in order to take over the command of the battlefield with the presence of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry on the ground at LZ X-Ray. When Moore refused to relinquish the command of his battalion, Brown contented to notify him before leaving that the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry would be withdrawn the next day.<ref name="Moore, page 202">Moore, page 202</ref>
I've left it in for now, but the whole para is dubious...
1. It states that Col. Brown had deemed 1/7's job was to draw enemy attention away from the Plei Me camp, but sources the statement to the enemy commander. Anyone else find this odd?

The source pertains to "the decision of postponing the attack" as stated by Nguyen Huu An. "Deeming its job (of distracting the enemy from focusing at Pleime) done" has its source here: "Just before he departed, Colonel Brown told us that we had done a great job but now that Tully's fresh battalion was coming in, along with two rifle companies of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cav, he would likely pull us out of X-Ray the following day." (Coleman, p. 202) Tnguyen4321 (talk) 21:55, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

So. The sentence combines the statement "the decision of postponing the attack" sourced from Nguyen Huu An with the statement "Brown told us we had done a great job but...he would...pull us out of X-Ray..." sourced from Coleman to create the statement that the battalion's job was to "...[draw] the attention of the enemy away from attacking Plei Me...", which neither of them say. How is that not WP:SYNTH? Factotem (talk) 17:48, 11 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Fact: Brown praised Moore for a job well done. What job? kill the enemy or distract the enemy? Obviously not kill. Fact: An stated that the insertion of Air Cav made him postpone the attack. If you deem my wording sound SYN, feel free to edit it in conserving the two facts.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 18:46, 11 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I've moved An's statement that the battle disrupted plans for an attack on Plei Me to the aftermath section, where that was already covered by a statement that the ARVN claimed it thus, and I've edited the above statement so that it says only that the job was deemed to have been done, without going into what that job was. I believe that to be a fair representation of what the sources say. Factotem (talk) 19:12, 11 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Fine with me.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 21:36, 11 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

2. Col. Brown has flown in to prepare the withdrawal of 1/7, but it later states that he intended to establish a forward command post with three battalions, one of which is to be 1/7. Contradiction?

You got it wrong: Brown flew in with the intention to establish a field brigade command post to control two 2/7 and 2/5 coming in to replace the 1/7 and allow it to withdraw. Moore did not understand Brown's intention of withdrawing the 1/7 and refused to bulge.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 21:55, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

3. Further, Col. Brown apparently intended to take over command of the battlefield, but left when Moore refused to relinquish command of his battalion. Are American Brigade commanders so easily diverted?

Moore not only refused to follow the order of Brown, but even dared to disobey Knows at division level and Depuy at MACV level of quitting the battlefield! It all spelled out in Moore's book, pp. 202-216.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 21:55, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I don't have access to either of the sources. I suspect the first is in Vietnamese only - if the purpose of the battle was indeed to draw attention away from Plei Me then I doubt that it will be too difficult to find an English source to support that. As for the second source, that's Hal Moore's book - I'd be interested to hear what he had to say, if anyone has access to his book. FactotEm (talk) 22:27, 29 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I cannot believe that you do not have a hold on Moore's book.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 21:55, 7 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I have Moore's book -- and let me weigh in. Page 202 of my edition says nothing about the job of "1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry deeming its job of drawing the attention of the enemy away from attacking Plei Mei." To the contrary, Moore says his job was "to find and kill the enemy" at a suspected "Enemy base camp" in the Ia Drang valley. (p. 51-52) The US forces had been attempting to find and kill the enemy since October 25 when the siege of Plei Me was lifted. Moore's job was search and destroy. Nothing more.

There was an official (find and kill the enemy) mission and a implicit (diversion) mission. The successive events unfolded at LZ X-Ray pointed to an execution of the latter rather than the previous one:

- First, on November 14, after closing in LZ X-Ray, Hal Moore did not advance forward in a sweeping move to find the enemy, but contented to secure the perimeter of the landing zone in a defensive posture.

- Second, when the enemy gave an assault with the size of two battalions, General Knowles did not react with a massive troop piling and contented to reinforce the defensive lines with just one battalion, the 2/7th Air Cavalry Battalion, and seemed to be satisfied when the enemy disengaged and withdrew on November 16 instead of pursuing the enemy.

