Network Competition and Network Regulation

Lucía Quesada

No 13_2001, UADE Working Papers from Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa

Abstract: The competitive structure of the telecommunication sector is changing all over the world. Competition is being introduced in the long-distance segments while the local markets remain in general under the control of a (group of) regulated monopolies. This paper tries to find the optimal regulation in the monopoly sector and the optimal access price, taking into account the effects of the competition between networks, any access price plays a role in that it allows the regulator to indirectly control prices in the unregulated segment. We show that, there is no loss of generality in making the access pcices for originating or terminating a call equal. Moreover, under complete information, if networks are poor substitutes, the optimal access price is lower than the marginal cost of access. Under asymmetric information, two effects work in opposite directions. On the one hand, access price is reduced with respect to marginal cost to induce a reduction in final price. On the other hand, access price is increased with respect to marginal cost to give incentives to reveal information.

Keywords: telecommunication sector; regulated monopolies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L50 L90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2001-07-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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