Ownership, Agency and Wages: An Examination of the Fast Food Industry

No 606, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.

Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of wages and fringe benefits in the fast food industry- The focus of the paper is on exploring differences between company-owned and franchised restaurants because agency problems are likely to affect the management and operation of company-owned restaurants- Empirical analysis of two data sets finds that total labor compensation for non-management employees is slightly greater at company-owned outlets than franchisee-owned outlets, all else held constant. Furthermore, workers' wages grow more rapidly over time at company-owned restaurants than franchisee-owned restaurants- In addition, the results suggest that wage differentials for race, sex and marital status are small in the fast food industry relative to other industries.

Keywords: agency; efficiency wages; fast food; wage differentials (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987-09
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Related works:
Working Paper: Ownership, Agency and Wages: An Examination in the Fast Food Industry (1990)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:indrel:226

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