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How Rebellion Expands? From Periphery to Heartland

Keisuke Nakao

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: While the theoretical literature maintains that strategic coordination is one of the keys to successful rebellion, anti-governmental campaigns are not necessarily synchronized across rebel groups in observed civil wars. To resolve this discrepancy, we develop a dynamic and spatial model of rebellion that illustrates patterns of contagious challenges against a government. As battles evolve, more rebels are inclined to "bandwagon," joining the ongoing war because the government is gradually revealed to be weak and because accumulated challenges shift the balance of power away from the government. Our theory also addresses why rebel movements often spread across the periphery and can eventually reach the heartland as if a siege shrinks. We delineate four geographic patterns of rebellion and then classify into them the Yugoslav Wars and other historical incidents.

Keywords: bandwagoning; geopolitics; expansion of rebellion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-10-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50546/1/MPRA_paper_50546.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50569/8/MPRA_paper_50569.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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