- Third, instead of bringing more troops in preparation of a pursuit operation, General Knowles effectuated a troop rotation by relieving the 1/7th with the 2/5th Battalion to continue to secure LZ X-Ray.

- Four, on November 17, in order to make room for B-52 airstrikes, instead of a speedy helilifted troop extraction, General Knowles gave order to the 2/7th and 2/5th to march out of the landing zone toward LZ Columbus and LZ Albany respectively to "grab the tiger by its tail from another direction".

On Nov 15, around 9:30am, Brown praised Moore for a job well done. What job was that? Had Moore done with killing the two attacking troops of the 7th and 9th NVA battalions yet?Tnguyen4321 (talk) 23:39, 10 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Secondly, I don't find anything between pages 202 and 216 of Moore's book that says anything about a command problem between Moore and Brown. Nor do I find anything about Moore resisting evacuation. In fact (page 212), Moore says that he ordered "the evacuation organized and rolling." Please cite your source.

Moore wrote on page 216 of his book: Around midnight [November 15] Lieutenant Colonel Edward C. (Shy) Meyer, 3rd Brigade executive officer, passed me an astonishing message: General William Westmoreland 's headquarters wanted me to "leave X-Ray early the next morning for Saigon to brief him and his staff on the battle." I could not believe I was being ordered out before the battle was over! I was also perplexed that division or brigade HQ had not squelched such an incomprehensible order before it reached me. My place was clearly with my men. Then on page 217: Around 1:30 a.m., I got Shy Meyer on the radio and registered my objections to the order in no uncertain terms. I made it very clear that this battle was not over and that my place was with my men - that I was the first man of my battalion to set foot in this terrible killing ground and I damned well intended to be the last man to leave. That ended that. I heard no more on the matter.

This incident was also reported in the Daily Log of G3/IFFV, Nhatrang on November 15:- 21:05H : 1st Cav (Col Beaty): Lt Col Moore will arrive Saigon 1130 in morning (to brief Gen DePuy). Tnguyen4321 (talk) 00:18, 11 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

You're using a different edition of Moore's book than I am. That passage you cite is on page 200 and 201 in my book. In any case, it's not correct to say that Moore refused an order. Moore complained about an order, and the matter was dropped. Secondly, the source doesn't say that Moore had a problem with Brown. Nor does it say that the purpose of Ia Drang was to draw the attention of the enemy away from Plei Me. And, in my opinion, the whole paragraph could deleted with no loss to the article -- or could be used to point out the idiocy of Westmoreland's staff in bothering the commander in the middle of an operation. Typical, I'm afraid. [User:Smallchief|Smallchief ]] (talk) 00:52, 11 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I think that you misjudge and underestimate Westmoreland and Depuy in thinking they were that idiot "in bothering the commander in the middle of an operation". Why can you not see that they and Brown and Knowles had been patient in trying to make Moore understand the role of the Air Cav was over, and had to be pulled out to let the B-52's to do the killing. Brown hinted the Moore and his men will be pulled out the next day. Knowles went in in the afternoon to reiterate the withdrawal operation. When they felt that Moore did not seem to understand that, Depuy had to get involved and relieve Moore of his command under the pretext of needing him to go to Saigon to brief Depuy. That's a nice way to say, you are fired.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 03:07, 11 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

That's speculation on your part. Original research, which is not appropriate for Wikipedia. Smallchief (talk) 09:27, 11 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Discernment is called for here. This speculation/explanation on my part is addressed only on this talk page, not in the article page. It's appropriate for Wikipedia. At the article page, only sourced facts are presented.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 12:47, 11 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

This whole paragraph should be deleted. In addition to probably being in part or wholly incorrect, it's not important to the description of the Ia Drang battle.Smallchief (talk) 17:02, 10 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

The correctness of the whole paragraph is established above. It's important because it provides completeness to the Ia Drang battle.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 00:24, 11 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Nothing you said established anything in the paragraph as accurate -- and given that the references don't say what the text says, this is clearly a paragraph that should be deleted. Smallchief (talk) 23:53, 10 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Hope that you change your mind and retract this statement of yours after I have provided further clarification.Tnguyen4321 (talk) 00:24, 11 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

The three summary paragraphs for this article contain material that should not be in the summary paras. The most important facts about the battle are lost in details that are of little interest to the average reader.

