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Insurance demand under ambiguity and conflict for extreme risks: Evidence from a large representative survey

Théodora Dupont-Courtade ()
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Théodora Dupont-Courtade: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.cnrs.fr

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: This paper investigates how the general public behaves when confronted with low probability events and ambiguity in an insurance context. It reports the results of a questionnaire completed by a large representative sample of the French population that aims at separating attitudes toward risk, imprecision and conflict and at determining if there is a demand for ambiguous and extreme event risks. The data show a strong distinction between two aspects of the problem: the decision of purchasing insurance and the willingness to pay. In the decision to insure, more than 25% of the respondents refuse to buy insurance and people are more willing to insure in a risky situation than in an ambiguous one. This certain taste for risk can be explained by the respondents' observable characteristics. In addition, it highlights a lack of confidence in the insurance markets. When it comes to willingness to pay, people exhibit ambiguity seeking behaviors. They are willing to pay more under risk than under ambiguity (embracing here imprecision and conflict), revealing that people consider ambiguous situations as inferior. Furthermore, respondents behave differently under imprecision and conflict. They exhibit a preference for consensual information and dislike conflicts. However, the willingness to pay is poorly correlated with observable characteristics

Keywords: Ambiguity; imprecision; conflict; decision making; extreme risk; insurance demand; willingness to pay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D81 D83 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-ias and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2012/12020.pdf (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12020

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