All of us agree that some sentences are true and some are false. We further agree that the truth ... more All of us agree that some sentences are true and some are false. We further agree that the truth values of sentences are determined by two factors: language and reality. The truth of ‘Mount Everest is higher than Mont Blanc’ is due partly to the meanings of the expressions occurring in it, partly to the way things in fact are. If ‘Mount Everest’ meant Eiger, it would be false. It would also be false if Mount Everest were not actually higher than Mont Blanc. We also agree that the truth values of most sentences are in some sense independent of us. Of course, we may conspire to change the meanings of the words or transform the world and thereby change the truth values of the sentences, but if we keep the meanings fixed and the world unchanged, the truth values will be independent of our beliefs, desires, fears or hopes. We usually explain this independence by saying that reality, i. e. the way things are, is independent of us. The truth of the sentence ‘Mount Everest is higher than Mont Blanc’ is independent of us, because the fact that Mount Everest is higher than Mont Blanc does not depend on our beliefs, fears, desires, etc.
In recent articles in this journal Benoit Gaultier and John Biro have argued that the original Ge... more In recent articles in this journal Benoit Gaultier and John Biro have argued that the original Gettier cases and the ones closely modelled on them fail, and the reason for the failure is that the subject in these cases does not actually have the belief that would serve as a counterexample to the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge. They claim that if our evidence pertains to a particular individual (as in the first case) or to the truth of one of the disjuncts (as in the second case), we do not genuinely believe the existential generalization or the disjunction which logically follows. I will challenge their arguments and suggest that our unwillingness to assert the existential generalization or the disjunction under these conditions does not stem from lack of belief but from pragmatic principles.
Argumentation theory used to be concerned exclusively with verbal arguments, but in recent years ... more Argumentation theory used to be concerned exclusively with verbal arguments, but in recent years visual argumentation has become a new field of study. After explaining why the notion of visual argument makes sense, we will explore how visual arguments can be reconstructed and compare this with the reconstruction of verbal arguments. We will argue that the reconstruction of visual argumentation follows broadly the same method as that of verbal argumentation. Finally we are going to show how the steps of reconstruction look like in practice by analyzing the visual arguments presented in a commercial for a Dove cosmetic product.
Margitay, Tihamér and Fehér, Márta and Forrai, Gábor and Kutrovátz, Gábor and Laki, János and Tan... more Margitay, Tihamér and Fehér, Márta and Forrai, Gábor and Kutrovátz, Gábor and Laki, János and Tanács, János and Zemplén, Gábor (2006) Externális tényezők a tudományban és a tudásban = External Factors in Science and Knowledge. Project Report. OTKA.
Kutatásunk a filozófia 20. század eleji nyelvi fordulatáról szóló közismert tézist akképp módosít... more Kutatásunk a filozófia 20. század eleji nyelvi fordulatáról szóló közismert tézist akképp módosította, hogy a 17., s még inkább a 18. századról szólva nem kevésbé értelmes a filozófia "nyelvi fordulatáról" szólnunk, mint ahogyan ezt szokásosan a 20. századról beszélve tesszük. Ezt a tézist kiegészítettük azzal, hogy nem indokolt a nyelvfilozófiát alapvetően az angolszász vagy az analitikus filozófiai hagyományhoz sem kötni: ha itt különbséget teszünk az analitikus és más gondolkodásmódok (pl. fenomenológiai, hermeneutikai stb. gondolkodásmód) között, akkor ez inkább a filozofálás nyelvében, mint a nyelv filozófiájában mutatkozik meg. A nyelvi fordulatról szóló tézisünk nemzetközi szinten is új eredmény, noha természetesen vannak előzményei. A második gondolat ugyan lassan kezd polgárjogot nyerni akár még az angol nyelvű könyvkiadásban is, ám Magyarországon csak elvétve reprezentált, a tényleges kutatás sokkal inkább szétválik irányzatok szerint. | The prevalent view that t...