The first summary para need not list every military unit involved in the battle. That material is in the infobox. Nor do we need to know in summary paras 2 and 3 the U.S. justification for the combat losses in the battle and the public relations response of Gen. Westmoreland. That stuff is interesting and relevant but can be summarized in a single sentence or two rather than two long -- overly long -- paragraphs. Nor do we need in the summary paras a long section on the literary and film history of the battle. A one sentence summary will suffice.

In my opinion, the three summary paragraphs should be shortened by more than one-half, the focus on important elements of the battle should be sharpened, and the material deleted from the summary paras should be put into the body of the article as appropriate. Any takers to do it? [[User:Smallchief|Smallchief]] ([[User talk:Smallchief|talk]] (talk) 11:32, 29 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Agreed, but the entire article is a bit of a mess, the result I think of some edit wars in the past. I'm going through slowly when I get the chance, but don't know when I can get round to the lead. FactotEm (talk) 11:47, 29 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Made a start, but it has some way to go yet. FactotEm (talk) 09:26, 30 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Think it's in a bit better shape now, but its completely missing any Vietnamese perspective, although that's probably true of most of the article anyway. FactotEm (talk) 11:19, 30 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Last sentence, 1st para, "Americans dig in for the night" section...
By nightfall, the battle had taken a heavy toll on Lt. Col. Moore's battalion: B/2/7 had taken 47 casualties (including one officer) and A Company had taken 34 casualties (including three officers); C company had taken only four casualties. (my emphasis)
Is the B/2/7 above a typo? Moore's Bn was 1/7. It's confusing because B Coy of the 2nd Bn 7th Cav had also just landed. Can't check the sources - none provided. FactotEm (talk) 21:19, 29 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

• Apparently. Probable source is Moore's book, page 142. I'll make the corrections and add reference. [[User:Smallchief|Smallchief]] ([[User talk:Smallchief|talk]] (talk) 23:19, 29 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

That's great. Thx. Do you have his book with you? Interested to hear whether p202 supports any of the information I copied to Dubious Statement number IV above, if you get the chance to have a peek. FactotEm (talk) 23:26, 29 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Page 202 does not mention Col. Tim Brown in the edition which I have. Page 194 mentions that General Knowles on 15 Nov planned to tell Col Brown to withdraw Moore's battalion (1/7) on 16 Nov for two days of rest and rehabilitation. There's no mention of Plei Me as a reason for the proposed withdrawal. In a quick look through the book, I don't find a suggestion of a command problem between Moore and Brown. In other words, I would say this para could be deleted from the article unless somebody can come up with a reliable source. [[User:Smallchief|Smallchief]] ([[User talk:Smallchief|talk]] (talk) 00:33, 30 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks. Not sure what to do with this para. I'll leave it there for now and see what comes up after a bit more research. FactotEm (talk) 09:28, 30 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

This 06:16, 1 November 2017‎ Day to day (Undid revision 807820029 by David J Johnson (talk) I did examine and can't see it in the source) should be undone. Here are the two references he could not see:

- "The initial request would include the general situation, target information, objective, distance from friendly forces, and contemplated ground follow-up, if any. If beacon emplacement was precluded by virtue of target locations, normal radar bombing techniques would be used. When a request was initiated, approval for the strike, MACV said, would be expedited to allow a TOT not later than 24 hours after the initial message was transmitted." (Meyan, p.9)

- "However, during November, the B-52s were used in a close-support role in conjunction with a major battle in the Ia Drang valley of Pleiku Province, involving the 1st Air Cavalry Division in Operation "Silver Bayonet," a bitter fight with North Vietnamese elements. On five consecutive days, beginning 17 November, strikes were conducted in the 1st Air Cav battle area. To meet these close-support needs, scheduled strikes in Binh Duong Province were deferred and, within 14 hours and 57 minutes of the COMUSMACV request, 18 B-52s launched from Guam to provide necessary support." (Meyan, p.23)

Tnguyen4321 (talk) 21:20, 9 December 2017 (UTC)[reply]

There is an issue with the Vietnamese casualty counts from the sourced material. The current Vietnamese side casualty counts are referenced correctly from the source "The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History. Spencer C. Tucker. ABC-CLIO. P. 529".

