Incentive Effects of Pensions

No 1126, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Many different types of pension plans exist in American firms. The stipulations of plans vary dramatically, even among large firms, with respect to vesting, relationship of the pension to final salary, maximum and minimum years of service constraints, and maximum and minimum benefit levels. These provisions are examined to determine their effects on worker behavior.Specifically, the paper analyes which plans encourage or discourage appropriate worker responses in hours worked, turnover, human capital investment and effort. An attempt is made to explain the provisions in light of the findings.

Date: 1983-05
Note: PE LS
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published as Lazear, Edward P. "Incentive Effects of Pensions." Pension, Labor, and Individual Choice, edited by David A. Wise. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (1985), pp. 253-282.
Published as Incentive Effects of Pensions , Edward P. Lazear. in Pensions, Labor, and Individual Choice , Wise. 1985

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w1126.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Chapter: Incentive Effects of Pensions (1985)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1126

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w1126

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().