Boros, Gábor and Bizáczki Varga, Balázs and Blum, Paul Richard and Csejtei, Dezső and Dékány, And... more Boros, Gábor and Bizáczki Varga, Balázs and Blum, Paul Richard and Csejtei, Dezső and Dékány, András and Faragó-Szabó, István and Forrai, Gábor and Losonczi, Péter and Moldvay, Tamás and Pavlovits, Tamás and Schmal, Dániel and Trencsényi, Balázs and ...
gabor@fi lozofi a.bme.hu The paper seeks to show that the theory of strategic maneuvering, the mo... more gabor@fi lozofi a.bme.hu The paper seeks to show that the theory of strategic maneuvering, the most recent version of the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, can make vital contribution to understanding how commercials are designed and defended against legal challenges. If commercials can be subjected to argumentation-theoretic analysis, that would also show that the idea that commercials never constitute genuine arguments is mistaken. We will begin by sketching the pragma-dialectical approach and the theory of strategic maneuvering, then we apply the latter to two cases: the argument in a commercial aiming to persuade customers that Dove Intensive Cream moisturizes better than Nivea's similar product, and the argument given by Dove's manufacturer, Unilever, during the proceedings conducted by the Hungarian Competition Authority, which is intended to convince the Authority that the commercial is not deceptive.
Persuasion dialogue
sometimes helps us to clarify our
ideas; this paper attempts to find out
what... more Persuasion dialogue sometimes helps us to clarify our ideas; this paper attempts to find out what this kind of clarification consists in. After examining Walton’s analysis of the maieutic function of persuasion dialogue it concludes that it offers little help in understanding the phenomenon in question and proposes that clarifying our ideas consists in replacing narrowly individuated views with ones which improve the coherence of one’s views and retain elements of the earlier views. It also argues that the clarification of our ideas so conceived is not one of the main goals of persuasion dialogue but rather an accidental even if welcome side effect.
Court decisions on defamation cases often hinge on the question whether the utterances the plain... more Court decisions on defamation cases often hinge on the question whether the utterances the plaintiff finds damaging to his or her reputation qualify as statements of facts or statements of opinion. Generally speaking, statements of opinion enjoy a much higher level of legal protection (notwithstanding the significant differences between different jurisdictions). False allegations of a factual nature which bring the plaintiff into disrepute are sanctioned by compensatory or even punitive damages, whereas false opinions, however disparaging they may be, are immune to sanctions (unless special conditions obtain). The distinction raises two kinds of concerns. One is the more philosophical issue is whether the discrimination is indeed a reasonable one, for it does not correspond to any of the well-established dichotomies of classes of statements, e.g. the fact-value dichotomy. The second one is a practical issue of how one may argue that a particular utterance falls into one category rather than the other. Judges, trial lawyers and legal theorists all agree that the distinction is extremely different to apply in practice. As to the first issue, I will argue that the distinction makes sense as it is based on a plausible normative model of how our opinions of others should be formed in light of what is said about them. This idea will be spelled out in argumentative terms: in a dialogue concerning the moral standing of a particular person a statement of fact limits the choice of arguments the defender of the person’s moral character may utilize. As to the second to issue, I will show that there are certain types of good but defeasible arguments pointing towards one or the other conclusion. Having a look at these argument types also explains why the distinction is so difficult to apply.
All of us agree that some sentences are true and some are false. We further agree that the truth ... more All of us agree that some sentences are true and some are false. We further agree that the truth values of sentences are determined by two factors: language and reality. The truth of ‘Mount Everest is higher than Mont Blanc’ is due partly to the meanings of the expressions occurring in it, partly to the way things in fact are. If ‘Mount Everest’ meant Eiger, it would be false. It would also be false if Mount Everest were not actually higher than Mont Blanc. We also agree that the truth values of most sentences are in some sense independent of us. Of course, we may conspire to change the meanings of the words or transform the world and thereby change the truth values of the sentences, but if we keep the meanings fixed and the world unchanged, the truth values will be independent of our beliefs, desires, fears or hopes. We usually explain this independence by saying that reality, i. e. the way things are, is independent of us. The truth of the sentence ‘Mount Everest is higher than Mont Blanc’ is independent of us, because the fact that Mount Everest is higher than Mont Blanc does not depend on our beliefs, fears, desires, etc.
In recent articles in this journal Benoit Gaultier and John Biro have argued that the original Ge... more In recent articles in this journal Benoit Gaultier and John Biro have argued that the original Gettier cases and the ones closely modelled on them fail, and the reason for the failure is that the subject in these cases does not actually have the belief that would serve as a counterexample to the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge. They claim that if our evidence pertains to a particular individual (as in the first case) or to the truth of one of the disjuncts (as in the second case), we do not genuinely believe the existential generalization or the disjunction which logically follows. I will challenge their arguments and suggest that our unwillingness to assert the existential generalization or the disjunction under these conditions does not stem from lack of belief but from pragmatic principles.