I looked at the references for that figure in the previoulsy mentioned source and found this "Pribbenow, Merle L. "The Fog of War: The Vietnamese View of the La Drang Battle." Military Review 81, no. 1 (Jan, 2001): 93-97. (Proquest)" the following link is a copy I found http://www.generalhieu.com/e66pleime-2.htm. In this referenced source I found the numbers mentioned however the numbers mentioned are for the claimed kills and wounded from the regional command on the Vietnamese side of the battle. The direct quote from this source is

"A 1966 Central Highlands Front report claimed that in five major engagements with US forces between 14 and 18 November 1965, NVA forces killed 559 soldiers and wounded 669."

I will admit it is oddly precise but that is the direct wording from the source. So a correction is needed but I have not found any updated figures from the Vietnamese side yet. Just a heads up to people on this article.

Cladors (talk) 17:16, 19 April 2018 (UTC)[reply]

LZ X-Ray 3 day battle Total Enemy dead 1,849 . LZ ALBANY 18 hour battle total enemy dead 553

total includes estimated enemy dead.

From Pleiku by J.D. Coleman

Pleiku page 249

Unlike LZ X-Ray 25% enemy were killed by rifle and machine-gun fire, 75% Artillery,Rockets,and Tac Air.

At LZ ALBANY, 90% of the enemy killed was killed by rifle and machine-gun fire, 10%Artillery and Tac Air.

LZ ALBANY unlike LZ X-Ray.

Pleiku page 249

2 Battles

LZ X-Ray, A defensive battle.

LZALBANY, A Meeting engagement head on.

LZ X-Ray, Hal G. Moore, 1st battalion 7th Cavalry, 14th -16 Nov 1965, an Air Assault on LZ X-Ray, a 3 day 2

nite battle, from a defensive position, A 360% perimeter, Moore never left his objective, LZ X-Ray.

1st day of the battle, reinforced by 1 company 2/7, McDade's Battalion.

LZ X-Ray Reinforced by 3 Battalions.

None of the reinforcements, At LZ X-Ray, Get credit for the enemy they killed.

Moore is told 10 minutes before lift off for LZ X-Ray, he was facing 1,500 enemy troops.

Moore didn't tell any one, his company commanders,or Crandall ( pilot lift helicopters )

page 199 We Were Soldiers Once and Young by Hal Moore.

1st version enemy dead ,weapons captured

enemy dead 834 by body count

estimated enemy killed, wounded 1,215

total enemy dead 2,049

captured enemy weapons 239

missing enemy weapons 1,810

2nd version enemy dead, weapons captured.

Moore on my own, I later cut back enemy dead to 634

estimated enemy killed wounded 1,215

TOTAL Enemy dead 1,849

TOTAL captured enemy weapons 239

634 enemy dead- 239= 395 missing enemy weapons

estimated missing enemy weapons 1,610.

25% enemy killed by was killed by rifle and machine-gun fire.

75% of the enemy killed was by Artillery, Rockets,and Tac Air.

page 199 We Were Soldiers Once and Young

captured enemy weapons, LZ X-Ray.

57 AK-47

54 SKS

17 auto rifles

4 heavy machine-guns

5 RPG rocket launchers

2 Mortar tubes

2 pistols

139 total undamaged weapons.

100 rifles and machine-guns, Engineers, picked up pieces of damaged weapons.

Engineers destroyed the weapons. Why? Hal G. Moore would want all of the weapons to show what he had

captured.

239 total weapons captured at LZ X-Ray.

Missing American weapons estimate 75 rifles 12 pistols, enemy was seen picking up American weapons, after

1 Moore's company was overran.

Pleiku page 248

LT.Col. Robert McDade

LZ ALBANY, an 18 hour battle. 1200hrs to 0600hrs, Nov. 17, 1965. To the morning of Nov,18, 1965

LT.Col. Robert McDade

The enemy was 1 kl away, was headed for another engagement.

A Meeting engagement, enemy and american's meet head on, in heavy folige a running gun battle.

