Strategically Equivalent Contests

Subhasish Chowdhury and Roman Sheremeta

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research.

Keywords: rent-seeking; contest; equivalence; contest design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategically equivalent contests (2015)
Working Paper: Strategically Equivalent Contests (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:55450

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