Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Philip Reny's approach to games with discontinuous utility functions can work outside its original context. The existence of Nash equilibrium and the possibility to approach the equilibrium set with a finite number of individual improvements are established, under conditions weaker than the better reply security, for three classes of strategic games: potential games, games with strategic complements, and aggregative games with appropriate monotonicity conditions.

Keywords: discontinuous game; potential game; Bertrand competition; strategic complements; aggregative game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81460/1/MPRA_paper_81460.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82802/1/MPRA_paper_82802.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:81460

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