75% of the enemy killed was killed by rifle and machine-gun fire.

25% Artillery, Rockets,and Tac Air.

None of the reinforcements, at LZ X-Ray, Get credit for the enemy they killed.

But at LZ ALBANY reinforcements do get credit for the enemy killed.

LZ ALBANY McDade's after action report enemy killed 303.

Attached units Get credit for the enemy they killed.

George Forrest, Tully attached units, Get credit for their enemy killed,100, bringing the enemy dead to 403

by body count. estimated 100, total enemy dead LZ ALBANY 504

page 249

And, unlike Landing Zone X-Ray, where so much of the damage was done by Artillery, Rockets,and Tac Air,

many of the NVA corpses found by search parties met their doom by Rifle and Machine-gun fire.

page 317 We Were Soldiers Once and Young by Hal Moore

captured enemy weapons at LZ ALBANY

112 rifles no AK47? I took apart 1 of the AK 47s, there was a lot of them in the pile.

 33 light machine-guns

  4     mortar tubes 

   2    RPG

   3    heavy machine-guns

154 total enemy weapons

enemy dead LZ ALBANY 403

estimated enemy dead ,wounded, 150.

total enemy dead 553

missing enemy weapons 339

LZ ALBANY, captured enemy weapons.

From Pleiku page 248

212 AK 47

39    light machine-guns

   6   mortars

   3 heavy machine-guns

   8 RPG

268  total captured enemy weapons.

Missing enemy weapons 236

Missing American weapons, 0. the enemy left the battle field before morning.

Hal G. Moore SHORTS LZ ALBANY 114 captured enemy weapons.

Hal G. Moore tacks on 50 estimated dead,wounded.

Russell L. Ross Dco. 2/7 RECON PLATOON 17 Nov 1965 — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2601:646:8901:C5A9:812A:74C3:4737:E139 (talk) 01:05, 26 November 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I recall that the M16's used at Ia Drang still used the IMR 4475 stick powder instead of the WC846 ball powder (which caused the M16's to jam). Thus the M16's were reliable at Ia Drang and contributed to success in battle along with artillery and air support. Anybody got any info on this? 75.4.34.74 (talk) 17:28, 21 September 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Hal Moore gave a statement to the press after the battle crediting the M16 as one of the factors that contributed to US success, so he clearly saw no issues with it. Mztourist (talk) 02:56, 7 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

"While medical evacuation helicopters (medevacs) were supposed to transport the battalion's increasing numbers of casualties, they evacuated only two before the pilots called off their mission under intense PAVN fire. Casualties were loaded onto the assault Hueys (lifting the battalion's forces to X-Ray), whose pilots carried load after load of wounded from the battlefield..."

In an interview with (air cav. helo pilot) Maj. Bruce Crandall (awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during the battle) at that time of the war, Medevacs helo's (by order) were not allowed to enter live ("red") battle zones, and had to wait until declared "green" (no shooting). It was his action with the threat (pulling a gun) to the officer in charge of the medevac units which changed this policy. I think this fact needs weaving in, as the actions of the medevac (at that time - 1965) were correct - they were following proper orders, not flying into hot zones. The medevacs helo's had only become involved at Crandell's (an air cav. officer) direction. Thus making the reference regarding helo medevac pilots' action is incorrect. Same goes for the "Medal of Honor" section "...while enemy fire was so heavy that medical evacuation helicopters refused to approach.". They did not refuse, their orders (at that time 1965) prohibited them to be involved. (though the reasoning needs explanation).

Is Ia Drang situated in what used to be, at the time, North Vietnam or South Vietnam? Thank you, Maikel (talk) 18:22, 4 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]

South Vietnam. Mztourist (talk) 02:54, 7 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

as of 11 May 2023, Fort Benning has been re-named Fort Moore, after Hal Moore. See 173d Memorial website for verification. Also includes 33x Australians 'who fell' - as a unit under 173d Brigade command - in '65-'66. photos and names listed on 'facebook'.

Colin Rayfield, 1 RAR '65-'66. (1st Bn - Royal Australian Regiment) 211.30.7.57 (talk) 04:23, 16 November 2023 (UTC)[reply]