The Demand for Student-Athlete Labor and the Supply of Violations in the NCAA

Jill Harris

No 1115, Working Papers from International Association of Sports Economists, North American Association of Sports Economists

Abstract: The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) acts as a cartel with monopsony power in the market for student-athletes. This paper models the demand for student-athlete labor using a Mill-Edgeworth-Marshall reciprocal demand model. The reciprocal demand translates into a supply of violations (or cheating) on the NCAA cartel agreement. A theoretical foundation for this simultaneous system is created and an empirical model is estimated using a maximum likelihood estimator on violations data from Division IA basketball, baseball, and football programs from 5 conferences. Results suggest market power is significant in explaining some of the variation in the supply of violations. Since detecting and deterring cheating is costly, information about the supply of violations is useful.

Keywords: NCAA; monopsony rent; cartel; reciprocal demand; cheating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 J42 L13 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2011-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spe:wpaper:1115

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