Argumentation theory used to be concerned exclusively with verbal arguments, but in recent years ... more Argumentation theory used to be concerned exclusively with verbal arguments, but in recent years visual argumentation has become a new field of study. After explaining why the notion of visual argument makes sense, we will explore how visual arguments can be reconstructed and compare this with the reconstruction of verbal arguments. We will argue that the reconstruction of visual argumentation follows broadly the same method as that of verbal argumentation. Finally we are going to show how the steps of reconstruction look like in practice by analyzing the visual arguments presented in a commercial for a Dove cosmetic product.
Margitay, Tihamér and Fehér, Márta and Forrai, Gábor and Kutrovátz, Gábor and Laki, János and Tan... more Margitay, Tihamér and Fehér, Márta and Forrai, Gábor and Kutrovátz, Gábor and Laki, János and Tanács, János and Zemplén, Gábor (2006) Externális tényezők a tudományban és a tudásban = External Factors in Science and Knowledge. Project Report. OTKA.
Kutatásunk a filozófia 20. század eleji nyelvi fordulatáról szóló közismert tézist akképp módosít... more Kutatásunk a filozófia 20. század eleji nyelvi fordulatáról szóló közismert tézist akképp módosította, hogy a 17., s még inkább a 18. századról szólva nem kevésbé értelmes a filozófia "nyelvi fordulatáról" szólnunk, mint ahogyan ezt szokásosan a 20. századról beszélve tesszük. Ezt a tézist kiegészítettük azzal, hogy nem indokolt a nyelvfilozófiát alapvetően az angolszász vagy az analitikus filozófiai hagyományhoz sem kötni: ha itt különbséget teszünk az analitikus és más gondolkodásmódok (pl. fenomenológiai, hermeneutikai stb. gondolkodásmód) között, akkor ez inkább a filozofálás nyelvében, mint a nyelv filozófiájában mutatkozik meg. A nyelvi fordulatról szóló tézisünk nemzetközi szinten is új eredmény, noha természetesen vannak előzményei. A második gondolat ugyan lassan kezd polgárjogot nyerni akár még az angol nyelvű könyvkiadásban is, ám Magyarországon csak elvétve reprezentált, a tényleges kutatás sokkal inkább szétválik irányzatok szerint. | The prevalent view that t...
Boros, Gábor and Bizáczki Varga, Balázs and Blum, Paul Richard and Csejtei, Dezső and Dékány, And... more Boros, Gábor and Bizáczki Varga, Balázs and Blum, Paul Richard and Csejtei, Dezső and Dékány, András and Faragó-Szabó, István and Forrai, Gábor and Losonczi, Péter and Moldvay, Tamás and Pavlovits, Tamás and Schmal, Dániel and Trencsényi, Balázs and ...
gabor@fi lozofi a.bme.hu The paper seeks to show that the theory of strategic maneuvering, the mo... more gabor@fi lozofi a.bme.hu The paper seeks to show that the theory of strategic maneuvering, the most recent version of the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, can make vital contribution to understanding how commercials are designed and defended against legal challenges. If commercials can be subjected to argumentation-theoretic analysis, that would also show that the idea that commercials never constitute genuine arguments is mistaken. We will begin by sketching the pragma-dialectical approach and the theory of strategic maneuvering, then we apply the latter to two cases: the argument in a commercial aiming to persuade customers that Dove Intensive Cream moisturizes better than Nivea's similar product, and the argument given by Dove's manufacturer, Unilever, during the proceedings conducted by the Hungarian Competition Authority, which is intended to convince the Authority that the commercial is not deceptive.
Persuasion dialogue
sometimes helps us to clarify our
ideas; this paper attempts to find out
what... more Persuasion dialogue sometimes helps us to clarify our ideas; this paper attempts to find out what this kind of clarification consists in. After examining Walton’s analysis of the maieutic function of persuasion dialogue it concludes that it offers little help in understanding the phenomenon in question and proposes that clarifying our ideas consists in replacing narrowly individuated views with ones which improve the coherence of one’s views and retain elements of the earlier views. It also argues that the clarification of our ideas so conceived is not one of the main goals of persuasion dialogue but rather an accidental even if welcome side effect.
Court decisions on defamation cases often hinge on the question whether the utterances the plain... more Court decisions on defamation cases often hinge on the question whether the utterances the plaintiff finds damaging to his or her reputation qualify as statements of facts or statements of opinion. Generally speaking, statements of opinion enjoy a much higher level of legal protection (notwithstanding the significant differences between different jurisdictions). False allegations of a factual nature which bring the plaintiff into disrepute are sanctioned by compensatory or even punitive damages, whereas false opinions, however disparaging they may be, are immune to sanctions (unless special conditions obtain). The distinction raises two kinds of concerns. One is the more philosophical issue is whether the discrimination is indeed a reasonable one, for it does not correspond to any of the well-established dichotomies of classes of statements, e.g. the fact-value dichotomy. The second one is a practical issue of how one may argue that a particular utterance falls into one category rather than the other. Judges, trial lawyers and legal theorists all agree that the distinction is extremely different to apply in practice. As to the first issue, I will argue that the distinction makes sense as it is based on a plausible normative model of how our opinions of others should be formed in light of what is said about them. This idea will be spelled out in argumentative terms: in a dialogue concerning the moral standing of a particular person a statement of fact limits the choice of arguments the defender of the person’s moral character may utilize. As to the second to issue, I will show that there are certain types of good but defeasible arguments pointing towards one or the other conclusion. Having a look at these argument types also explains why the distinction is so difficult to apply.
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Papers by Gábor Forrai
sometimes helps us to clarify our
ideas; this paper attempts to find out
what this kind of clarification consists
in. After examining Walton’s
analysis of the maieutic function of
persuasion dialogue it concludes that
it offers little help in understanding
the phenomenon in question and
proposes that clarifying our ideas
consists in replacing narrowly individuated
views with ones which
improve the coherence of one’s
views and retain elements of the
earlier views. It also argues that the
clarification of our ideas so conceived
is not one of the main goals
of persuasion dialogue but rather an
accidental even if welcome side
effect.
The distinction raises two kinds of concerns. One is the more philosophical issue is whether the discrimination is indeed a reasonable one, for it does not correspond to any of the well-established dichotomies of classes of statements, e.g. the fact-value dichotomy. The second one is a practical issue of how one may argue that a particular utterance falls into one category rather than the other. Judges, trial lawyers and legal theorists all agree that the distinction is extremely different to apply in practice.
As to the first issue, I will argue that the distinction makes sense as it is based on a plausible normative model of how our opinions of others should be formed in light of what is said about them. This idea will be spelled out in argumentative terms: in a dialogue concerning the moral standing of a particular person a statement of fact limits the choice of arguments the defender of the person’s moral character may utilize.
As to the second to issue, I will show that there are certain types of good but defeasible arguments pointing towards one or the other conclusion. Having a look at these argument types also explains why the distinction is so difficult to apply.
sometimes helps us to clarify our
ideas; this paper attempts to find out
what this kind of clarification consists
in. After examining Walton’s
analysis of the maieutic function of
persuasion dialogue it concludes that
it offers little help in understanding
the phenomenon in question and
proposes that clarifying our ideas
consists in replacing narrowly individuated
views with ones which
improve the coherence of one’s
views and retain elements of the
earlier views. It also argues that the
clarification of our ideas so conceived
is not one of the main goals
of persuasion dialogue but rather an
accidental even if welcome side
effect.
The distinction raises two kinds of concerns. One is the more philosophical issue is whether the discrimination is indeed a reasonable one, for it does not correspond to any of the well-established dichotomies of classes of statements, e.g. the fact-value dichotomy. The second one is a practical issue of how one may argue that a particular utterance falls into one category rather than the other. Judges, trial lawyers and legal theorists all agree that the distinction is extremely different to apply in practice.
As to the first issue, I will argue that the distinction makes sense as it is based on a plausible normative model of how our opinions of others should be formed in light of what is said about them. This idea will be spelled out in argumentative terms: in a dialogue concerning the moral standing of a particular person a statement of fact limits the choice of arguments the defender of the person’s moral character may utilize.
As to the second to issue, I will show that there are certain types of good but defeasible arguments pointing towards one or the other conclusion. Having a look at these argument types also explains why the distinction is so difficult to apply.